To: | "[ontolog-forum]" <ontolog-forum@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> |
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From: | Thomas Johnston <tmj44p@xxxxxxx> |
Date: | Mon, 12 Oct 2015 21:00:46 +0000 (UTC) |
Message-id: | <1925224852.2639751.1444683646393.JavaMail.yahoo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx> |
Oct 10, 2015. A Question About Logic. I have a question about logic, which I
hope the logicians in this group can help me with. In predicate logic, universal
quantification does not involve ontological commitment, whereas
existential quantification (as the name suggests) does. To
illustrate: "All dogs are renates" is
formalized as "If anything is a dog, it is a renate".
In notation: Ux(Dx --> Rx) "Some dogs are friendly"
doesn't require translation, and in notation is: Ex(Dx & Fx). (I use "U" for the universal
quantifier, "E" for the existential quantifier, "-->"
for material implication, "~" for not, "&"
for conjunction, and "<--->" for the metalogical
operator of being equivalent to.) So Ex(Dx & Fx) says: "There
exists a dog such that it is friendly." "There exists";
in other words, an ontological commitment to the existence of at
least one dog. But Ux(Dx --> Rx) says: "If
anything is a dog, it is a renate". No ontological commitment
here. This is all very familiar, of course.
But here's a question: why, in the formalization of predicate logic,
was it decided that "Some X" would carry ontological
commitment whereas "All X" would not? (I think the question
has been asked and answered before, but I don't recall what the
answer is.) Now let's move on to the deMorgan's
equivalences, in which the negation of a universal quantification is
an existential one, and vice versa. In notation: ~Ux(Dx --> Rx) <---> Ex(Dx &
~Rx) ~Ex(Dx & Fx) <---> Ux(Dx -->
~Fx) In English: "It is not the case
that if something is a dog, then it is a renate" is equivalent
to "There exists something that is a dog and is not a renate".
And: "It is not the case that there exists a dog which is
friendly" is equivalent to "If something is a dog, then it
is not friendly". I've worked with deMorgan equivalences
for so long that they seem intuitively right to me. But now notice
something: negation creates and removes ontological commitment. And
this seems really strange. Why should negation do this? My being
ontologically committed to something doesn't have anything to do with
negation; it's simply the _expression_ of my belief that the world
contains something, of such-and-such a type.
Note, too, that Aristotle's square of
opposition didn't have this strange feature. The negation of "All
dogs are renates" is simply "Some dog is not a renate",
and the negation of "Some dogs are friendly" is simply "No
dogs are friendly". I suspect that this strange feature, of
negation having ontological import, has something to do with Frege's
meta-logical interpretation of properties (predicates) as sets, i.e.
as purely extensional objects. But I don't know, and that's what I
asking about. I'd also like to know if there are
formal logics which do not impute this extravagant power of
ontological commitment / de-commitment to the negation operator in
predicate logics. As recent earlier comments have
indicated, I'm currently on the track of semantics, primarily of the
cognitive variety, and definitely including the diachronic variety.
And so this question is well-off that track. It came up as I was
(re-)reading a book which, although it is 25 years old, I highly
recommend: Meaning and Grammar: an Introduction
to Semantics (MIT, 1990), by Gennaro Chierchia and Sally
McConnell-Ginet What dates this book is that it is
heavily influenced by Chomsky who, at the time of the book's
publication, had left behind (i) transformational-generative grammar,
(ii) extended transformational-generative grammar (the result of the
"linguistics wars"), and was in either his (iii) principles
and parameters incarnation, or (iv) his X-bar theory incarnation, or
somewhere between the two. But the book is at least as deeply
indebted to "west coast" semantics, i.e. the Montague
program, and, as it seems to me, the Chomskyean associations do not
run deep enough to tie this work to any of Chomsky's later repudiated
positions. Thanks, Tom _________________________________________________________________ Message Archives: http://ontolog.cim3.net/forum/ontolog-forum/ Config Subscr: http://ontolog.cim3.net/mailman/listinfo/ontolog-forum/ Unsubscribe: mailto:ontolog-forum-leave@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx Shared Files: http://ontolog.cim3.net/file/ Community Wiki: http://ontolog.cim3.net/wiki/ To join: http://ontolog.cim3.net/cgi-bin/wiki.pl?WikiHomePage#nid1J (01) |
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