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Re: [ontolog-forum] A Question About Logic

To: "[ontolog-forum] " <ontolog-forum@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>, Thomas Johnston <tmj44p@xxxxxxx>
From: "Obrst, Leo J." <lobrst@xxxxxxxxx>
Date: Mon, 12 Oct 2015 23:06:16 +0000
Message-id: <CY1PR09MB0826A2ED13D49875196B28BBDD310@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>

I agree, Ed. This is why some of us view ontologies as not just logical theories, but as logical theories about the real world.

 

Thanks,

Leo

 

From: ontolog-forum-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx [mailto:ontolog-forum-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx] On Behalf Of Edward Barkmeyer
Sent: Monday, October 12, 2015 6:58 PM
To: Thomas Johnston <tmj44p@xxxxxxx>; [ontolog-forum] <ontolog-forum@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Subject: Re: [ontolog-forum] A Question About Logic

 

Thomas,

 

I do not claim to be an expert in this area, but I will make what I believe is an important observation. 

 

I was taught formal logic as a mathematical discipline, not a philosophical discipline.  I do not believe that mathematics has any interest in ontological commitment.  It deals with conceptual spaces that have certain properties, and whether those spaces have any metaphysical counterpart is irrelevant.  A mathematician does not have a problem considering “six impossible things before breakfast”.

 

To be useful any logical axiom is part of (perhaps all of) a theory.  So your Dog Theory may contain:

- A1: All dogs are renates.

- A2: Some dogs are friendly.

as axioms.

 

Consider then that “Some dogs are friendly” has the mathematical representation:

There is a thing in the universe of discourse that is a dog and that is friendly.

 

This actually asserts something rather more than the English assertion, in that it requires the existence of a friendly dog in any world of interest that constitutes the ‘universe of discourse’.  That is to say: any ‘universe’ or ‘model’ that satisfies the Dog Theory contains at least one thing that satisfies Dog(x).  No universe that has no dog can satisfy the Dog Theory.  But whether that universe corresponds to any ontological notion of reality is a separate issue.  It may be that the Dog Theory is a *false* theory for the behavior of the “real world”.  But any ‘model’ for the Dog Theory necessarily contains a thing that satisfies Dog(x). 

 

And we have examples of useful mathematical theories that are not clearly grounded in reality.  The base of the complex number system, for example, is meaningless, but if you assume that it exists, you get a powerful mathematics that can be used to predict physical behaviors.

 

No one disputes that mathematical logic has value to philosophy, or even that mathematical logic has its roots in philosophy.  But, as a domain of study, it has been formally separated from epistemology and ontology for at least 50 years.  Your question may be philosophically significant, but ontological commitment is not intrinsic to existential quantification.

 

-Ed

 

 

 

 

From: ontolog-forum-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx [mailto:ontolog-forum-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx] On Behalf Of Thomas Johnston
Sent: Monday, October 12, 2015 5:01 PM
To: [ontolog-forum]
Subject: [ontolog-forum] A Question About Logic

 

Oct 10, 2015. A Question About Logic.

 

I have a question about logic, which I hope the logicians in this group can help me with.

 

In predicate logic, universal quantification does not involve ontological commitment, whereas existential quantification (as the name suggests) does. To illustrate:

 

"All dogs are renates" is formalized as "If anything is a dog, it is a renate".

In notation: Ux(Dx --> Rx)

 

"Some dogs are friendly" doesn't require translation, and in notation is: Ex(Dx & Fx).

 

(I use "U" for the universal quantifier, "E" for the existential quantifier, "-->" for material implication, "~" for not, "&" for conjunction, and "<--->" for the metalogical operator of being equivalent to.)

 

So Ex(Dx & Fx) says: "There exists a dog such that it is friendly." "There exists"; in other words, an ontological commitment to the existence of at least one dog.

 

But Ux(Dx --> Rx) says: "If anything is a dog, it is a renate". No ontological commitment here.

 

This is all very familiar, of course. But here's a question: why, in the formalization of predicate logic, was it decided that "Some X" would carry ontological commitment whereas "All X" would not? (I think the question has been asked and answered before, but I don't recall what the answer is.)

 

Now let's move on to the deMorgan's equivalences, in which the negation of a universal quantification is an existential one, and vice versa. In notation:

 

~Ux(Dx --> Rx) <---> Ex(Dx & ~Rx)

~Ex(Dx & Fx) <---> Ux(Dx --> ~Fx)

 

In English: "It is not the case that if something is a dog, then it is a renate" is equivalent to "There exists something that is a dog and is not a renate". And: "It is not the case that there exists a dog which is friendly" is equivalent to "If something is a dog, then it is not friendly".

 

I've worked with deMorgan equivalences for so long that they seem intuitively right to me. But now notice something: negation creates and removes ontological commitment. And this seems really strange. Why should negation do this? My being ontologically committed to something doesn't have anything to do with negation; it's simply the _expression_ of my belief that the world contains something, of such-and-such a type.

 

Note, too, that Aristotle's square of opposition didn't have this strange feature. The negation of "All dogs are renates" is simply "Some dog is not a renate", and the negation of "Some dogs are friendly" is simply "No dogs are friendly".

 

I suspect that this strange feature, of negation having ontological import, has something to do with Frege's meta-logical interpretation of properties (predicates) as sets, i.e. as purely extensional objects. But I don't know, and that's what I asking about.

 

I'd also like to know if there are formal logics which do not impute this extravagant power of ontological commitment / de-commitment to the negation operator in predicate logics.

 

As recent earlier comments have indicated, I'm currently on the track of semantics, primarily of the cognitive variety, and definitely including the diachronic variety. And so this question is well-off that track. It came up as I was (re-)reading a book which, although it is 25 years old, I highly recommend:

 

Meaning and Grammar: an Introduction to Semantics (MIT, 1990), by Gennaro Chierchia and Sally McConnell-Ginet

 

What dates this book is that it is heavily influenced by Chomsky who, at the time of the book's publication, had left behind (i) transformational-generative grammar, (ii) extended transformational-generative grammar (the result of the "linguistics wars"), and was in either his (iii) principles and parameters incarnation, or (iv) his X-bar theory incarnation, or somewhere between the two.

 

But the book is at least as deeply indebted to "west coast" semantics, i.e. the Montague program, and, as it seems to me, the Chomskyean associations do not run deep enough to tie this work to any of Chomsky's later repudiated positions.

 

Thanks,

 

Tom

 


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