On Fri, February 4, 2011 4:52, Chris Partridge said:
>
> One small clarification.
> I think the reason Markosian (and others) use the term "Descartes in 1625"
> is that it is relatively neutral in respect of its commitments - it does
> not presuppose the so-called 3D view. (01)
Of course, it does not presuppose the 3D view; it presupposes the 4D view.
The text was purportedly a description of the 3D view, yet it uses a 4D
term and claims that the 3D view has something to state about that 4D term. (02)
> DF> the 3D statement would be "in 1625 Descartes is the same thing
>> as Descartes." (03)
> I think it is quite difficult to get a version that does the work
> it needs to.
> In your version, if we assume that both occurrences of the term
> 'Descartes'
> refer to the same thing, then 1625 is superfluous. (04)
Which is why many 3Ders have a problem understanding the 4D view.
Which is why in the 3D view "the same" spatial-temporal object is
present at any time it exists. (05)
> This may be because in the original version "... in 1625" was part
> of the name - but not in your version. (06)
It is part of the name of a 4D time slice of temporal-spatial object.
Such an object is not a 3D object, and as such is not described in 3D
terms. What 3D considers to be a temporal-spatial object, 4D considers
to be a complete temporal-spatial worm. (07)
> It may be easiest to rely on a charitable interpretation. (08)
> Regards,
> Chris
>
>> -----Original Message-----
>> From: ontolog-forum-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx [mailto:ontolog-forum-
>> bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx] On Behalf Of doug foxvog
>> Sent: 04 February 2011 05:06
>> To: [ontolog-forum]
>> Subject: Re: [ontolog-forum] Presentism (was Re: Ontology of Rough Sets)
>>
>> On Jan 27, 2011, at 2:38 PM, Chris Partridge wrote:
>> > ...
>> > BTW the oddity I find with the Markosian description is this - "By
>> > contrast, on The 3D View, objects are to be thought of as three-
>> > dimensional things that are not made up of different temporal parts.
>>
>> This seems a good description of the 3D View. In the 3D View an object
> has a
>> starting time and an ending time, and the object can be referred to as
>> the
>> same object at any time it exists. Translated into 4D terms, the 3D
>> View
>> labels a certain set of 4D worms as objects but does not include the
> concept
>> of temporal parts or slices of the worm.
>>
>> Attributes which the 4D View assigns to a slice of a temporal worm
>> applies
> to
>> the whole object *at the specified time* in the 3D View.
>>
>> > On this view, an object at a time
>>
>> ... is not considered as an object or as something with an identity.
>> This is the concept of a temporal slice.
>>
>> > - Descartes in 1625, for example - is the same thing as the whole
>> > object - Descartes.
>>
>> This is an incorrect portrayal of the 3D View, as the 3D View does not
> include
>> the first object. Instead of saying, "Descartes in 1625 is the same
>> thing
> as
>> Descartes", the 3D statement would be "in 1625 Descartes is the same
>> thing
>> as Descartes." In 4D terms, this would mean "a 1625 temporal slice of
>> Descartes is a temporal slice of Descartes."
>>
>> Some 3D systems do not allow a comparison of things at different times.
>>
>> > Thus, according to The 3D View, the relation between Descartes in 1625
>> > and Descartes in 1635 is the relation of identity:
>> > each one is just the same thing as Descartes."
>>
>> They are "identical" in that the two references to Descartes have the
>> same
>> "identity", in the 3D View. There is no "each one", since only one
>> object
> (in
>> 4D terms, a temporal worm) referred to.
>>
>> > As a term, 3D or three-dimensional things seems to imply spatial
>> > dimensions, but 'Descartes in 1625' and 'Descartes in 1635'
>> > are identical,
>>
>> No. The 3D View does not have the concept of "X in Year Y". This could
> be
>> stated in 3D terms as "the person referred to as 'Descartes'
>> in 1625 and the person referred to as 'Descartes' in 1635 were the same
>> person."
>>
>> A feature attributed to a temporal object at a certain time in the 3D
> view,
>> should be translated into a 4D statement saying that a temporal slice of
> that
>> object has that property at that time.
>>
>> > and he had a wider girth in 1635
>> > (or was in a different part of the house/country), then spatially he
>> > does not seem to be identical
>>
>> The identity is for the object -- in 4D terms the temporal worm -- not
>> for
> any
>> arbitrary property of the object.
>>
>> > - his spatial characteristics (his 3D characteristics?) are then
>> > clearly not identical.
>>
>> Features of a temporal spatial object are permitted to be different at
>> different times in a 3D View.
>>
>> > But Markosian says
>> > "on The 3D View, objects are to be thought of as three-dimensional
>> > things".
>>
>> They are thought to have 3 spatial dimensions, and also a temporal
>> extent
> --
>> which is not thought of as a dimension.
