On Feb 4, 2011, at 3:52 AM, Chris Partridge wrote: (01)
> Hi Doug,
>
> One small clarification.
> I think the reason Markosian (and others) use the term "Descartes in 1625"
> is that it is relatively neutral in respect of its commitments - it does not
> presuppose the so-called 3D view.
>
> DF> the 3D statement would be "in 1625 Descartes is the same thing
>> as Descartes."
>
> I think it is quite difficult to get a version that does the work it needs
> to.
> In your version, if we assume that both occurrences of the term 'Descartes'
> refer to the same thing, then 1625 is superfluous.
> This may be because in the original version "... in 1625" was part of the
> name - but not in your version.
>
> It may be easiest to rely on a charitable interpretation. (02)
It is possible to read the English phrase "Descartes in 1625" in two ways. A
confirmed 4D thinker will give it a gloss which might be written as
"Descartes-in-1625" and think of this as a noun (phrase) denoting a temporal
slice of a philosopher. A confirmed 3D thinker will read it as "Descartes, in
1625", and take it be referring to Descartes, a robustly 3-dimensional chappie
- indeed, a continuant - throughout his life, and be saying that something
that was true of him in 1625. So if we take a slightly larger piece of text:
"Descartes in 1625 lived in Vienna", the first reading attributes a property
(timelessly) to the 4D slice, with the logical form (03)
Inhabit(Descartes-in-1625, Vienna) (04)
and the second attributes a temporally sensitive property - a fluent - to the
timeless entity called Descartes: (05)
Inhabit(Descartes, Vienna, 1625) (06)
The English does not clearly distinguish these two readings, hence the apparent
neutrality, but also the possibility that one who habitually reads such
sentences in one way will presume that this is the only correct reading. (07)
BTW, I say 'timeless' meaning 'not temporally extended, having no temporal
parts'. Of course, Descartes was temporally 'embedded', as we might say, in
that he was alive only during a certain temporal interval. But unlike any walks
he took, or other events in which he participated, he himself did not have a
temporal *extent*. He was simply wholly present at each moment of his lifetime.
And in this paragraph I speak continuant-talk rather than 4D-talk. (08)
Pat (09)
>
> Regards,
> Chris
>
>> -----Original Message-----
>> From: ontolog-forum-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx [mailto:ontolog-forum-
>> bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx] On Behalf Of doug foxvog
>> Sent: 04 February 2011 05:06
>> To: [ontolog-forum]
>> Subject: Re: [ontolog-forum] Presentism (was Re: Ontology of Rough Sets)
>>
>> On Jan 27, 2011, at 2:38 PM, Chris Partridge wrote:
>>> ...
>>> BTW the oddity I find with the Markosian description is this - "By
>>> contrast, on The 3D View, objects are to be thought of as three-
>>> dimensional things that are not made up of different temporal parts.
>>
>> This seems a good description of the 3D View. In the 3D View an object
> has a
>> starting time and an ending time, and the object can be referred to as the
>> same object at any time it exists. Translated into 4D terms, the 3D View
>> labels a certain set of 4D worms as objects but does not include the
> concept
>> of temporal parts or slices of the worm.
>>
>> Attributes which the 4D View assigns to a slice of a temporal worm applies
> to
>> the whole object *at the specified time* in the 3D View.
>>
>>> On this view, an object at a time
>>
>> ... is not considered as an object or as something with an identity.
>> This is the concept of a temporal slice.
>>
>>> - Descartes in 1625, for example - is the same thing as the whole
>>> object - Descartes.
>>
>> This is an incorrect portrayal of the 3D View, as the 3D View does not
> include
>> the first object. Instead of saying, "Descartes in 1625 is the same thing
> as
>> Descartes", the 3D statement would be "in 1625 Descartes is the same thing
>> as Descartes." In 4D terms, this would mean "a 1625 temporal slice of
>> Descartes is a temporal slice of Descartes."
>>
>> Some 3D systems do not allow a comparison of things at different times.
>>
>>> Thus, according to The 3D View, the relation between Descartes in 1625
>>> and Descartes in 1635 is the relation of identity:
>>> each one is just the same thing as Descartes."
>>
>> They are "identical" in that the two references to Descartes have the same
>> "identity", in the 3D View. There is no "each one", since only one object
> (in
>> 4D terms, a temporal worm) referred to.
>>
>>> As a term, 3D or three-dimensional things seems to imply spatial
>>> dimensions, but 'Descartes in 1625' and 'Descartes in 1635'
>>> are identical,
>>
>> No. The 3D View does not have the concept of "X in Year Y". This could
> be
>> stated in 3D terms as "the person referred to as 'Descartes'
>> in 1625 and the person referred to as 'Descartes' in 1635 were the same
>> person."
>>
>> A feature attributed to a temporal object at a certain time in the 3D
> view,
>> should be translated into a 4D statement saying that a temporal slice of
> that
>> object has that property at that time.
