>Waclaw Kusnierczyk <Waclaw.Marcin.Kusnierczyk@xxxxxxxxxxx> writes:
>
>> Even the basic elements of logic are may not be invariants. Take the
>> case of FOL; various logics other than FOL extend it rather than try to
>> modify not necessarily because FOL is invariantly correct, but because
>> it is so firmly established.
>
>This is my feeling, too. It's an awful lot to swallow, I know, but I
>think, in general, it's deeply correct to recognize, always and
>everywhere, that everything we think and do is rooted in culture. (01)
This is either vacuous or wrong, depending on how one construes the
meaning of 'culture'. (02)
> In
>our own culture, FOL is a fixture, no doubt about it. (And I'm not
>interested in replacing it. I just don't want to close off
>alternatives about which I currently know nothing.) (03)
Nor do I, I assure you. But the way to advance things is to
understand them thoroughly first, rather than burbling on in a vague
way about how there might be other things. (04)
>
>[ John Sowa:]
>> >> Logic is the discipline that has been searching for those
>> >> underlying invariants. But those invariants are often
>> >> obscured by variations in the notations and terminologies.
>
>
>[ Steve Newcomb:]
>> > I agree that the search is vitally important, now more than ever, and
>> > I admire your contributions to that search. The only thing I object
>> > to about your position is its apparent implication that there is some
>> > higher Truth or Absoluteness (note capital letters indicating numinous
>> > significance) in any logic or logical system -- even if it's Logic.
>
>I would add to my above remark that, while it's true that "variations
>in the notations and terminologies" could obscure the hoped-for
>invariants, these same cultural variations could just as easily
>obscure the fact that there are *no* invariants. (05)
It seems however to be the case that the logic of conjunction and
negation *is* pretty much invariant across almost all literate human
cultures. (06)
> When it comes to a
>question that cannot have an objective answer (07)
But it can, both as a question in cultural sociology and as a
question in semiotics. Believe it or not, people have thought about
questions like this rather carefully, in many cultures. (08)
>, we must fall back on
>other things. I think habits are what we fall back on, most of the
>time.
>
>Waclaw Kusnierczyk <Waclaw.Marcin.Kusnierczyk@xxxxxxxxxxx> writes:
>
>> It is hard for us to imagine what happens within the dark holes, how
>> there could be no time (before time 'began'), and it may just be too
>> hard for us to imagine a world in which Logic would not be an invariant.
>> That humans cannot imagine something is only an empirical proof of its
>> unimaginability by humans, not of its inexistence.
>
>I would go even farther, adding the following emphasized words:
>
> > That *some* humans cannot imagine something is only an empirical
> > proof of its unimaginability by *those* humans, not of its
> > inexistence.
>
>...or even of its unimaginability by *other* humans. (09)
Imagination really isn't the issue here. We do not decide that (say)
the rule of and-introduction is correct because we cannot imagine a
world in which it is false. It is not a failure of imagination at
work here. Rather, it is the opposite: we *can* imagine what it is to
be a world, in a very abstract sense of 'world', and we then
*discover* that this rule is satisfied in all of them. And in fact we
can imagine several different notions of what it is to be a world,
and we find that this rule is satisfied in all of them. And then we
can see exactly what it is about a world that makes it be the case
that this rule comes out true in all of them; a theory of
world-satisfaction. And this theory gives us insight into *why* this
logical rule is always satisfied; basically, it is because of the
very meaning of 'and'. (010)
What I just sketched above is logical semantics (followed by a brief
observation about English semantics.) It - this theory - is a mature
mathematical theory applied to semiotics and language analysis, a
general account of how language relates to the world(s) it describes.
It is not a failure of imagination. I don't even think it is
culturally relative (unless you would claim that mathematics is
culturally relative?) (011)
>
>BTW, as happens with increasing frequency these days, my mind was just
>blown (in a happy way) by the news in the April 12 issue of _Nature_
>that there is now experimental evidence in support of an explanation
>as to how photosynthesis is 90% efficient in its capture of energy
>from photons, when the best man-made technology currently tops out at
>30%. Evidently, a long (over 600-femtosecond) interval of quantum
>state superposition exists in a photosynthetic system during the
>capture of a photon. During that time, the system "tries many paths
>at once", ultimately directing the photon to precisely the right place
>to exploit its energy most efficiently. The photon doesn't stumble
>around; the system *guides* it. Wow.
>
>I have a lot of trouble imagining quantum mechanical stuff, but I'm
>surely glad that some people can. (012)
Are you referring to English QM, Japanese QM, or Indian QM? They are
presumably rooted in different cultures. (013)
> I frequently benefit from what
>others *can* imagine, that I *can't* imagine. (The invention of the
>transistor springs to mind.) The very last thing I want to do is to
>shackle anybody's imagination, or to fail to guide imagination-energy
>toward wherever its usefulness can best be exploited.
>
>Humanity can best serve its own interests by supporting multiple
>cultures simultaneously, so that imagination-photons can "try many
>paths at once." Fear of what presently-unknowable things might happen
>then must be overcome by Faith. We need to achieve consensus that,
>whatever those presently-unknowable things might turn out to be, it
>will be much better to know them than to remain ignorant of them. Am
>I talking about Faith in, uh, Truth? Yes, if you like. I think so.
>We cannot master Truth. (014)
Im not sure what the capital letter is supposed to imply, but we
certainly can master ordinary truth. Semantics is a (now fairly
mature) theory of truth, in fact. (015)
> The smartest thing we can do is to help Truth
>master *us*.
>
>I think many people are deeply afraid of knowing things. And that's
>understandable: having to adapt to some previously hidden or
>unrecognized fact can be extremely inconvenient and emotionally
>unsettling.
>
>The current U.S. government will say anything that it thinks the
>voters want to hear, even if it's a complete lie. It is constantly
>appealing to the Fears of the voters; it never asks them for Faith.
>This approach has worked spectacularly well, from the perspective of
>gaining and holding power for an 8-year period. Extrapolating from
>the size of the Bush voter base, and the size of the Christian Right's
>radio audience, I regret to guess that at least 30% of the American
>population is deeply afraid of learning things. (I speak about
>Americans because I know them, and not in order to single them out for
>special praise or opprobrium. Is 30% low, or is it high, in
>comparison with other populations? Honestly, I have no idea. All I
>know is, I'd be a lot happier, and I'd feel *much* safer, with a
>number like 1% or 2%.)
>
>Peter Yim, I'm sure you're horrified that I'm saying these things in
>this forum. Sorry. They're 100% relevant to what we face in our
>arena. (016)
I completely fail to see how. In fact, they don't seem to be relevant
to anything. (017)
>Our work cannot be ungrounded (018)
Can you elicidate what this is supposed to mean? What constitutes
'grounding' in this sense? (019)
Pat Hayes
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