Dear Hans,
You wrote:
We
should also be aware that there are different types of reality that we might
want to share or discuss. There is physical reality, detectable and measurable
by physical sensors – and our own senses. The coupling of that reality to the
perceptions presented to us in our brain is the topic of Rich’s presentation.
This is the domain of physics, chemistry, biology, and similar science and
engineering domains. Ironically, it is also an area where there is a fairly
healthy debate about whether there is such a thing as “objective” physical
reality related to interpretations of quantum mechanics, string theory, and
cosmology.
No, my claim is that our individual mental
concepts are correlated to the perceptions we can individually experience. I
can’t talk about an abstract “circle” without having actually experienced what
a manifested circle is. The circle I actually experienced seemed to wrap back
on itself, but other circles have little gaps between two ends (e.g., a key
chain on which I can skewer keys, but it has to have an open end so I can add
or remove keys from the chain).
Except for the case of extremely simple
concepts (circles, rectangles, triangles …), perception and experience play essential
roles in how I think about the concepts in which I classify those perceptions
and experiences. Even the extremely simple Michelson Morley experiment, which
concluded that light speed is constant, was interpreted completely differently
by AE who concluded that constant light speed implied changing spatial and
velocity factors. Yet in both MM’s actual experiment and AE’s
gedankenexperiment there were the same objects waiting for MM and AE to
perceive them as different manifestations of different conceptualizations of
space time.
So the only way to experience a concept is
through individual perceptions of the physical reality of the concepts. We
individually, through a lifetime of experience, develop mental concepts which
are simply abstractions of our experiences, ways of mapping contexts into relationally
organized concepts, but always based on the individual’s experience. If I
discuss my concept with you, it is very likely that you have a concept of your
own which is different than my concept, but similar enough that we can discuss
our own experiences. But no matter how vividly you explain your experience to
me, I will not experience exactly the same thing you did until I am placed in
an identical situation, I perceive the situation in my own terms, and I am able
to experience the reality for myself.
So I insist that perceptions aggregated
into concepts provide the only way of actually experiencing the concepts.
-Rich
Sincerely,
Rich Cooper
EnglishLogicKernel.com
Rich AT EnglishLogicKernel DOT com
9 4 9 \ 5 2 5 - 5 7 1 2
From:
ontolog-forum-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
[mailto:ontolog-forum-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx] On Behalf Of Hans Polzer
Sent: Friday, March 09, 2012 1:53
PM
To: ontolog-forum@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Subject: Re: [ontolog-forum] Constructs, primitives, terms
Rich,
One other important
point on this issue of “semantic baggage” is the issue that some types of
“reality” and associated frames of reference are inherently institutional or social
in nature. I had written on this point in response to an earlier post by Leo
Obrst, but my IP address was temporarily on a spammer list used by the forum to
filter emails and it never got sent (no wise-cracks, please J
). I’ve reproduced most of that email below.
We should also be
aware that there are different types of reality that we might want to share or
discuss. There is physical reality, detectable and measurable by physical
sensors – and our own senses. The coupling of that reality to the perceptions
presented to us in our brain is the topic of Rich’s presentation. This is the
domain of physics, chemistry, biology, and similar science and engineering
domains. Ironically, it is also an area where there is a fairly healthy debate
about whether there is such a thing as “objective” physical reality related to
interpretations of quantum mechanics, string theory, and cosmology.
Then there is
conceptual reality, which includes most of the discussion in this forum, but
transcends it, at least at the margins. For example, we can have the concept of
a corporation or a nation independent of any particular corporation or nation,
but specific corporations depend on the existence and processes of actual
nations (and in the case of the US, the existence of actual states – each of
which have somewhat different rules for the formation and continued existence
of corporations). Note that there are no physical sensors that can detect
corporations or nations – they are a reality created by human brains and sustained
by society. But there is an objective sense for conceptual reality – for
example, a corporation either exists or it doesn’t, in some jurisdiction – it’s
not up to our individual opinion as to whether said corporation or our driver’s
license exists.
