John F. Sowa schrieb:
> Yes, that is true:
> > So, antimatter as a form of matter (made of elementary antiparticles)
> > is a kind of substance, the first class citizen of Aristotle's
> > categories.
> But that is so very general that it hardly says anything. Aristotle
> also developed the form-matter distinction, which doesn't quite fit
> the ten categories. Aristotle's matter does not correspond exactly
> to the modern physicists' concept of matter, which itself undergoes
> major revisions with new discoveries and new theories.
> As Peirce said,
> "It is easy to be certain. One has only to be sufficiently vague."
> For some purposes, a vague answer is adequate. But for other purposes,
> it is necessary to deal with the very annoying details that don't fit
> together as nicely as one would hope.
I do not find Aristotle especially vague. He distinguishes between
*primary substances*, which are individual property bearers, and
*secondary substances*, which are natural kinds and universals. The
*form-matter* distinction is a distinction between different groups of
secondary substances, and it is a relative distinction. That is, a
form-matter unity can as such be matter for another and overlying form,
form2. In contemporary philosophical idioms, the form is an emergent
property in relation to its constituting matter. Since one form may
allow several natural kinds, it becomes rather natural to talk of the
different forms as constituting different levels of reality. I happen to
embrace a kind of level ontology. Somewhat famous forerunners are
Nicolai Hartmann (1882-1950) and Mario Bunge (b. 1919). Founding father
for this tradition is Aristotle. (02)
Ingvar J (03)
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