To: | "[ontolog-forum]" <ontolog-forum@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> |
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From: | William Frank <williamf.frank@xxxxxxxxx> |
Date: | Mon, 24 Feb 2014 18:43:55 -0500 |
Message-id: | <CALuUwtB5SB2O2QyczXdR7HJ3XcEoDBqMe5CeoCk0cySQYx0j7A@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx> |
On Mon, Feb 24, 2014 at 5:03 PM, Barkmeyer, Edward J <edward.barkmeyer@xxxxxxxx> wrote:
Yes.
Yes, of course, between the things that are true by definition, such as mercury is a metal, and those that are true by observation, such as there is 1 cc of mercury in this thermometer. Of course, the line between analytic and synthetic knowledge is famously difficult to get too precise about. But, for practical purposes, in a given domain, we can pretty easily figure out where we want to draw the line, if we have learned about definitions, etc. I think that my Wittgenstein quote gave the wrong impression, as does some of Halpin's early writing. A conceptual model shows how **concepts** in a domain are related to each other, so that for members of the knoweldge community, there will be large agreement that things MUST be that way. Squares have four equal sides and four equal angles. Contracts have parties to the contracts, each of whom have rights and obligations under the contract. I think that conceptual models are prescriptive within a community. For me, a 'fact base' has a set of synthetic assertions that are taken to be true, but might not be true. There is a contract C between Exon and Royal Dutch Petrolium. These are descriptive, not prescriptive. Again, names of individuals give some trouble, because unless they are defined as functions or properties as the result of something akin to a lamda operator, or are stipulated as an axiom, like the existence of the number zero or the empty string, then we can only prove that there is a unique x that necessarily exists, such as the unique number that is the sucessor of 3, and give it a name, via something equivelent to an iota operation. Otherwise, names (or 0-order relations, ***are just hanging out**, waiting for a job, given to them by a particular interpretation of the theory. I have found that what is taken to exist of necessity is very domain dependent. For example, in the domain of U.S. law, we might take the fact that there is a unique court called the supreme court as part of the domain concept model. Of course, in the domain of the theory of legal systems, I would NOT expect the existence of the supreme court to be taken as an axiom.
Second, what I am asserting is that ONE PERSON"S set of necessary assertions, (a prescription -- if you want to play chess, these are the rules, if you want to do natural number arithmetic, these are the rules) in one context, is ANOTHER PERSON's fact base, in a different context. For example, I can **describe** the set of concepts and relations used by alchemists, without a personal commiment to the sense of the whole thing. This would be, to me, a fact base about their conceptual scheme. I think this is legitimate 'going all meta'. OTOH, If I am constructing a domain ontology for use by minerologists, following interviews, literature reviews, etc. I am proposing a prescription for the conceptual relations in the language. As a description, the counterexamples will be the mere fact that someone in the community is using the terms differently. (Not everybody plays cricket this way) As prescription, the counterexamples will be that there is something ineffective about following these rules (these damn rules will cause cricket matches to take days to play!).
Well, without the 'just' for sure. John Sowa is an entity I happen to know about in my fact domain. Person and Writes are part of my conceptual model.
ABSOLUTELY!! there is the rub.
I disagree. The glue needed is only (or just?) Logical glue, no domain content. As in John's example: John Sowa HAS AS A PROPERTY maleness. Would be a synthetic statement, while A Husband HAS AS A PROPERTY maleness would be analytic, in may domains. and A CAR HAS AS AN AFFORDANCE carrying passengers on a road. would also be analytic, in most domains. So, parts, affordances, properties, subtypes, etc., are part of the logical glue of ANY domain.
Exactly. And, x IS A ROLE IN y is another part of the logical, domain independent glue, so, while I start with common logic, I would not end there. I Alternatively, the <role> entities can participate in a fixed ternary relation: Participation(relation entity, <role> entity, role player entity), where Participation itself is not an entity. Yes, I agree fully. I am only saying the domain specific things, like courts and lawyers and defendents and jurisdictions and trials and attorneys for the prossecution and objections are all thingies. I do not think that quantifiers, variables, boolean connectives, modal operators, speech act operators, part-whole, inclusion, is a role in, are entities, in the domain of discourse of law. (They could be in the domain of discourse of mathematical logic, or discussions about the elments of an ontology, such as this discussion.) And similarly, you can create hasProperty(owning entity, property entity, property value entity). This turns the glue into a fixed part of your language, as distinct from a user-defined set of Relations and/or Properties. EXACTLY!!!
ah, but this is exactly what one wants to avoid!!! Property entity symbols vs. role entity symbols break our symbols up according to the parts of speech. Now, I need to have a separat symbol for the color blue, the property blue, and the role of blue in the frame x agent is coloring affected y color z. every instance of either of the above ternary relations is one RDF triple in which the “verb” is the role or property entity. That is,
Ah, this is the question I was afraid to ask, because the answer would be too complicated. As I have said, I can use my sematics with UML diagrams, and hang the 'fathers'. I wondered, how about RDF, how about OWL? I would have guessed so.
SURE. My point (stated again) is, there is no semantic difference between nouns and verbs! Noun and verb is a part of speech, only. Parts of speech jump all over. To be silent is a verb in German. There is no such verb in English. Silence is the concept. I can apply it as I will, in different frames.
Of course, one can MAP most any language to any other. We can use 1s and 0s, or even just 1s. But we don't, why not?
I would agree, but also,
In UML, it does not. I bet not 1 in 1000 users of UML understand the convoluted official semantics, with all its distinctions. For people to understand, we want a theory with 5 to 9 primitives. And, how many primitives we choose is up to US.
Exactly. I am with you.
I agree there too, ONLY, that particular semantic intuition is not as universal as one would think, and not that useful in many contexts. I am, by this time, so convinced that ROLES are a much more flexible, easier to understand for the truly unitiated in ER modelling, that are attributes, and all the 'keys' that go with them.
Again, this seems to be because you think I don't want semantic intuitions. I do, I just want more fundamental, easier for the average speaker of malagasy, tagalog, latin, or greek to understand.
I could not agree more. I am with you even more that you are with you, maybe. I believe that INTENTION and ACCOUNTABILITY rule! Not formal mathematics. One person here used the word agent to mean, I think, a responsible party. I think that responsible party is a human primitive concept. But, to think that Peter Chen discovered the BEST semantic intuitions for conceptual modelling, back in 1972, so that we should change the calandar to BPC and APC, is more than highly questionable. What I have been trying to describe these last few days is that there is a whole hafl century of study of the fundamental categories of human though that leaves E/R in the dust. So, the point is now, let us stop trying to REFINE a weak model of semantic intuitions, and find a new, richer one. I have to say, it seems that at the beginning, you used the word 'just' on my introduction of common logic ideas, and then used that straw man to paint a picture entirely opposite of my views! Thanks for this highly stimulating exchange. Wm
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