I will be short : Well done !
But, But it HAD TO BE DONE !
This what Philosophy and Metaphysics call to do !
Thanks !
Eric Beaussart.
> Message du 15/02/13 21:18
> De : "doug foxvog"
> A : "Ontology Summit 2013 discussion"
> Copie à :
> Objet : Re: [ontology-summit] {quality-methodology} Architectural considerations in Ontology Development?
>
> On Wed, February 13, 2013 05:35, Matthew West wrote:
> > ...
>
> > Chris Partridge made a plea for an architectural approach to developing a
> > top ontology, considering the ontological commitments. There were two
> > slides in particular that struck me.
> > The first listed typical ontological choices
> > that a top ontology needs to make,
>
> I would challenge the statement that a top ontology would have to make
> these kinds of philosophical commitments. I think that John Sowa also
> challenged this, but i'd like to explain in more depth.
>
> In most instances, the same (non-philosophical) conclusions can be made
> no matter which metaphysical commitment is made. Sometimes things
> need to be worded differently depending upon the metaphysics/philosophy
> chosen, but that seems like an NL issue to me. If one is generating or
> interpreting NL, one could use different modules for different philosophies.
>
> It would be useful to create sub-top level ontologies modeling the various
> restrictions below, so that contexts that wish to commit to one of these
> viewpoints can include them as well as a generic top-level ontology and
> the appropriate domain ontologies.
>
> Domain ontologies that do not make such commitments can be used
> by contexts that make different metaphysical commitments.
>
> > and be adopted by domain ontologies that
> > use the top ontology, to ensure consistency. These are:
>
> Let me comment on these individually.
>
> > Perdurantism versus endurantism
> > This makes the choice between whether e.g. physical objects
> > wholly exist at each point in time, and pass through time,
> > or are extended in time as well as space
> > and have states that are the physical object for a period of time.
>
> This is a nice philosophical issue that has been debated for millennia.
> The issue brings up the idea of timestamping assertions -- something
> that often does not happen. If one wishes to state that at time T
> object O has property P with value V, that is naturally a ternary
> relation, if P is modeled as a predicate. To force this into binary
> relations without reifying the situation, perdurantism would suggest
> (during T (P O V)) while endurantism would suggest (P' (duringFn O T) V).
>
> Either reifying the situation or allowing for ternary predicates would not
> force the use of one of these forms over the other.
>
> > Presentism versus eternalism
> > Presentism takes the view that only things that exist now exist, and that
> > things in the past and the future do not exist. Eternalism take the view
> > that all points in time exist, and we can talk about historical objects as
> > existing, and future objects.
>
> This is merely arguing over the meaning of the predicate "objectExists".
> We can reify two predicates: "objectCurrentlyExists" and
> "objectExistsAtSomeTime". We can take the logical "thereExists" to
> not refer to the types of existence referred to by presentism or eternalism.
>
> > Absolute versus relative space, time and spacetime
> > Absolute space-time essentially supports a Newtonian view of the world.
> > Relative space-time would be the view of Einstein.
>
> Why should this be part of an ontology instead of a context?
>
> If this refers to a necessity for modeling time and space dilation at
> relativistic speeds, that would be something that very few contexts
> would need to model, since the Einsteinian equations become the
> Newtonian ones (to enough significant figures) at "normal" speeds.
>
> Special contexts could define what happens at near light speeds,
> but that should be independent from the definitions of almost
> every type, relation, and individual in an ontology.
>
> Inter-timezone situations need to model that stated times are relative
> to location. Again, i fail to see that this needs to be an issue of a top
> ontology.
>
> It seems to me that any space model would always be relative to some
> object . In a specific context, that object would be either understood
> or stated (rigid Earth, Solar system, specific artifact, Milky Way Galaxy,
> specific organism's body, ...). It might be nice to force it to be stated.
> Within that context the space is "absolute". For inter-context reasoning,
> one would need to compare what the absolute space models are for the
> different contexts.
>
> > Modally extended versus unextended individuals
> > Modality is about supporting what could be as well as what is. You can
> > choose not to support modality, use a modal logic, or take a Possible
> > Worlds approach.
>
> Again, the choice made here seems to be what predicates are chosen
> to use. A top ontology could provide such predicates, but not force
> knowledge bases to use them. Specific theories can be defined in mid-level
> ontologies and have rules that use such predicates.
>
> I don't see that a top-level ontology needs to make a commitment here.
