On Wed, February 12, 2014 07:46, Matthew West wrote:
> On Tue, February 11, 2014 15:13, Ali H wrote:
>> On Tue, Feb 11, 2014 at 2:48 PM, John McClure
>> <jmcclure@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>wrote: (01)
>>> Take a Person for example, with subclasses Boy and Man.
> *[MW] The main
>>>> problem with this is that Boy and Man are not subtypes of person.
>>>> For Boy and Man to be subtypes of Person, each Boy is a Person, and
>>>> each Man is a (different) Person.
>>>> What would be correct is that Boy and Man a subtypes of
>>>> StateOfPerson, and that each StateOfPerson is a temporalPart of a
>>>> Person.* (02)
> This is forcing a 4D view on those who don't wish to use it.
> [MW>] Actually it isn't. Boy is not a subtype of person in either 3D or 4D
> ontologies (well not good ones anyway). (03)
I'm afraid that you are mistaken here ... unless you consider 3D ontologies
that disagree with you to not be good ones. (04)
>> Instead of claiming one model is (in)correct, it would be nicer to say,
>> "In
>> the 4D model, non-rigid classes such as Boy and Man, are not subtypes of
>> rigid classes such as Person. A 4D model would consider Boy and Man to be
>> subtypes of a non-rigid StateOfPerson, and ..." (05)
> [MW>] OK. So let's try this in BFO. BFO has endurants and processes,
> and for a person there is an endurant object,
> and also process which is the person's life. (06)
Correct. (07)
> The person participates in that life. Boy and man are parts of that
> life, and are subtypes of process. (08)
This is where you are mistaken. In BFO, "Continuants are grasped through
their existence in the world as it is now, whereas processual entities unfold
through time." [Spatio-temporality in Basic Formal Ontology by Pierre
Grenon
http://www.ifomis.org/Research/IFOMISReports/IFOMIS%20Report%2005_2003.pdf] (09)
A boy is grasped as an instance of the class of continuants, Boy, through
his existence in the world as it is now. Instances of Man are similar. (010)
>From the same report:
" In addition to continuants, there are processes in the world. Processes are
normal occurrents, such as, for instance, the smiling of a person, the
tarnishing of a table or the reaching the wall of the table which has been
moved from the centre of the room next to the wall. Those which persist
in time do so by perduring, and they have temporal parts. They occur at a
time or throughout a period of time. ... It might be useful to emphasize
that the processual entities recognized
by BFO are really those things which are called ‘events’ on a day-to-day
basis. They are the only occurrents, and to clarify even further, not
only do continuants exist as enduring entities for BFO, but also that there
is no occurrent by means of which it would be possible to reconstruct
continuants analogously to the way so-called four-dimensionalists
are keen of doing. " (011)
> Process is disjoint form the endurant objects, so cannot share subtypes. (012)
So Boy & Man can not be processes. (013)
>>> To most people, and dictionaries, Boy and Man are subtypes of Person. (014)
> The relation "subtype" means that any instance of the first thing are
> instances of the second thing. In 4D a Man or Boy is a time slice of a
> MalePerson. (015)
> For someone using 3D(+1) at any time there is an instance of
> a Man or Boy, that instance is also an instance of Person. (016)
> [MW>] That is not quite right. For them to be the same thing in 3D+T at
> ALL instances when an object is a person
> it must also be a boy (or man). (017)
I am referring to at a specific time, while you are referring to what is
timelessly true. (018)
I am referring to one thing, at a specific time being an instance of both
a rigid class and a non-rigid class. You are discussing whether two
individuals
are the same or not, while i am not referring to two individuals. (019)
> That is
> what being rigid means, it is also why boy and man are not subtypes of
> person under 3D. It is just a less clear explanation than the 4D one. (020)
I don't disagree that Person is rigid, while Boy and Man are not. [Of course,
the Supreme Court can decide that various entities are Persons or not,
which means that Person is not rigid. 8)# ] (021)
>>> Second, should a KB contain both a Boy & Man resource about a given
>>> individual, owl:sameAs would be used to indicate their equivalence
>>> otherwise, yes, they would be a different person, as they should be.
>
> If Man & Boy were defined as disjoint, then nothing could simultaneously
> be an instance of both.
> But something could in one context be an instance of
> one and in another context be an instance of the other.
> [MW>] Sure, and there might be a 3D person that linked the two together, (022)
You are referring to "the two", when the only "two" i'm referring to are
classes. A 3D person is instantaneous and can not be an instance of
both Man and Boy. A 3D+1 person can in one context be an instance
of Man and in another be an instance of Boy, while being an instance
of Person in both contexts. One can compare this individual's status at
different times only through inter-contextual reasoning. (023)
A 4D person can not be an instance of *anything* at a specific time.
