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Re: [ontolog-forum] Why most classifications are fuzzy

To: "'[ontolog-forum] '" <ontolog-forum@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
From: "Rich Cooper" <rich@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Date: Fri, 8 Jul 2011 12:11:34 -0700
Message-id: <20110708191142.9E93C138CD6@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>

Emmanuel Kant's "Critique of Pure Reason", published in 1781, is far more descriptive of semantics than anything Peirce did, IMHO.

 

http://ebooks.adelaide.edu.au/k/kant/immanuel/k16p/

 

-Rich

 

John wrote:

 

We wouldn't have modern science and technology if the philosophers hadn't thoroughly analyzed the many thorny issues.

 

That is a circular definition.  The "philosopher" label is assigned only to people who have already throughly analyzed the many thorny issues.  

 

Sincerely,

Rich Cooper

EnglishLogicKernel.com

Rich AT EnglishLogicKernel DOT com

9 4 9 \ 5 2 5 - 5 7 1 2

 

-----Original Message-----
From: ontolog-forum-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx [mailto:ontolog-forum-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx] On Behalf Of John F. Sowa
Sent: Friday, July 08, 2011 6:24 AM
To: ontolog-forum@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Subject: Re: [ontolog-forum] Why most classifications are fuzzy

 

Pat and Doug,

 

Philosophers have discovered, created, and occasionally solved

huge numbers of problems over the centuries.  On the whole, I

would say that their influence has been positive.  We wouldn't

have modern science and technology if the philosophers hadn't

thoroughly analyzed the many thorny issues.

 

But philosophers often create problems that nobody but a philosopher

would ever worry about.  Some amount of worrying can guard against

disaster.  But too much worrying can cause depression and despair.

 

I have recommended Peirce's philosophy for one very important

reason:  it can cure an enormous amount of philosophical disease.

Peirce created a lot of terminology of his own, but in general

he eliminated more useless terminology and worrying than he created.

Furthermore, all his terms can be mapped directly to logic -- that's

not true of all philosophy.

 

PC

>> When do contracts exist?

>> Pardon for the tangential post:  There is one point in this discussion

>> that I am curious about -

>> do contracts (or other conceptual works) exist even if

>> all tangible record of them (including the record in the creator's brain)

>> disappear?  This was mentioned in Doug F's post (below)

 

DF

> This is a few steps past what i referred to.  It really becomes a meta-

> physical issue: "if all evidence of a non-tangible ceases to exist, does

> the non-tangible cease to exist as well?"

 

This is a symptom of a philosophical disease.  Please remember the basic

triad of Mark, Token, and Type.  Every contract is a type, which can be

embodied in one or more tokens.

 

Every type is of the same nature as any mathematical structure.  An

example is the mathematical definition of a dodecahedron.  That defines

a type.  Every physical object that looks like a dodecahedron is a more

or less perfect token of that type.  Asking whether a mathematical

entity exists if there are no embodiments or no mathematicians who

learned or remember the definition is a symptom that somebody needs

an aspirin to avoid an incipient philosophical headache.

 

DF

> How would one ever know that an identical conceptual work was created

> if all knowledge and records of the previous work ceased to exist?

 

That question could cause a migraine.

 

PC

> I try to make my classes as unfuzzy as possible.

 

DF

> This is useful for most purposes.  Cyc generally does the same.

> But it does find fuzzy classes useful for NLP stages.

 

This is another issue that Peirce addressed.  He used the word 'vague'

instead of 'fuzzy', but the issues are the same.

 

Peirce insisted that vagueness is *not* a degenerate stage from some

original Platonic realm where everything is precise.  Instead, he

noted that continuity is all pervasive.  No discrete set of words,

types, or classes can precisely describe the physical world.

 

For mathematical analysis, we often need precision in order to

prove theorems.  Just think of a dodecahedron.  We couldn't prove

theorems about them if we had to worry about the rough edges.

But we have to remember that every physical token will be an

imperfect embodiment for which many of those theorems will be

approximations.  Sometimes they'll be completely false.

 

John

 

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