John raises an important issue: (01)
> But if you mean detailed theories, nobody is *claiming* that
> it's impossible. It has been *proved* that physics as a whole
> does not have a consistent foundation. And every field other
> than physics is in even worse shape.
> (02)
Of course, there will be theories of the real world whose models are
logically incompatible with each other. That's why they can be
represented as ***theories*** and not accepted as the basis for the
conceptual defining vocabulary. In this sense, yes, the conceptual
defining vocabulary will be underspecified in the sense that it will
not **include** any of the theories of physics that are inconsistent,
but will be able to **describe** those theories. I do have protons and
neutrons as constituents of (most) atomic nuclei in my ontology -- is
there any serious debate about that? If so, it may be possible to
remove that "theory" and still have an adequate defining vocabulary.
The answer *must* be determined by trying it. (03)
In fact, if we didn't have a common set of accepted linguistic and
mathematical meanings, we wouldn't be able to coherently demonstrate
that different theories are inconsistent. (04)
There is a big difference between having a vocabulary that allows us to
describe precisely different theories and their effects, and actually
believing that the models behind those theories are a full description
of the real world. There is no need to make such a confusion. Adam
Pease has pointed out that a lot of comments about how "one can't have
one consistent ontology" actually resolve into differences over
representations of the real world that can and must be resolved
experimentally, and have no relevance to the issue of what fundamental
concepts are needed to formulate those theories. (05)
Inconsistent physics theories will be described adequately by the
conceptual defining vocabulary, and represented in some domain ontology
as inconsistent **theories**. (06)
Pat (07)
Patrick Cassidy
CNTR-MITRE
260 Industrial Way West
Eatontown NJ 07724
Eatontown: 732-578-6340
Cell: 908-565-4053
pcassidy@xxxxxxxxx (08)
> -----Original Message-----
> From: ontolog-forum-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
> [mailto:ontolog-forum-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx] On Behalf Of
> John F. Sowa
> Sent: Wednesday, May 02, 2007 3:04 PM
> To: [ontolog-forum]
> Subject: Re: [ontolog-forum] A "common basis"
>
> Azamat, Pat, and Adam,
>
> I certainly agree that there is one universe and that a
> perfect description of that universe would be an excellent
> foundation for a unified ontology. I also believe that there
> are many useful approximations to such a perfect description
> and that for many special cases, we can even give good
> estimates of how close we might be to any ultimate answer
> *for that particular special case*.
>
> PC> To have an effective standard for information interchange,
> > it is only necessary to have a large enough user base so that
> > third party vendors can make money building interfaces to
> > make using it easy, and building applications that illustrate
> > the utility of the standard.
>
> I interpret that as implying that we need a systematic framework
> for cataloging and relating all the special cases. But *not* as
> implying that we need a final Grand Unified Theory (GUT). As
> I've said many times, we need a hierarchy of categories that is
> *underspecified* -- i.e., it is more of a terminology than an
> axiomatized theory.
>
> Fundamental problem about axioms: they cause inconsistencies.
> The fewer axioms you have, the more reliable the theory. As you
> add axioms, you can prove more statements -- but, aye, there's
> the rub: as soon as you get a single inconsistency, the whole
> edifice collapses because everything becomes provable.
>
> PC> I think should be given a serious try before anyone claims
> > that it is not possible.
>
> That depends on what you mean. If you mean an underspecified
> set of axioms that avoid saying anything about incompatible
> details, then yes -- you can have a broad coverage theory.
>
> But if you mean detailed theories, nobody is *claiming* that
> it's impossible. It has been *proved* that physics as a whole
> does not have a consistent foundation. And every field other
> than physics is in even worse shape.
>
> AP> While some folks want to keep claiming a common ontology
> > is somehow impossible, some of us having been doing the
> > "impossible" for years.
>
> I repeat: an underspecified ontology is easy to construct,
> but a detailed theory of everything is impossible. The only
> question to be determined is how much can usefully be
> included in the common core and how much should be left
> for the open-ended collections of microtheories.
>
> John
>
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> (09)
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