> >
> > If you can represent it as a set, then it is a set.
> >
>
> >> That doesn't mean the universe "is" a set. To say that something can
> >> be represented as a set for purposes of defining truth-values of
> >> sentences is a very different thing from saying it IS a set.
> >>
> >
> > I disagree. I think these are exactly the same
> > thing to say. To say that a collection is a set
> > is to say nothing about it at all.
> >
>
>In many philosophical contexts it is important to keep *sets* (abstract
>non-temporal entities)
>
>[Chris Partridge] I believe David Lewis (In Plurarity of Worlds) rails
>against this interpretation. He sees sets (especially small finite sets
>whose members are not scattered) as clearly concrete, with an obvious
>spatio-temporal location. Can I put that on people's reading lists :-). (01)
Lewis's book Parts of Classes does indeed draw set theory and
mereology closer together, in a beautiful way -- but he does not
think that sets are concrete -- nor that they are 'clearly' anything;
on the contrary he insists that they are a great mystery. (02)
The parts of the class {Chris Menzel, Pat Hayes} include: {Chris
Menzel} and {Pat Hayes}. The parts of Chris Menzel include his
molecules. Chris Menzel is not a part, but rather an element of
{Chris Menzel}. The former is concrete. The latter is, well, anybody's guess.
BS (03)
_________________________________________________________________
Message Archives: http://ontolog.cim3.net/forum/ontolog-forum/
Subscribe/Config: http://ontolog.cim3.net/mailman/listinfo/ontolog-forum/
Unsubscribe: mailto:ontolog-forum-leave@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Shared Files: http://ontolog.cim3.net/file/
Community Wiki: http://ontolog.cim3.net/wiki/
To Post: mailto:ontolog-forum@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx (04)
|