John, (01)
your remarks made me convinced that it is confusing to use the term
'universal' as Armstrong does in both (1) realized properties sense &
(2) the one over many sense as a general type. Armstrong may have
adapted the sense 1 because of the following reason. Whatever property
is universal in the sense of 2, is also a realized property. One
source of the confusion is that not every realized property is as
universal/general in the sense 2. (02)
I also agree that the term 'trope' should be used only as a historical
reference. As a historical note, at least one reason for tropes is to
function as a reaction against the so-called state of affairs
ontologies, where state of affairs = property + the particular where
the property is realized. In one sense (A), there is really no need to
distinguish a property from a particular, but in another sense (B)
there is. (03)
A. a realized property is identical to its interrelated constituents,
and thus there is no need for the term 'particular' here. (04)
B. it is difficult to not to talk about particulars such as rocks and
trees. What would you call these then? (05)
In the sense of B, particulars have several properties on the same
level. For instance, a rock has a total mass and a total geometrical
form. One strategy is to call such particulars bundles of properties. (06)
Avril (07)
Lainaus "John F Sowa" <sowa@xxxxxxxxxxx>: (08)
> Avril,
>
> I agree that a deeper analysis of similarities among relations
> and properties is essential.
>
> AS
>> If you don't explain the resemblance with the structure of the
>> properties, you must appeal to some form of phenomenalism/idealism,
>> where the resemblance is due to the perceiving agents. Sure, you don't
>> want to get on that path.
>
> I agree completely. Any version of logic that can represent those
> aspects must also be able to represent and analyze the underlying
> structures. But please note my discussion of and quotations from
> John Bacon's article: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/tropes/
>
> JFS
>> Bacon gives some history of the ideas and terminology. He also gives a
>> precise definition of the version he prefers -- the idea that tropes are
>> instances of relations or instances of properties (monadic relations).
>> He calls them _relatons_ and _qualitons_.
>>
>> In logic, a relaton or qualiton would just be a ground-level clause:
>> a single relation with all its argument places filled with elements
>> of the domain.
>
> Note Bacon's conclusion:
>
> JB
>> The thing-property view, the property-cluster theory, the relaton-cluster
>> theory, and even perhaps model-theoretic particularism are apparently
>> all capable of modeling each other (Bacon 1988).
>
> As I said, this confirms my claim that the terminology for describing
> the logic (and its model theory) is all that you need to describe and
> define *every* distinction in any ontology specified in that logic.
>
> I won't quarrel with any of Armstrong's discussion about properties
> and their structure and/or interrelationships. But my claim is that
> *all* of his discussion and analysis can be stated more precisely and
> clearly if you adopt the following definitions:
>
> 1. A universal is a relation (in any version of logic you prefer).
>
> 2. A property is a monadic relation.
>
> 3. A trope is a ground-level clause.
>
> If you adopt Common Logic (or some variation thereof) together with the
> IKL extensions to CL (or some variation thereof), you can analyze and
> represent all of Armstrong's points. And you can dispense with all
> the confusing verbiage about universals and tropes (except in the
> historical references).
>
> As an example, following is one of your quotations from Armstrong:
>
> DMA
>> "...resemblance is always identity in nature. This identity is partial
>> in partial resemblance, and complete in complete resemblance. ...
>> a particular a resembles a particular b if and only if: There
>> exists a property,
>> P, such that a has P, and that there exists a property, Q, such
>> that b has Q,
>> and either P=Q or P resembles Q. P's resembling Q will, of course,
>> be a matter
>> of the resemblance of universals, and so we cannot gain a full view of the
>> resemblance of particulars until we understand the resemblance of
>> universals." p95-96
>
> There are many thorny issues about resemblance and identity. I don't
> claim that translating Armstrong's terminology by the definitions above
> will automagically solve all the problems.
>
> But I do claim that the word 'universal' has a couple of millennia
> of confused, confusing, misleading, and ambiguous baggage. The
> overwhelming majority of discussions about universals and tropes
> are so vague that they are "not even false." The first step in
> clarifying the issues is to get rid of the confusing terminology.
>
> John
> (09)
--
Avril Styrman
+358 40 7000 589 (010)
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