>
> > Materialism and non-materialism
> > Materialism takes things that exist as matter or energy. Idealism is an
> > alternative that considers that reality is essentially mentally
> > constructed.
>
> A top ontology should not make commitments that prevent things from
> being modeled, imho. Thus, unless this is an argument over the meaning
> of the predicate "thingExists", a top ontology should not restrict modeled
> entities from being composed of mass-energy (even if it extended to
> accept time periods as entities).
>
> I'm not sure what domain (other than philosophy) would need to define
> the term "reality". Again, that does not seem to be an issue for a top
> ontology.
>
> > Extensionalism versus non-extensionalism - I - Universals
> > Are sets/types defined by their membership, or to put it another way, can
> > the membership of sets/types change or not?
>
> If by "set", you mean "mathematical set", then membership in a set can
> not change. If types are defined by extent, then membership can not
> change. If types are defined by rules, then for types that are defined
> by rules rules whose results depend upon context, their membership
> can change.
>
> The most general model would thus be non-extensionalism, but a
> top ontology could define static types whose defining rules must be
> context-independent. It could also define mathematical sets.
>
> Domain ontologies could define their types as general types or static
> types as appropriate. Contexts that use domain ontologies could
> also define general types as static within their own context.
>
> It seems that the selection of Extensional types should be a context
> issue; types in a top-ontology should not be restricted to static
> types.
>
> > Extensionalism versus non-extensionalism - II - Particulars
> > Can two objects share their the same space (or space-time if you are a
> > perdurantist)?
>
> This is a question on the definition of "spatial object". I'd suggest
> that a top
> ontology should include different types of spatial objects and clearly define
> them. There is no need, imho, for a top ontology to restrict the types of
> spatial object to one of these, although, of course, it can be quite useful
> to do so in specific contexts.
>
> For example, i have a mass of soft clay. I mold it into a sphere. I then
> roll the sphere between my hands to make a cylinder with rounded ends.
> Then i form the cylinder into a snake with patterned back, eyes, mouth,
> tongue, and rattles on its tail. Finally, i crush the snake form back into
> an amorphous blob of clay. Was the sphere an object? ... the cylinder?
> ... the snake? ... the mass of clay? WHO CARES????
> As long as my ontology can model the actions taken and the forms and
> properties of the various shapes made, which of them should be considered
> "objects" and which shouldn't is an immaterial (no pun intended) issue.
>
> > Topology of time - branching or linear.
> > In branching temporal logics, each moment in time may split into various
> > possible futures. Linear time does not have this possibility.
>
> Again, why must this be a decision for the top level ontology?
>
> If branching time (or branching space) is to be used by many domain
> ontologies, then to prevent much re-inventing of the wheel, it would
> be useful for the appropriate types and relations to be defined in a
> top-level ontology.
>
> The choice to use (or ban the use of?) such predicates would be a
> context issue.
>
> > Chris was arguing that you need to consider the order of the choices you
> > make, there are natural dependencies between them.
>
> It would be useful to model the dependencies between such models
> in the top ontology. That does not mean that the top ontology needs
> to commit to any of these.
>
> > These are not the only choices that need to be made,
>
> Such decisions often are needed in specific contexts -- data contexts
> and occasionally for theory contexts.
>
> > and the combinations may seem daunting, but in
> > practice, the choices naturally cluster together. Certainly, your top
> > ontology will be making assumptions about these issues.
>
> A top domain ontology need not make such assumptions, imho, if
> definitional ontologies are separated from ontologies stating theories
> about the domain. Theory ontologies may make such assumptions.
> As you state below, if such assumptions are made, they should be
> explicit.
>
> > It is always much better to know what assumptions you have made,
> > than find yourself tripped up
> > by them having made the choices implicitly, or find yourself with domain
> > ontologies that are inconsistent from making different choices.
>
> Agreed. IF such assumptions have been made, the domain ontology
> should
>
> > Together the choices you make can be considered an ontological paradigm
> > that a top ontology embodies.
>
> "sub-top level"
>
> -- doug foxvog
>
> > ...
> >
> > Regards
> >
> > Matthew West
> > Information Junction
> > Tel: +44 1489 880185
> > Mobile: +44 750 3385279
> > Skype: dr.matthew.west
> > matthew.west@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
> > http://www.informationjunction.co.uk/
> > http://www.matthew-west.org.uk/
> >
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>
>
>
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