Dear Doug, (01)
> > Something being intentional does not mean it cannot be extensional also.
> > Take for example the paperweight on my desk. I found it as a nice round
> > stone on the beach, and I intentionally decided it would make a good
> > weight. Are you saying it therefore ceases to be an extensional object
> > because it is intentionally created as a paperweight?
> This seems to be reversed from the computer ontological meanings of
> "intensional" and "extensional". An "intensional" claass is defined by
> properties, while an "extensional" class is defined as comprising the
> objects that are specified as members. Thus the stone you found was
> a member of the intensional class, BeachPebble (and of all its
> while you added it to the extent of the Paperweight class. (02)
MW: "intentional" is not the same as "intensional". Intentional means it is
created as an act of will (like the paperweight or an agreement) whilst
intensional means a class that is defined by its properties, and which may
not be extensional because , for example, different memberships exist at
different times. (03)
MW: With individuals, defined by extension means their spatio-temporal
extent, rather than membership as with sets. (04)
> John was referring to the creation of possible worlds to produce models
> proving something. Such models are populated with instances (extents of
> various classes) in order to prove/demonstrate something about a world
> outside the generated possible world. His argument is that the parameters
> that you used to create the possible world, could be used to demonstrate
> whatever was demonstrated by the possible world. (05)
MW: I say nothing about the extensionality of alternatives to possible
worlds. Only that possible worlds are defined by their spatio-temporal
extent. It is a matter of conjecture whether those possible worlds are real
> > As far as possible worlds is concerned you should also look at
> > (Hugh Everett). This is becoming quite a respectable theory in physics
> > that the different possibilities really happen from a quantum level
> > upwards. So they do not necessarily exist just in someone's imagination.
> But such multiverses, in my understanding, are intrinsically undetectable
> from our universe and can not affect it. Therefore, they have no
> predictive value and thus could be considered non-scientific. It is
> similarly impossible to prove that the universe did not come into
> a millisecond ago (with all particles having positions and momenta that
> suggest a universe of an age of ~14 billion years. (06)
MW: Now that is a statement I would consider unscientific.
> Neither theory is useful for an ontological description of any given
> state of affairs that is not specifically dealing with such a theory. (07)
MW: Interesting then that I have found them to be extremely useful in
practical situations. (08)
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> -- doug foxvog
> > Regards
> > Matthew West
> > Information Junction
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> > This email originates from Information Junction Ltd. Registered in
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> > From: ontolog-forum-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
> > [mailto:ontolog-forum-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx] On Behalf Of
> > sowa@xxxxxxxxxxx
> > Sent: 19 July 2011 11:17
> > To: [ontolog-forum]
> > Subject: Re: [ontolog-forum] intangibles (was RE: Why most
> > are fuzzy)
> > Dear Matthew,
> > The point I'm trying to make is that possible worlds don't exist. They
> > are
> > imaginary. The way you imagine them is to create some hypothesis,
> > axioms, or specifications that generate them.
> > The so-called extensional methods are superfluous. Whatever hypothesis
> > you
> > formed to generate the possible worlds contains all the information
> > necessary to derive whatever conclusion you could get by analyzing the
> > of worlds.
> > In short, the starting hypothesis is intensional. The possible worlds
> > are
> > useless baggage. They might give you some pleasure in your imagination.
> > They might even be useful as illustrations. But the method of forming
> > initial specification for the worlds is intensional.
> > John
> doug foxvog doug@xxxxxxxxxx http://ProgressiveAustin.org
> "I speak as an American to the leaders of my own nation. The great
> initiative in this war is ours. The initiative to stop it must be ours."
> - Dr. Martin Luther King Jr.
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