>>
>> > How can we think of them 'three-dimensional things' and also identical
>> > at different times?
>>
>> Some 3D systems would not allow the comparison of an object at different
>> times. For systems that do, such objects would be identical in that
>> they
> have
>> the same identity -- not in that they have the same properties at
> different
>> times.
>>
>> > What sense does three-dimensional have here? Does it just mean capable
>> > of having spatial dimensions?
>>
>> It would mean having three spatial dimensions.
>>
>> > Your question, which to me has almost the force of a plea, is exactly
>> > my own reaction to the 'continuant' notion which Markosian is
>> > describing here.
>> > But this really is what some philosophers (Barry Smith and Peter
>> > Simons, to name but two) insist upon: ordinary physical objects, such
>> > as cups and saucers and animals such as you and me, are genuinely
>> > three-dimensional things which last through time
>>
>> In 4D terms, they are referring to 4D worms.
>>
>> > (already I have a mental problem, but leave that aside) and change
>> > their physical properties (perhaps) but not their identity.
>> > You are the *very same person* as time passes, on this view, and yet
>> > you are three-dimensional:
>>
>> ... in the spatial sense of "dimensional". The 3D view certainly
>> accepts
> that a
>> temporal object has a start & end time.
>>
>> > at any time you are present, you are *wholly* present:
>> > all your parts are present. (Of course, by 'parts' I mean 'parts at
>> > the time in question', since parthood, like all other time-dependent
>> > relations, has to be relativized to a time.)
>>
>> This seems like a reasonable description of that view.
>>
>> > This perspective, I find, can be made
>> > intuitive and even comfortable, once one gets used to it; but it takes
>> > a certain mental discipline to keep reminding oneself that identity
>> > across times does not imply preservation of properties across times. I
>> > can grow fatter and still be the *very same* person, and this person
>> > can be wholly present now and also have been wholly present a while
>> > ago when I was thinner.
>> > Calling this 3D does not of course mean that I occupied the same, or
>> > even a congruent, chunk of 3D space as I did then; only that I did,
>> > and now also do, occupy a purely 3D space. And that space contains
>> > *all* of me now, just as that other space did back then, when there
>> > was less of me.
>>
>> This describes the 3D Viewpoint. However, it appears that you are
> thinking
>> of these 3D concepts in a 4D way, which makes it invalid.
>>
>> "All" of you refers to your complete 3D extent, not complete 4D extent,
>> above. Translating into 4D terms, the above description
>> means:
>> "A later temporal slice of me may be fatter than my current temporal
>> slice and still be temporal slices of the *very same* person, and
>> a temporal slice of this person can have its 3D extent wholly present
>> now and also have a temporal slice whose 3D extent was wholly present
>> a while ago when I was thinner.
>>
>> Calling this 3D does not of course mean that a temporal slice of me
>> occupied the same, or even a congruent, chunk of 3D space as a
>> temporal
>> slice of me did then; only that a temporal slice of me did, and now
>> a temporal slice of me does, spatially occupy a purely 3D space. And
>> that space contains *all* of the 3D extent of my current instantaneous
>> temporal slice, just as that other space did back then,
>> when there was less 3D extent of the then current temporal slice of
>> me."
>>
>> > But as I say, to stay comfortable with this perspective is a constant
>> > mental effort. And it has some very odd consequences. If for example
>> > we allow (as OBO does) something to be described either in this way or
>> > as a genuinely 4D entity, then we are obliged to distinguish the 4D
>> > 'thing'
>> > from the 3D one that lasts through time.
>> > OBO distinguishes in this way between a continuant and the occurrent
>> > which is that continuant's 'life'.
>> > So if Joe goes into an empty room and stays there for an hour, there
>> > were *two* things in the room during the hour:
>>
>> And for portions of the hour there were shorter slices of Joe's
>> lifetime.
> There
>> were an infinite number of slices of Joe's life in the room at some
>> point
>> during the hour.
>>
>> > Joe, the continuant, *and* the hour-long slice of Joe's lifetime. ( I
>> > have checked this very example with Werner, and he says this is the
>> > right analysis.) But of course they are in the room with two different
>> > senses of 'in', which makes everything much clearer.
>>
>> And the infinite other slices of Joe's lifetime are in the room with a
> different
>> sense of the word 'in'.
>>
>> -- doug
>>
>> > Pat
>>
>>
>> > I would have thought something like "on The 3D View, objects are to be
>> > thought of as having a three-dimensional spatial extent with no
>> > temporal extent that can be different at different times" would be
>> less
>> confusing.
>>
>>
>>
>> > Regards,
>> >
>> > Chris
>> >
>> >
>> >
>> >
>> >
>> > From: Christopher Menzel [mailto:cmenzel@xxxxxxxx]
>> > Sent: 27 January 2011 19:32
>> > To: [ontolog-forum]
>> > Cc: mail@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
>> > Subject: Re: [ontolog-forum] Presentism (was Re: Ontology of Rough
>> > Sets)
>> >
>> >
>> >
>> > On Jan 27, 2011, at 12:58 PM, Chris Partridge wrote:
>> >
>> > Hi Chris,
>> >
>> >
>> >
>> > Is the issue here *strict* presentism?