The third type of
reality, social reality, is not grounded in any physical or conceptual reality,
but rather is based on social convention and the preponderance of opinion and
behavior. Most (all?) language is really of this nature. What a word means
is grounded in social reality. So is the value of real estate, both in terms of
current market value and value for a particular purpose (parking lot, lab,
high-rise office, etc.). There is no “ground truth” or “objective” truth
associated with terms and attribute values of conversations or data elements
discussing/describing social reality constructs. We have to be explicit about
what contexts and what associated “anchors” we are using when capturing,
representing, and communicating social reality constructs or activities. Saying
that someone is lying about some social reality can be problematic, and may
well be perceived as wrong by some other party with a different social frame of
reference. That’s why politics and the stock market are so much fun – they tend
to mix all these different types of reality together and most people have a
hard time distinguishing among them (and some are motivated to avoid those
distinctions).
The main point of
all this is that the nature of the frames of reference used to claim some
objective/absolute truth for a definition depend on the type of reality that
the definition is attempting to describe. Some concepts and “facts” are
inherently subjective in nature, and we need to be clear about which are which.
A last point on this
topic is that we can have “alternate realities”, that don’t correspond to any
physical, conceptual, or non-fictional social reality, at least not in any
straightforward way. Second Life comes to mind as a great example of an
alternate reality, as are the multi role player games on the Internet, but
there are many possible variations on this theme. The modeling and simulation
domain is mostly about creating alternate realities or partial, incomplete
representations of the realities above. The key again is to be explicit about
the context and frames of reference used to describe these alternate realities
so as to have them properly used or interpreted by others, over the network or
otherwise.
Hans
From: ontolog-forum-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
[mailto:ontolog-forum-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx]
On Behalf Of Hans Polzer
Sent: Friday, March 09, 2012 3:40
PM
To: '[ontolog-forum]
'
Subject: Re: [ontolog-forum] Constructs, primitives, terms
Rich,
I think it would be
better not to use terms like “semantic baggage”, which suggest some lack of
objectivity on the part of whoever defined C. At the risk of getting into a
discussion of Plato, the key point is that every definition of C, C’, and C”,
are based on some context (often assumed and implicit), some frame(s) of
reference for describing entities/concepts within that context, and with
specific (if often implicit) scope, and from some perspective upon that
context. Until we have a shared language for describing context, frames of
reference, their scope, and the perspective from which the context is
described, we will always have variations in definitions of C, C’. and C”.
Indeed, there will be as many variations of C as there are context dimensions
and scope values for those dimensions as might have a material influence on the
definition of C.
Which brings up
another important point, namely that of purpose of the definition, or of the
concept/entity being defined, modulo the above discussion. The purpose of the
definition is what determines whether a context dimension is material or not.
If the differences in definition of C and C’ do not alter the intended/desired
outcome for some purpose (or set of purposes over some context dimension scope
ranges), then they are functionally equivalent definitions in that context
“space”. This is the pragmatic aspect of “common” semantics, which many
on this forum have brought up in the past. Commonality is a meaningful concept
only if one specifies the context “space” (i.e., the range of context
dimensions and scope attribute value ranges for each dimension in that
“n”-space) over which the concept or entity definition is functionally
equivalent among the actors intending to use that definition for some set of
purposes.
The NCOIC SCOPE
model is an attempt to define such a context space and scope dimensional
“scales” so that two or more systems can determine whether they can
interoperate correctly for their intended purposes. Note that semantic
interoperability is only a portion of the SCOPE model dimension
set. Conversely, the SCOPE model is explicitly limited in scope to interactions
that are possible over a network connection. It does not address physical
interoperability, for example.