>>
>>> and he had a wider girth in 1635
>>> (or was in a different part of the house/country), then spatially he
>>> does not seem to be identical
>>
>> The identity is for the object -- in 4D terms the temporal worm -- not for
> any
>> arbitrary property of the object.
>>
>>> - his spatial characteristics (his 3D characteristics?) are then
>>> clearly not identical.
>>
>> Features of a temporal spatial object are permitted to be different at
>> different times in a 3D View.
>>
>>> But Markosian says
>>> "on The 3D View, objects are to be thought of as three-dimensional
>>> things".
>>
>> They are thought to have 3 spatial dimensions, and also a temporal extent
> --
>> which is not thought of as a dimension.
>>
>>> How can we think of them 'three-dimensional things' and also identical
>>> at different times?
>>
>> Some 3D systems would not allow the comparison of an object at different
>> times. For systems that do, such objects would be identical in that they
> have
>> the same identity -- not in that they have the same properties at
> different
>> times.
>>
>>> What sense does three-dimensional have here? Does it just mean capable
>>> of having spatial dimensions?
>>
>> It would mean having three spatial dimensions.
>>
>>> Your question, which to me has almost the force of a plea, is exactly
>>> my own reaction to the 'continuant' notion which Markosian is
>>> describing here.
>>> But this really is what some philosophers (Barry Smith and Peter
>>> Simons, to name but two) insist upon: ordinary physical objects, such
>>> as cups and saucers and animals such as you and me, are genuinely
>>> three-dimensional things which last through time
>>
>> In 4D terms, they are referring to 4D worms.
>>
>>> (already I have a mental problem, but leave that aside) and change
>>> their physical properties (perhaps) but not their identity.
>>> You are the *very same person* as time passes, on this view, and yet
>>> you are three-dimensional:
>>
>> ... in the spatial sense of "dimensional". The 3D view certainly accepts
> that a
>> temporal object has a start & end time.
>>
>>> at any time you are present, you are *wholly* present:
>>> all your parts are present. (Of course, by 'parts' I mean 'parts at
>>> the time in question', since parthood, like all other time-dependent
>>> relations, has to be relativized to a time.)
>>
>> This seems like a reasonable description of that view.
>>
>>> This perspective, I find, can be made
>>> intuitive and even comfortable, once one gets used to it; but it takes
>>> a certain mental discipline to keep reminding oneself that identity
>>> across times does not imply preservation of properties across times. I
>>> can grow fatter and still be the *very same* person, and this person
>>> can be wholly present now and also have been wholly present a while
>>> ago when I was thinner.
>>> Calling this 3D does not of course mean that I occupied the same, or
>>> even a congruent, chunk of 3D space as I did then; only that I did,
>>> and now also do, occupy a purely 3D space. And that space contains
>>> *all* of me now, just as that other space did back then, when there
>>> was less of me.
>>
>> This describes the 3D Viewpoint. However, it appears that you are
> thinking
>> of these 3D concepts in a 4D way, which makes it invalid.
>>
>> "All" of you refers to your complete 3D extent, not complete 4D extent,
>> above. Translating into 4D terms, the above description
>> means:
>> "A later temporal slice of me may be fatter than my current temporal
>> slice and still be temporal slices of the *very same* person, and
>> a temporal slice of this person can have its 3D extent wholly present
>> now and also have a temporal slice whose 3D extent was wholly present
>> a while ago when I was thinner.
>>
>> Calling this 3D does not of course mean that a temporal slice of me
>> occupied the same, or even a congruent, chunk of 3D space as a temporal
>> slice of me did then; only that a temporal slice of me did, and now
>> a temporal slice of me does, spatially occupy a purely 3D space. And
>> that space contains *all* of the 3D extent of my current instantaneous
>> temporal slice, just as that other space did back then,
>> when there was less 3D extent of the then current temporal slice of me."
>>
>>> But as I say, to stay comfortable with this perspective is a constant
>>> mental effort. And it has some very odd consequences. If for example
>>> we allow (as OBO does) something to be described either in this way or
>>> as a genuinely 4D entity, then we are obliged to distinguish the 4D
>>> 'thing'
>>> from the 3D one that lasts through time.
>>> OBO distinguishes in this way between a continuant and the occurrent
>>> which is that continuant's 'life'.
>>> So if Joe goes into an empty room and stays there for an hour, there
>>> were *two* things in the room during the hour:
>>
>> And for portions of the hour there were shorter slices of Joe's lifetime.
> There
>> were an infinite number of slices of Joe's life in the room at some point
>> during the hour.
>>
>>> Joe, the continuant, *and* the hour-long slice of Joe's lifetime. ( I
>>> have checked this very example with Werner, and he says this is the
>>> right analysis.) But of course they are in the room with two different
>>> senses of 'in', which makes everything much clearer.
