JFS, as derived from definitions in the Free Merriam-Webster online:
>> a particular analysis of a set of facts in their relation to one another
>> about the nature of being or the kinds of things that have existence
EJB
> If this were the definition we use in the Ontolog Forum, I would
> unsubscribe immediately.
I cannot see why you or anybody else would object to it as a general
statement that subsumes all the definitions anyone has proposed.
JFS
>> To specialize this definition for computer applications, delete the
>> option "the nature of being" and add "in some domain of application":
>>> a particular analysis of a set of facts in their relation to one another
>>> about the kinds of things that have existence in some domain of application
EJB
> So now we are not using the dictionary definition, and we are assigning
> a very different semantic interpretation to "kinds of things that have existence".
This is just a specialization of the general definition. There are
only two differences: (1) delete the option "the nature of existence",
which is more philosophical than computational, and (2) add the point
that it is specialized for a particular application domain.
In this forum, we have been talking about ontologies for particular
domains for years. I don't know what you object to.
EJB: What I object to is that John’s “specialization” is (a) not the dictionary definition he claims it to be, and (b) not a specialization of the intent of the dictionary definition. What he did was to delete the key phrase that conveys the intent “the nature of being”, and reinterpret “have existence” by adding “in some domain”. Philosophically, a notional thing does not “have existence in some domain”. It either “has existence” or it doesn’t. This is just linguistic trickery, whose objective is to support the idea that John’s interpretation of the term matches that of some authoritative source.
<snip>
It is useless to argue about a general, all-purpose definition of 'ontology.' That is a natural language _expression_, and like so many others, it has a variety of different meanings (In WordNet, it will have multiple word senses, each of which belongs to a different Synset. In a formal, computational ontology with lexical mappings, it can properly be specified as a label, or "use for" string for multiple concepts, including, but not limited to, the technical concepts it expresses in philosophy and computer science, respectively, and to looser, non-technical concepts in lay use, such as those in general-purpose dictionaries. [And by the way, as someone trained and experienced in both computational and philosophical ontology, I do not think that one specializes the other, or that both are specializations of some more general, lay "ontology". The two technical fields have elements in common, but they bear a family resemblance relationship, not a subsumption or direct-common-ancestor one.]
EJB: Thank you, Amanda. The first point of my emails is that John’s “specialization” is an entirely different concept!
EJB: My second point is that “ontology” is not a ‘natural language _expression_’. It is a “term of art” in philosophy, and we have made it a “term of art” in knowledge engineering. And generalizing the term “ontology” in knowledge engineering to cover every _expression_ and non-_expression_ of intent does not help to advance the discipline of knowledge engineering.
EJB: It seems to me that John is trying to invent 4 or 5 “terms of art”, and somehow basing them all on a perversion of the definition of the philosophical notion. John proposes that we use “formal ontology” to mean what knowledge engineers mean by “ontology” (but cannot agree on precisely), and I really don’t mind that. But the impact of his proposed definition of “ontology” is that when someone uses the term “ontology” without one of John’s selected adjectives, we don’t know what it means, because that category covers everything that is or has semantics. And that is counterproductive to our discipline. My position is simply that we use the term “ontology” to mean what John calls a “formal ontology”, and that we don’t eviscerate the term “ontology” by extending it to cover everything from the writings of Macchiavelli to assembly programs for the IBM 704. We have enough problems agreeing on what we mean by a “formal ontology” (for which Amanda gives examples above).
EJB: My third point is this: “Knowledge engineering” is a relatively well-defined branch of software engineering that produces “logic programs” and “rulesets” and “ontologies” and perhaps other kinds of artifacts “Knowledge engineering” is the discipline this forum seeks to advance. There are already terms for “computational model” and “text corpus” and “conceptualization”. Those are “resources” that a knowledge engineer uses to create an “ontology”, along with his/her specific knowledge engineering skills. Let us please not confuse the raw materials with the product.
It is immensely frustrating, and a repeating straw on the back of the camel that takes people off of this list and out of this community, when conversation comes back to this type of red herring again and again.
EJB: I’m sorry to disappoint you. But IMO, this is not a repetition of the arguments about where exactly to place the boundary. I regard John’s choosing to extend the term “ontology” to a meaningless buzzword as a negative contribution to the community itself, and as a threat to the external perception of the knowledge engineering community, precisely because John is (rightly) respected!