John,
at the risk of hubris, I am going to disagree with you, for two
reasons. (01)
1) If a narrative which starts with two opposing points of view, it is
usually fair to assume that these are to be contrasted. In the opening
of Philosophical Investigations, the words-picture-reality is contrasted
with no-pictures-in-the-head. You quote Wittgenstein as saying he said
that the new ideas "could be seen in the right light only by contrast
with and against the background of my old way of thinking." which
suggests to me something stronger than simply putting his old ideas in a
more general framework. (02)
2) For me, changing from "pictures-in-the-head" to "forms of life" was a
duck-rabbit moment - when a seeing-it-this-way suddenly becomes
seeing-it-as-something-else. (Ironically enough, I was on my way
<i>to</i> the Logie Baird pub.) With language, the problem of changing
perspective is more difficult, because - as your notes on conceptual
graphs illustrate - it is possible to use language as a system for
modelling (for making pictures). However, this is an extension of how we
use language, and comes after classification of forms of life. I'd be
interested to see how conceptual graphs can be used to define
differential criteria - that is, rather than state that three things are
actually different, use a graph to define how to tell three things apart
- say the difference between a spade, a shovel and a hoe. (03)
Also, my use of the term "pattern recognition" was probably ill-advised,
since it "comes with baggage". I was thinking, for example, of the way
one can lay down different patterns of electrodes on a Surface Acoustic
Wave device, to enable it to preferentially detect certain types of
signal. For lots of interesting signals, the response is approximately a
sine(x)/x curve, and you recognise a signal when it passes a threshold.
In this case I'm doubtful that equating thresholding with classification
is helpful, even though both provide a binary output. (04)
-----Original Message-----
From: ontolog-forum-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
[mailto:ontolog-forum-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx] On Behalf Of John F.
Sowa
Sent: 07 August 2008 19:50
To: [ontolog-forum]
Subject: Re: [ontolog-forum] Wittgenstein and the pictures (05)
*** WARNING *** (06)
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Keep this in mind if you answer this message. (07)
Alex, Sean, Len, Ferenc, et al., (08)
I would like to respond to Alex in the atom thread, but the ideas lead
to the more general thread about Wittgenstein and pictures.
So I'll begin with the comments by Alex and move to the others. (09)
AS> ... formalization of scientific concepts (well, may be - "terms")
> is much more difficult than common sense ones... (010)
Yes and no. Science has developed very rich mathematical formalisms
which are difficult to understand without a great deal of study.
But the fundamental principles are much simpler and easier to define
precisely than anything that has to do with human nature, psychology,
actions, intentions, purposes, interactions, families, societies,
businesses, governments, etc. (011)
AS> And look - how many words do we have in "common"? Let's suppose
> 45000. Let's put 10 meanings for each - it gives us 450 000 simple >
formulas. I think in Science we'll get from 10 to 100 times more > of
complex formulas. (012)
When you get to anything related to human behavior, psychology, and
sociology, you have vastly more than 10 meanings of each word.
Although people might use common words, such as 'like', 'love', 'hate',
'hope', 'wish', 'need', etc., it's unlikely that any two people have
identical meanings for them. In fact, the same person usually has
different meanings for the same word with regard to different friends,
relatives, and acquaintances -- and different meanings with regard to
the *same* friend at different points in time, even at different times
of the same day. (013)
SB> The way I was taught Wittgenstein was that the Philosophical
> Investigations were a repudiation of Tractatus... (014)
The word 'repudiation' is too strong. His ideas evolved over time, and
even in the PI, his last book, he said that the new ideas "could be seen
in the right light only by contrast with and against the background of
my old way of thinking." (015)
To understand that contrast, his _Philosophical Remarks_, which W. wrote
around 1929-1930, are an important transition phase.
In the PR, W. used the term 'Satzsystem' for a system of sentences or
propositions, of which the Tractatus was only one Satzsystem.
Unlike the Tractatus, which W. intended to cover "everything that could
be said clearly", he said in the PR that the meaning of a word is
determined by the Satzsystem in which it is used. Outside of a
Satzsystem, he said that a word is like a "wheel turning idly". (016)
In the PR, a Satzsystem is still a system of logic, similar to what
logicians today call a "theory", namely a deductive closure of a set of
axioms. W's later term 'Sprachspiel' (language game or language play)
can be interpreted as a generalization that includes a Satzsystem as a
specialization. Then the system of the Tractatus becomes just one
instance of that specialization. (017)
SB> The temptation of "pictures in the head" arises from the way
> our brain presents patterns ready-recognised to our conscious, > so
that when I look out of my window at an arrangement of red, > white and
black, I see a house, with no need for further > deliberate
investigation. (018)
Peirce made the point that every perception is an abduction from
fragmentary evidence. If you had seen that arrangement of colors every
day for years, you would immediately assume that it was a repetition of
some evidence that you had thoroughly investigated over a long period.
But if you saw it on top of a flatbed truck that was moving a house to a
new location, you would probably do a "double take" to reinterpret that
unusual pattern you saw in the middle of a familiar street. (019)
SB> In contrast, the paradigmatic algorithm for language is
> classification.... (020)
Classification is fundamental to all aspects of cognition, including
perception, memory, reasoning, and language. See the following paper
about categorization and reasoning: (021)
http://www.jfsowa.com/pubs/cogcat.htm
Categorization in Cognitive Computer Science (022)
SB> There remains a difficult problem of relating pattern recognition
> to classification (i.e. I have no idea what the answer is). If >
there were a fixed set of distinct patterns, then there would be > no
problem (and, for example, machine vision would have been solved > long
ago). (023)
The short answer is that pattern matching is fundamental to
classification and all other forms of cognition. And learning by
induction and guessing by abduction are essential for enabling humans
and other sentient beings to learn or create new patterns dynamically. (024)
SB> I note in this forum a recurring argument between on one hand
> the "one upper ontology"/"finite set of basic concepts" school and >
the "no single ontology" school. (025)
Little by little, we're managing to convince people of the hopelessness
of a one-size-fits-all ontology. (026)
SB> ... the "pattern recognition" and the "classification" schools
> of meaning. Since ontology languages seem oriented to supporting >
classification, it seems the former are confused. (027)
Since classification presupposes pattern recognition, it isK impossible
to have schools that that choose one over the other.
Any declarative language -- such as a formal logic or an informal
natural language can be used as "an ontology language." (028)
LY to FK> I have no clue what you are trying to say. (029)
I don't blame you. (030)
FK> As far as data structures are concerned, you either have a list
> or an array. (031)
What!?! Those are just two of an open-ended number of different kinds
of patterns that can be created in a digital computer. (032)
FK> All this new technology calls for a dynamic representation
> of ideas...
http://www.kurzweilai.net/news/frame.html?main=/news/news_single.html?id
%3D9165 (033)
That URL points to a discussion of "a man interacting with holographic
images projected before him, moving them around and resizing them."
That refutes your previous point, because those holographic images are
represented by data structures that are far more complex than just lists
and arrays. (034)
John Sowa (035)
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