Dear Simon,
Thanks for the Hume quotes. The antiquities
of his language usage notwithstanding, his conclusions seem inescapable. We
simply cannot know cause and effect; statistical knowledge is all that is
available to us, if even that. When we can statistically predict a future
event with reliability, we are exercising our experience, as categorized by the
situation at hand. But the concept of WHICH “situation at hand” is
actually at hand is a purely subjective observation and is dependent on the
observer and her experiences.
Thanks,
-Rich
Sincerely,
Rich Cooper
EnglishLogicKernel.com
Rich AT EnglishLogicKernel DOT com
9 4 9 \ 5 2 5 - 5 7 1 2
From:
ontolog-forum-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx [mailto:ontolog-forum-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx]
On Behalf Of Simon Spero
Sent: Sunday, November 13, 2011
10:50 AM
To: Len Yabloko; [ontolog-forum]
Subject: Re: [ontolog-forum] Science, Statistics and Ontology
On Sun, Nov 13, 2011 at 12:02 PM, Len Yabloko <lenyabloko@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
Never mind that David Hume thought there was not
any cause and effect to begin with.
Hume thought no such thing.
What he showed in section IV was that the relations between cause and
effect could not be "attained by reasonings a
priori; but arises entirely from
experience" (Enquiries, \s 23), and
that these relations would not be known with certainty.
Quoting
32:
Should
it be said that, from a number of uniform experiments, we
infer a connexion between the sensible qualities and the secret
powers; this, I must confess, seems the same difficulty, couched in different
terms. The question still recurs, on what process of argument this inference is founded? Where is the medium, the interposing ideas, which
join propositions so very wide of each other? It is confessed that the colour,
consistence, and other sensible qualities of bread appear not, of themselves,
to have any connexion with the secret powers of nourishment and support. For
otherwise we could infer these secret powers from the first appearance of these
sensible qualities, without the aid of experience; contrary to the sentiment of
all philosophers, and contrary to plain matter of fact. Here, then, is our
natural state of ignorance with regard to the powers and influence of all
objects. How is this remedied by experience? It only shows us a number of uniform
effects, resulting from certain objects, and teaches us that those particular
objects, at that particular time, were endowed with such powers and forces.
When a new object, endowed with similar sensible qualities, is produced, we
expect similar powers and forces, and look for a like effect. From a body of
like colour and consistence with bread we expect like nourishment and support.
But this surely is a step or progress of the mind, which wants to be explained.
When a man says, I have found, in
all past instances, such sensible qualities conjoined with such secret powers: And when he says, Similar sensible
qualities will always be conjoined with similar secret powers, he is not guilty of a tautology, nor are these propositions in any
respect the same. You say that the one proposition is an inference from the
other. But you must confess that the inference is not intuitive; neither is it
demonstrative: Of what nature is it, then? To say it is experimental, is
begging the question. For all inferences from experience suppose, as their
foundation, that the future will resemble the past, and that similar powers
will be conjoined with similar sensible qualities. If there be any suspicion
that the course of nature may change, and that the past may be no rule for the
future, all experience becomes useless, and can give rise to no inference or
conclusion. It is impossible, therefore, that any arguments from experience can
prove this resemblance of the past to the future; since all these arguments are
founded on the supposition of that resemblance. Let the course of things be
allowed hitherto ever so regular; that alone, without some new argument or
inference, proves not that, for the future, it will continue so. In vain do you
pretend to have learned the nature of bodies from your past experience. Their
secret nature, and consequently all their effects and influence, may change,
without any change in their sensible qualities. This happens sometimes, and
with regard to some objects: Why may it not happen always, and with regard to
all objects? What logic, what process of argument secures you against this
supposition? My practice, you say, refutes my doubts. But you mistake the
purport of my question. As an agent, I am quite satisfied in the point; but as
a philosopher, who has some share of curiosity, I will not say scepticism, I
want to learn the foundation of this inference. No reading, no enquiry has yet
been able to remove my difficulty, or give me satisfaction in a matter of such
importance. Can I do better than propose the difficulty to the public, even
though, perhaps, I have small hopes of obtaining a solution? We shall at least,
by this means, be sensible of our ignorance, if we do not augment our knowledge
In Section V,
he proposes some "Sceptical Solutions Of These Doubts";
quoting 44 at
length:
We may observe, that, in
these phaenomena, the belief of the correlative object is always presupposed;
without which the relation could have no effect. The influence of the picture
supposes, that we believe our
friend to have once existed. Contiguity to home can never excite our ideas of
home, unless webelieve that
it really exists. Now I assert, that this belief, where it reaches beyond the
memory or senses, is of a similar nature, and arises from similar causes, with
the transition of thought and vivacity of conception here explained. When I
throw a piece of dry wood into a fire, my mind is immediately carried to
conceive, that it augments, not extinguishes the flame. This transition of
thought from the cause to the effect proceeds not from reason. It derives its
origin altogether from custom and experience. And as it first begins from an
object, present to the senses, it renders the idea or conception of flame more
strong and lively than any loose, floating reverie of the imagination. That
idea arises immediately. The thought moves instantly towards it, and conveys to
it all that force of conception, which is derived from the impression present
to the senses. When a sword is levelled at my breast, does not the idea of
wound and pain strike me more strongly, than when a glass of wine is presented
to me, even though by accident this idea should occur after the appearance of
the latter object? But what is there in this whole matter to cause such a
strong conception, except only a present object and a customary transition to
the idea of another object, which we have been accustomed to conjoin with the
former? This is the whole operation of the mind, in all our conclusions
concerning matter of fact and existence; and it is a satisfaction to find some
analogies, by which it may be explained. The transition from a present object
does in all cases give strength and solidity to the related idea.
Here,
then, is a kind of pre-established harmony between the course of nature and the
succession of our ideas; and though the powers and forces, by which the former
is governed, be wholly unknown to us; yet our thoughts and conceptions have
still, we find, gone on in the same train with the other works of nature.
Custom is that principle, by which this correspondence has been effected; so
necessary to the subsistence of our species, and the regulation of our conduct,
in every circumstance and occurrence of human life. Had not the presence of an
object, instantly excited the idea of those objects, commonly conjoined with
it, all our knowledge must have been limited to the narrow sphere of our memory
and senses; and we should never have been able to adjust means to ends, or
employ our natural powers, either to the producing of good, or avoiding of
evil. Those, who delight in the discovery and contemplation of
final
causes, have here ample subject to employ
their wonder and admiration.
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