It is only an instance of something throughout its existence. (024)
> but
> that is 3 objects, not one object that is a person and a man and a boy. (025)
You can create as many conceptual objects as you want. If a time slice
of a person is an object, then when there is one person in a room, there are
over 10^90 continuous time slices of that person in the room (if you accept
time as quantized at the Planck level) and googleplexes of personal time
slices if you don't require the time slices to be continuous. (026)
>> First, you might want to take a look at the Ontoclean paper [1],[2].
>> related to a Person via a subtype relationship. (027)
> All this means is that Ontoclean promotes a 4D view. If this is merely a
> recommendation it does not require 4D. (028)
> [MW>] Actually Ontoclean is very 3D. It was developed in conjunction with
> DOLCE. Rigidity has no meaning in 4D. (029)
>>> Third, StateofPerson is a wholly artificial term, lacking both
>>> practical merit and semantic credibility. Fourth, this is a fine
>>> example of ontologists' implicit saintliness modelling 'concepts' not
> 'language'. (030)
>> Secondly, from your posts to this forum, this (the privileging or
>> equating ontology to language) seems to be a major point of departure
>> from your perspective and (I suspect) many ontologists on the list. (031)
> I agree. Language can inform ontologies but they are quite different. (032)
> If computer ontologies were originated by speakers of a language that
> differentiates "is currently" from "is necessarily", that distinction
> would
> be part of the ontology language. There would be classes which instances
> are necessarily members of, and classes which instances may be members of
> for part of their existence (of which subclasses would be necessarily
> (non)
> initial, necessarily (non) final, and those which an instance can join and
> leave multiple times). It would also probably have resulted in three or
> more subclass/subtype relations: one between rigid classes, one between
> non-rigid and rigid classes, and one (or more) between non-rigid classes. (033)
> [MW>] You do not have (valid) subtype relations between non-rigid
> and rigid classes in 3D,
> only between rigid classes and between non-rigid classes. (034)
You are making an Ontoclean recommendation a rule. (035)
In 3D, rigidity doesn't matter, because you are dealing with a single point
in time. (036)
If you want to reject having butterflies as types of insect or women as
types of people in an ontology, be my guest. But saying that no one
can have an ontology in which such things are true is quite extreme. (037)
Your can work in certain domains. So can the other. One can
establish mappings between assertions using the two frameworks.
Since that can be done, there is no need to say that one framework
is better than the other (except for certain purposes), nor is there
validity in claiming that one or the other framework is incorrect. (038)
-- doug foxvog (039)
-- doug foxvog (040)
> Regards
>
> Matthew West
> Information Junction
> Mobile: +44 750 3385279
> Skype: dr.matthew.west
> matthew.west@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
> http://www.informationjunction.co.uk/
> https://www.matthew-west.org.uk/
> This email originates from Information Junction Ltd. Registered in England
> and Wales No. 6632177.
> Registered office: 8 Ennismore Close, Letchworth Garden City,
> Hertfordshire,
> SG6 2SU.
>
>
>
> -- doug
>
>> Langauge and
>> ontology *are not* the same things. While language may contain many
>> clues as to how ontologically model something, it is only that - a clue.
>> ...
>
>> I suspect the majority of ontologists have come to at least the
>> following conclusions:
>>
>> 1. Ontology != Language
>> 2. There are serious limits to linguistic clues in building an
>> ontology ...
>
>> Best,
>> Ali
>>
>
>
>
> _________________________________________________________________
> Message Archives: http://ontolog.cim3.net/forum/ontolog-forum/
> Config Subscr: http://ontolog.cim3.net/mailman/listinfo/ontolog-forum/
> Unsubscribe: mailto:ontolog-forum-leave@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
> Shared Files: http://ontolog.cim3.net/file/ Community Wiki:
> http://ontolog.cim3.net/wiki/ To join:
> http://ontolog.cim3.net/cgi-bin/wiki.pl?WikiHomePage#nid1J
>
>
> (041)
_________________________________________________________________
Message Archives: http://ontolog.cim3.net/forum/ontolog-forum/
Config Subscr: http://ontolog.cim3.net/mailman/listinfo/ontolog-forum/
Unsubscribe: mailto:ontolog-forum-leave@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Shared Files: http://ontolog.cim3.net/file/
Community Wiki: http://ontolog.cim3.net/wiki/
To join: http://ontolog.cim3.net/cgi-bin/wiki.pl?WikiHomePage#nid1J (042)
|