John, (01)
Thanks, I see the argument now. (02)
I think your argument is that where one cannot use properties of the
individuals that belong to a set/type/universal (or whatever) to determine
the membership of that set etc. one has to have an intensional criteria of
identity. (You start by saying "there are no clearly observable criteria
that can be used to identify intentions" - but clarify later you mean
properties of the individuals "For example, if I buy a car, the car does not
change in any observable way." One can, of course, observe the process of
buying.) (03)
So these are Cambridge properties
(http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/existence/ and
http://www.bookrags.com/research/extrinsic-and-intrinsic-properties-eoph/
have the definitions) and I agree. These are the hallmarks on intentionally
constructed objects. (04)
However, I can easily give an extensional definition of them - if the role
of the definition is to capture the extension (and if you are an
extensionalist, what more could you want to capture). In some cases it is
usual to give the extensional definition - e.g. the current counties in
England (current States in the USA) - you would be hard pressed to find an
intensional definition, or one that was helpful.
So being a Cambridge property is 'orthogonal' to whether one can or does use
an extensional or intensional definition. (05)
What is true, is that if one provides an intensional definition for a
Cambridge property - then, in general, it will need to talk about extrinsic
properties.
It is also true, as I said earlier, that as extensions (even intensional
types have extensions) get larger, intensional definitions are preferable. (06)
So I do not see a clear path from the conclusion that intentional (with a
'T') properties have an extrinsic element that is usually captured in some
intensional definition to intentional properties are intensional. (07)
If one assumes that all properties are intensional, then one can provide
another interpretation of the example. One can say that while the
extensional and extensional definitions have the same extension, they have a
different intension and so are different properties. But that assumes what
it is trying to prove. Also, if one is an intentionalist then one needs to
have a good criteria of identity/difference for definitions, otherwise
entities proliferate seriously. (08)
I also think that it would help to differentiate between criteria of
identification and criteria of identity (if my memory serves me, these are
well laid out in Strawson's Individuals) - but the basic difference is
'obvious'. (09)
Regards,
Chris Partridge
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> -----Original Message-----
> From: uom-ontology-std-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx [mailto:uom-ontology-
> std-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx] On Behalf Of John F. Sowa
> Sent: 07 August 2009 00:43
> To: uom-ontology-std
> Subject: Re: [uom-ontology-std] uom-ontology-std - strawman UML
>
> Chris,
>
> If you are willing to grant intensional definitions, then you
> will have intensional criteria for determining identity.
>
> CP> It gets rather hard to define any large collection of items
> > without intensional definitions - beliefs, desires, and intentions
> > do not seem to be a special case. It would be interesting to see
> > how anyone can define infinite sets (collections) without
> > intensional definitions.
>
> I agree with you about infinite sets, but there are no clearly
> observable criteria that can be used to identify intentions.
>
> For example, if I buy a car, the car does not change in any
> observable way. However, I might change my behavior toward
> the car, by getting in it and driving it. A similar kind of
> behavioral change occurs if I merely rent or lease the car.
>
> It's very hard to tell the difference between a rented car
> and a leased car, except by looking at some piece of paper,
> which might not be present in or even near the car.
>
> JFS>> And without intentions, you can't define such things as
> >> contracts, promises, or anything that depends on them, such as
> >> money or businesses that hope to earn money.
>
> CP> I am afraid I do not quite follow you.
>
> I was giving examples of important concepts that are difficult
> or impossible to define by extensions. A contract is the
> distinguishing sign that determines whether a car is owned
> or rented. Without some contract and effective means of
> enforcing it, a banknote is a low-value piece of paper,
> but with an established institution behind it, it can
> be extremely valuable.
>
> The implicit contract that makes a stray dog into a pet dog
> is even more elusive, especially since dogs can't read.
> The pattern of behavior of a pet dog is easy to recognize
> by anyone who knows dogs, but it is definitely not easy
> to define by necessary and sufficient conditions.
>
> John
>
>
>
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