Hans
From: ontolog-forum-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
[mailto:ontolog-forum-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx]
On Behalf Of Rich Cooper
Sent: Friday, March 09, 2012 1:41
PM
To: '[ontolog-forum]
'
Subject: Re: [ontolog-forum] Constructs, primitives, terms
Dear David,
You wrote:
… In this example, the terms as used in C' and
C'' are effectively specializations (via added constraints) of the term in
C. To transmit a C' or C'' thing as a C thing is a fair substitution; but
to receive a C thing as a C' or C'' thing does an implicit narrowing that is
not necessarily valid.
…
In practice, though, such an understanding of the
differences (or that there are
differences) among similar terms as used in C, C' and C'' often comes out only
after a failure has occurred. In real-world use of any sort of language that
does not have mechanical, closed-world semantics, that potentially invalid
narrowing is not only unpreventable, but is often the "least worst"
translation that can be made into the receiver's conceptualization. Every
organization and every person applies their own semantic baggage (added
constraints) to supposedly common terms; said "local modifications"
are discovered, defined and communicated only after
a problem arises.
Your analysis seems promising, but I
suggest there is at least one more complication; the description of C must also
have been loaded with the “semantic baggage” of the person who defined it, just
as C’ and C” and therefore C seems likely to also be a specialization of some
even more abstract concept C- which may not have contained the baggage of C, C’
or C”.
There is no pure abstraction C- in most of
the descriptions for concepts so far as I have seen in our discussions.
Every concept seems to have been modulated by the proposer’s semantic
baggage. Since it is always a PERSON who produces the conceptualization C
in the first place, it isn’t possible to be that abstract.
-Rich
Sincerely,
Rich Cooper
EnglishLogicKernel.com
Rich AT EnglishLogicKernel DOT com
9 4 9 \ 5 2 5 - 5 7 1 2
From: ontolog-forum-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
[mailto:ontolog-forum-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx]
On Behalf Of David Flater
Sent: Friday, March 09, 2012 10:19
AM
To: [ontolog-forum]
Subject: Re: [ontolog-forum] Constructs, primitives, terms
On 3/5/2012 9:08 AM, John F. Sowa wrote:
Base vocabulary V: A collection of terms defined precisely at a level
of detail sufficient for interpreting messages that use those terms
in a general context C.
System A: A computational system that imports vocabulary V and uses
the definitions designated by the URIs. But it uses the terms in
a context C' that adds further information that is consistent with C.
That info may be implicit in declarative or procedural statements.
System B: Another computational system that imports and uses terms
in V. B was developed independently of A. It may use terms in V
in a context C'' that is consistent with the general context C,
but possibly inconsistent with the context C' of System A.
Problem: During operations, Systems A and B send messages from
one to the other that use only the vocabulary defined in V.
But the "same" message, which is consistent with the general
context C, may have inconsistent implications in the more
specialized contexts C' and C''.
My thinking began similar to what Patrick Cassidy wrote. In this example,
the terms as used in C' and C'' are effectively specializations (via added
constraints) of the term in C. To transmit a C' or C'' thing as a C thing
is a fair substitution; but to receive a C thing as a C' or C'' thing does an
implicit narrowing that is not necessarily valid.
In practice, though, such an understanding of the differences (or that there are differences) among similar terms as
used in C, C' and C'' often comes out only after a failure has occurred.
In real-world use of any sort of language that does not have mechanical,
closed-world semantics, that potentially invalid narrowing is not only
unpreventable, but is often the "least worst" translation that can be
made into the receiver's conceptualization. Every organization and every
person applies their own semantic baggage (added constraints) to supposedly
common terms; said "local modifications" are discovered, defined and
communicated only after a problem
arises.
Should we then blame the common model (ontology, lexicon, schema, exchange
format, whatever) for having been incomplete or wrong for the task at
hand? Nobody wants to complicate the model with the infinite number of
properties/attributes that don't matter. You just need to model exactly
the set of properties/attributes that are necessary and sufficient to prevent
all future catastrophes under all integration scenarios that will actually
happen, and none of those that won't happen. Easy! if you can predict the
future.
In digest mode,
--
David Flater, National Institute of Standards and Technology,
U.S.A.