>> >
>> > (Where weak presentism would allow past and future objects to exist,
>> > but exist in different ways.)
>> >
>> >
>> >
>> > No. The qualification "strict" adds nothing; I should have just said
>> > "presentist".
>> >
>> >
>> >
>> > I was under the impression that presentism and standard 3D accounts
>> > fitted naturally together (for example, Markosian makes this point in
>> > the Stanford article, though I find some of his comments on 3D a bit
>> > odd.).
>> >
>> >
>> >
>> > I think Markosian's point is simply that one must be a 3D'ist if one
>> > is a presentist, pretty much by definition. But one can certainly be
>> > a 3D'ist without being a presentist. Presentism is a very problematic
>> > (though, I admit, rather metaphysically appealing, for whatever that's
>> > worth) form of 3D'ism - see for example the three difficulties
>> > Markosian mentions briefly at the end of the section on presentism in
> his
>> article.
>> >
>> >
>> >
>> >
>> >
>> >
>> > That one of the attractions of a 3D view is that it supports a
>> > presentist stance.
>> >
>> > Otherwise, I cannot make sense of your comment - copied below.
>> >
>> > CM> This is actually a rather radical metaphysical doctrine that
>> > encounters
>> > very serious semantic roadblocks not encountered by the standard 3D
>> > and 4D views.
>> >
>> >
>> >
>> > It seems pretty clear to me that non-presentist 3D'ism is the
>> > "commonsense"
>> > view, at least, when it comes to the past - Socrates "exists in the
> past"
>> > and we unproblematically refer to him. For the presentist, this is
>> > strictly false, as there is no such ontological property as "past
>> > existence" and hence no such thing as Socrates to refer to. But how,
>> > then, do we make any sense of such apparently unproblematic
>> > commonsense truths as "Socrates was a Greek philosopher"?
>> >
>> >
>> >
>> > Presentism, by my lights, as an utter non-starter for the purposes of
>> > knowledge representation. There might be tortured ways for the
>> > presentist to make sense of claims about past and future entities, but
>> > if we're interested in building usable knowledge bases for information
>> > systems, regardless of where we come down on the 3D-vs-4D issue, we
>> > simply need to be "ontologically promiscuous" (to borrow from the
>> > title of a lovely (and
>> > important) paper by Jerry Hobbs) about past and future objects and
>> > refer to them and quantify over them liberally and unabashedly.
>> >
>> >
>> >
>> > -chris
>> >
>> >
>> >
>> >
>> >
>> > From: ontolog-forum-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
>> > [mailto:ontolog-forum-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx] On Behalf Of
>> > Christopher Menzel
>> > Sent: 27 January 2011 18:31
>> > To: [ontolog-forum]
>> > Subject: Re: [ontolog-forum] Presentism (was Re: Ontology of Rough
>> > Sets)
>> >
>> >
>> >
>> > On Jan 27, 2011, at 7:00 AM, Ronald Stamper wrote:
>> >
>> > The only things deemed to exist in a presentist ontology (metaphysical
>> > sense) exist now. The present is no prison because we now have signs
>> > that stand for things we wish to know about in the past and future.
>> >
>> >
>> >
>> > Actually, for the strict presentist, that is flatly false, because
>> > there are no "things.in the past and future" for our signs to refer to
>> > and for us to know about, for only presently existing things exist and
>> > things only exist now. This is actually a rather radical metaphysical
>> > doctrine that encounters very serious semantic roadblocks not
>> > encountered by the standard 3D and 4D views.
>> >
>> >
>> >
>> >
>> >
>> >
>> >
>> > Presentism, I contend, provides a valuable discipline for engineers of
>> > information systems because that's the kind of world we deal with.
>> >
>> >
>> >
>> > Seems to me that the world we deal with is the same regardless of
>> > one's metaphysical take on time. Be that as it may, might I suggest
>> > that the view you are actually arguing for is not presentism but
>> > rather the standard (and, I think most would agree, commonsense)
>> > 3-dimensionalist view that there is a distinguished, objective, ever
>> > changing present in virtue of which things are (at any present moment)
>> > genuinely present, past, or future?
>> >
>> >
>> >
>> > Chris Menzel
>> >
>> >
>> >
>> >
>> >
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>> =============================================================
>> doug foxvog doug@xxxxxxxxxx http://ProgressiveAustin.org
>>
>> "I speak as an American to the leaders of my own nation. The great
> initiative
>> in this war is ours. The initiative to stop it must be ours."
>> - Dr. Martin Luther King Jr.
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