Tom and Rich, (01)
I certainly agree with that point: (02)
TJ
> the internalist/externalist argument among cognitive scientists
> (the "brain in a vat" discussions) are orthogonal to the
> connectionist/representationalist argument. (03)
But I don't believe that induction is a riddle: (04)
TJ
> a level at which we can begin to understand how we could solve
> such representationalist issues as the riddle of induction. (05)
The people who think that induction is a riddle are so enamored with
deduction that they think that all reasoning should be algorithmic.
But deduction cannot generate anything new. It can only work out
the details of what we had already discovered by induction, assumed
by abduction, tested by trial and error -- and repeat, and repeat... (06)
For more about that cycle, skip to slides 41 to 46 of (07)
http://www.jfsowa.com/talks/micai.pdf
Why has AI failed? And how can it succeed? (08)
I posted micai.pdf earlier, but I recently added more slides
at the end. That cycle, which is based on Peirce's "logic of
pragmatism", captures the essence of all reasoning -- from
the so called "commonsense" to the most advanced science. (09)
For the more advanced issues, see the talk I presented in April: (010)
http://www.jfsowa.com/talks/ppe.pdf
Peirce, Polya, and Euclid:
Integrating Logic, Heuristics, and Geometry (011)
These slides show the relationship of induction, abduction, deduction,
and analogy to perception. (012)
TJ
> [Gärdenfors's] work (in Chapter 7 of Conceptual Spaces) makes it
> something more than a metaphor. But until its connection (pardon the
> pun) to the ANN paradigm is better articulated, it remains a mediational
> layer between representationalism and connectionism whose "connection"
> to connectionism remains unestablished. (013)
My major complaint about that work is the implication that there are
only three major paradigms. There are *infinitely many* paradigms.
I like to quote the slogan of the psychologists: "Beware of anybody
who has a one-factor theory." (014)
An article "The Amazing Teen Brain" in the June issue of _Scientific
American_ summarizes the issues. It's only 5 pages long, but it shows
the complexity. The three models that PG discusses each have a small
grain of truth, a larger amount of falsity, and many more unknowns. (015)
RC
> I took [PG's definition of the symbolic approach] to mean
> mathematically modeled by Turing machines, but NOBODY except
> mathematicians and philosophers with lots of time on their
> hands actually programs TMs. (016)
PG was using TMs as a generic representative of anything running
on any digital computer. In his examples, he cited Fodor and
other advocates of symbolic methods in AI. But that ignores the
huge differences ranging from Roger Schank to Richard Montague. (017)
In any case, there are many related issues in the fruit-fly thread.
I'll reply to them later. (018)
John (019)
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