On Fri, May 24, 2013 18:34, Ali H wrote:
> If I might belatedly wade in an attempt to clear up some of my own
> confusion wrt this thread... (01)
I like this analysis. (02)
> Especially for social constructs, we all agree(?) that it is exactly the
> physical representations which keep the social construct "alive" or
> "accessible". Without these physical markings (ID badges, contract), and
> some mental representation in people's heads, or bits on a computer, the
> organization ceases to exist. If no physical thing contains a trace of
> said organization, then it doesn't really exist, does it? (03)
No. The existence of some mental representation in people's heads
is key. If only the signs existed, but there was no way for people to
determine what they represent it would seem strange to say that
the organization or account exists. (04)
> The fact that my
> colleagues and I can discuss the organization is at least predicated on a
> physical representation of said organization in our brains,
> and perhaps complemented by a variety of other markers. (05)
Agreed. The fact that my colleagues and I can discuss tigers,
the Empire State Building, and the Sun is at least predicated on a
physical representation of said objects in our brains. (06)
> Those representations may have gained genesis via some contract that we
> signed (also physical), yet their social existence and acceptance rests on
> the physical representations of such an agreement, whether internally in
> the heads of the people who recognize the existence of the organization,
> or some external representation. (07)
You would certainly find people (not me) who argue that a representation
of something in someone's mind is a physical representation. (08)
Note that representations are normally different from the things
represented. How is the representation of a tiger, the Empire State
Building, or the Sun in my mind any different from the representation
of an organization in my mind? (09)
> Similarly, regarding an electronic bank account - if the bits located on a
> server somewhere are somehow deleted, then it is only the representation
> in my head that I actually *had* $X in some bank account, which is my
> evidence of possession. (010)
Unless you had other physical representations: paper statements or
computer files (011)
> And perhaps a trace of physical events (i.e. a glitch in the
> server, a hacker attack etc.) which can then verify my claim. Without
> either of those physical extents, my claim to a bank account would not
> even exist(!) or be verifiable. (012)
Without a representation of it in your brain or your records, your *claim*
to a bank account would not exist even if the bank had record of it. (013)
> ...
> The question of *how *accessible the representations of what others might
> call "abstract" entities then seems secondary to me. So in Matthew's view,
> it is exactly such physical manifestations which account for the "reality"
> of something like an "organization" or "my bank account" or "laws of
> physics". Hans would argue that these are simply identifiers, not part of
> the thing(?), (014)
That seems to be what he and i are claiming. (015)
> and the abstract thing (continues to exist?) even if all such
> physical aspects were to be destroyed/removed, correct? (016)
So long as you include mental representations, then i would
disagree that the abstract social entity would continue to
exist if society could no longer access it. (017)
Note that an account or organization may cease to exist with
absolutely no change in any of the physical representations
(although that is hard to apply to mental representations)
merely by time reaching an expiration date. (018)
> Though I can't
> fathom how this would hold for social constructs in any possible world. (019)
> Would it be correct to suggest that in Matthew's view, not only are these
> representations Parts of the abstract thing, but perhaps "essential
> parts", (020)
It seems so. (021)
> while in Hans view, these are simply incidental to the abstract thing? (022)
The mental representations are not incidental in my view, which i think
is similar to Hans's. (023)
> In either case, we agree that these physical things are essential for
> accessibility to the ostensibly abstract thing, right? (024)
Counting mental representations, sure. (025)
A key is often essential to accessibility to things on the other side of
the lock. But that does not mean that the key is part of the set of
things on the other side of the lock. (026)
> Without some physical manifestation,
> access to the abstract thing is moot, and might we
> then possibly say that its practical existence is also moot? (027)
Agreed. (028)
> Am I missing something? Can someone elucidate me on what? (029)
I can think of nothing more than my above clarifications. (030)
> Why might the fact that our external representations / tokens
> of some "abstract" entity are limited,
> support the existence of a category of abstract entities? (031)
If you are conceiving of abstract entities as physical entities,
you should consider that they are very different types of
physical entities than standard objects with mass. The location
and mass of physical objects (the aforementioned tiger, building, and
star) do not change as people learn about them, discuss them,
write about them or otherwise represent them. (032)
So they should be a different class of things. (033)
If you wish to claim they have mass & a physical location,
you can create a microtheory to do so. Could you tell me
what rules in that microtheory would be able to determine
(other than those assigned properties) that rules in a
microtheory that considers them to be abstract could not
conclude? (034)
If there is no difference in the set of possible conclusions,
what is the ontological (not philosophical) point of assigning
such properties? (035)
> Especially for social constructs (and knowledge for natural constructs),
> the lack of *any* physical representation/extent would render them at
> least invisible, if not non-existent, no? (036)
This would be inconsistent. If your ontology is representing some
abstract thing, then by (your) definition, it has a physical representation.
so it is neither invisible nor non-existent. If your ontology does
not represent it, it is irrelevant to your ontology. (037)
Of course, ontologies represent types/classes and relations/predicates.
According to your analysis, that makes the types and relations
physical things as well. You can refer to the mass of the class "Tiger"
and the location of "fatherOf". (038)
I can't understand the benefit of this. (039)
-- doug foxvog (040)
> Best,
> Ali
>
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