>>
>> And the infinite other slices of Joe's lifetime are in the room with a
> different
>> sense of the word 'in'.
>>
>> -- doug
>>
>>> Pat
>>
>>
>>> I would have thought something like "on The 3D View, objects are to be
>>> thought of as having a three-dimensional spatial extent with no
>>> temporal extent that can be different at different times" would be less
>> confusing.
>>
>>
>>
>>> Regards,
>>>
>>> Chris
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> From: Christopher Menzel [mailto:cmenzel@xxxxxxxx]
>>> Sent: 27 January 2011 19:32
>>> To: [ontolog-forum]
>>> Cc: mail@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
>>> Subject: Re: [ontolog-forum] Presentism (was Re: Ontology of Rough
>>> Sets)
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Jan 27, 2011, at 12:58 PM, Chris Partridge wrote:
>>>
>>> Hi Chris,
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Is the issue here *strict* presentism?
>>>
>>> (Where weak presentism would allow past and future objects to exist,
>>> but exist in different ways.)
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> No. The qualification "strict" adds nothing; I should have just said
>>> "presentist".
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> I was under the impression that presentism and standard 3D accounts
>>> fitted naturally together (for example, Markosian makes this point in
>>> the Stanford article, though I find some of his comments on 3D a bit
>>> odd.).
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> I think Markosian's point is simply that one must be a 3D'ist if one
>>> is a presentist, pretty much by definition. But one can certainly be
>>> a 3D'ist without being a presentist. Presentism is a very problematic
>>> (though, I admit, rather metaphysically appealing, for whatever that's
>>> worth) form of 3D'ism - see for example the three difficulties
>>> Markosian mentions briefly at the end of the section on presentism in
> his
>> article.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> That one of the attractions of a 3D view is that it supports a
>>> presentist stance.
>>>
>>> Otherwise, I cannot make sense of your comment - copied below.
>>>
>>> CM> This is actually a rather radical metaphysical doctrine that
>>> encounters
>>> very serious semantic roadblocks not encountered by the standard 3D
>>> and 4D views.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> It seems pretty clear to me that non-presentist 3D'ism is the
>>> "commonsense"
>>> view, at least, when it comes to the past - Socrates "exists in the
> past"
>>> and we unproblematically refer to him. For the presentist, this is
>>> strictly false, as there is no such ontological property as "past
>>> existence" and hence no such thing as Socrates to refer to. But how,
>>> then, do we make any sense of such apparently unproblematic
>>> commonsense truths as "Socrates was a Greek philosopher"?
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Presentism, by my lights, as an utter non-starter for the purposes of
>>> knowledge representation. There might be tortured ways for the
>>> presentist to make sense of claims about past and future entities, but
>>> if we're interested in building usable knowledge bases for information
>>> systems, regardless of where we come down on the 3D-vs-4D issue, we
>>> simply need to be "ontologically promiscuous" (to borrow from the
>>> title of a lovely (and
>>> important) paper by Jerry Hobbs) about past and future objects and
>>> refer to them and quantify over them liberally and unabashedly.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> -chris
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> From: ontolog-forum-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
>>> [mailto:ontolog-forum-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx] On Behalf Of
>>> Christopher Menzel
>>> Sent: 27 January 2011 18:31
>>> To: [ontolog-forum]
>>> Subject: Re: [ontolog-forum] Presentism (was Re: Ontology of Rough
>>> Sets)
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Jan 27, 2011, at 7:00 AM, Ronald Stamper wrote:
>>>
>>> The only things deemed to exist in a presentist ontology (metaphysical
>>> sense) exist now. The present is no prison because we now have signs
>>> that stand for things we wish to know about in the past and future.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Actually, for the strict presentist, that is flatly false, because
>>> there are no "things.in the past and future" for our signs to refer to
>>> and for us to know about, for only presently existing things exist and
>>> things only exist now. This is actually a rather radical metaphysical
>>> doctrine that encounters very serious semantic roadblocks not
>>> encountered by the standard 3D and 4D views.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Presentism, I contend, provides a valuable discipline for engineers of
>>> information systems because that's the kind of world we deal with.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Seems to me that the world we deal with is the same regardless of
>>> one's metaphysical take on time. Be that as it may, might I suggest
>>> that the view you are actually arguing for is not presentism but
>>> rather the standard (and, I think most would agree, commonsense)
>>> 3-dimensionalist view that there is a distinguished, objective, ever
>>> changing present in virtue of which things are (at any present moment)
>>> genuinely present, past, or future?
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Chris Menzel
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
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>>
>> =============================================================
>> doug foxvog doug@xxxxxxxxxx http://ProgressiveAustin.org
>>
>> "I speak as an American to the leaders of my own nation. The great
> initiative
>> in this war is ours. The initiative to stop it must be ours."
>> - Dr. Martin Luther King Jr.
>> =============================================================
>>
>>
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