So my tenets:
> (1) the world itself is whatever it is.
> (2) our understanding of the world, or any aspect of it, is a 'model'.
> (3) our communication of our understanding is an inferior 'model'.
>
> I'm not sure whether any of those matches John's philosophy. I think I
> may be close to the positions of Pat and Chris. (01)
I wish to have John's longanimity.
In fact, this is the realistic outlook, which John has been promoting for
long time. Unlike John, i am inclined to think that it is good for any
healthy mind not to interfere in the low quality dispute constantly created
by some messy minds, just not to be identified with them at the end of the
day.
Anyhow, it is really sad to reveal after long distinguished service to the
illusive cause of formal logic the very simple truth:
''If there is a 'represents' relationship between models and reality, then
all our axiomatic ontologies must be given a two-stage semantics, in which
model theory describes the first (02)
stage of interpretation, yielding a new kind of 'representation' which then
needs another, presumably different, semantic theory to relate it to
actuality.'' (03)
Let me remind some basic facts of science. All scientific theories are real
semantic systems, since we have here the composition of troika (3) semantic
relations: (04)
1. designation relation from signs to constructs (concepts, statements,
theories, context); (05)
2. reference relation from concepts to things (substances, objects, matter,
factual items, individuals); (06)
3. representation relation from functions to real properties of things
(states, changes, relations). (07)
If formal semantic systems, as of pure mathematics, restricted with formal
or conceptual languages and designation rules, the semantic systems of
empirical sciences are marked with the live bridge to the world, called
''correspondence rules'' or ''semantic hypotheses and assumptions.'' What
makes a crucial difference. This bridge allowed humanity to develop a New
World of Technology, based on hard sciences hardly grounded to reality. (08)
Summing up:
By its nature, no human is omniscient, we are neither gods no angels, may be
half angels and half animals. But if you are unhopefully ignorant in some
critical issues, don't spread this bad ignorance aggressively, harming good
virgin minds. Be modest, and Learn, Learn, and Learn, as instructed one big
revolutionary. (09)
azamat abdoullaev (010)
----- Original Message -----
From: "Ed Barkmeyer" <edbark@xxxxxxxx>
To: "[ontolog-forum]" <ontolog-forum@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Sent: Thursday, September 18, 2008 5:47 PM
Subject: Re: [ontolog-forum] Reality and semantics. [Was: Thing and Class] (011)
> Chris Menzel wrote:
>
>> Seems to me pretty clear that it does not mean that! Indeed, your last
>> sentence is exactly what I'd say about the relation between a model --
>> the mathematical "description" -- and the world. But really now. Let's
>> define a model (for a given first-order language L, say) to be a triple
>> <D,R,V>, where D is a set of objects, R a set of extensional relations
>> over D, and V is a mapping from L to appropriate semantic values in D
>> and R. Surely neither *the world*, nor any physical part of it, is
>> literally such a triple.
>
> I would observe that what the world *is* is a philosophical problem that
> we don't need to solve. It is the function of philosophers to study
> problems we don't need to solve. ;-)
>
> But, from a scientific point of view, the real world itself is
> "unknowable". What we have is a collection of individual perceptions of
> the world, and our brains organize our individual perceptions into a
> model. What the nature of that model is is the subject of cognitive
> theory, and I don't pretend to know anything about that, either. But
> the great leap forward among humans occurred when we learned to
> communicate our mental models to others. And the problem seems to be
> that 40,000 years later, our languages, natural and formal, are still
> not able to express the entirety of our mental model of elements of the
> "real world". But in ontological engineering, it is our job to do that
> as well as we can, with the languages we have.
>
> So my tenets:
> (1) the world itself is whatever it is.
> (2) our understanding of the world, or any aspect of it, is a 'model'.
> (3) our communication of our understanding is an inferior 'model'.
>
> I'm not sure whether any of those matches John's philosophy. I think I
> may be close to the positions of Pat and Chris.
>
> -Ed
>
> "All models are wrong; some are useful."
> -- W. Edwards Deming (1947) and George E.P. Box (1979)
>
> --
> Edward J. Barkmeyer Email: edbark@xxxxxxxx
> National Institute of Standards & Technology
> Manufacturing Systems Integration Division
> 100 Bureau Drive, Stop 8263 Tel: +1 301-975-3528
> Gaithersburg, MD 20899-8263 FAX: +1 301-975-4694
>
> "The opinions expressed above do not reflect consensus of NIST,
> and have not been reviewed by any Government authority."
>
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