Hi Chris P. and Ed,
You wrote:
If one is 4D, then it does not acquire properties - it
always has the
properties. One needs to adopt a 3D approach to allow
for this.
It seems to me you are giving a 3D view here.
Nothing wrong with that - provide you acknowledge your
stance.
One could also say that one is 4D, but what is
happening is epistemic - one
gains knowledge about these properties at some point.
Again, one needs to acknowledge the stance one is
taking.
Clearly the 3D view will generally show a dynamic class inventory in 4D
environments, but its (3D) individual instances can be static snapshots of
those views, AND of NO OTHER view, said view not in said dynamic class
inventory, within the said 4D environments as viewed in the current state of
the 4D environment.
Other designs can be specified, usually as views of the said 3D view of
some equivalent 4D environment.
Rough views, for piecewise linear analysis;
Probabilistic views, for accounting for all case values uniformly;
Fuzzy, for sets that are too precise for their own instances
(languages, learning views, ...;
Crisp views, for observers that consume actual data. Usually that
is limited to the backup storage until an incident requires viewing it.
JMHO,
-Rich
Sincerely,
Rich Cooper
EnglishLogicKernel.com
Rich AT EnglishLogicKernel DOT com
9 4 9 \ 5 2 5 - 5 7 1 2
-----Original Message-----
From: ontolog-forum-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
[mailto:ontolog-forum-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx] On Behalf Of Chris Partridge
Sent: Friday, January 21, 2011 4:20 PM
To: edbark@xxxxxxxx; mail@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Cc: '[ontolog-forum] '
Subject: Re: [ontolog-forum] Ontology of Rough Sets
Hi Ed,
Comments below.
Chris
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Edward Barkmeyer [mailto:edward.barkmeyer@xxxxxxxx]
> Sent: 21 January 2011 21:00
> To: mail@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
> Cc: '[ontolog-forum] '
> Subject: Re: [ontolog-forum] Ontology of Rough Sets
>
> Chris,
>
> you wrote:
> > Hi Ed,
> >
> > Late delivery is a common business feature in financial
contracts,
> > such as foreign exchange.
> > I have always treated the contract as describing a possible
world -
> > which might be actual - and a late delivery (and a partial
late
> > delivery) as a counter-part (in the actual world) of the
delivery.
> > (This is a solution you indicate below).
> > In the case of your late shipment, doesn't the comment cash
out as any
> > actual shipment made after now that is a counter-part of the
> > contracted/agreed shipment will be late. In this case,
nothing changes
> > state.
>
> To be clearer, the conceptual shipment may acquire an
instance/counterpart
> when it originally goes on the schedule, i.e., when it is created
as an
object
> pursuant to an order under a contract. At that point it has
a number of
> properties -- the supplier, the customer, the quantity, the item,
the
order
> and the expected delivery date. Once the manufacturer
fulfills the order
by
> making and shipping the parts, it acquires additional properties
-- a
> container, a related carrier, a carrier contract, etc., and it
starts to
acquire
> real 'states', notably location at time.
If one is 4D, then it does not acquire properties - it always has the
properties. One needs to adopt a 3D approach to allow for this.
It seems to me you are giving a 3D view here.
Nothing wrong with that - provide you acknowledge your stance.
One could also say that one is 4D, but what is happening is epistemic -
one
gains knowledge about these properties at some point.
Again, one needs to acknowledge the stance one is taking.
All of this can be handled by ordinary
> relations, a few of which are ternary. But it becomes
"late" when the
> delivery date passes and the delivery has not happened. The
business
rules
> are written in terms of a class called 'late shipment', which can
be
defined in
> terms of other properties of a shipment, with a bit of trickery
for the
'time is
> past' relation. But the shipment does not satisfy the class
predicate
when it
> is created.
Which shipment in which possible world?
The shipment described by the contract (in the possible world defined
by the
contract) cannot be late - by definition.
In other possible worlds, its counterpart is late.
It comes to satisfy the class predicate precisely via the trickery for
> 'time is past'.
What trickery? I cannot see any.
There are times when one needs the indexicality of 'now', but not here
as
far as I can tell.
And the recovery actions could involve substitute shipments
> and reassignment of some other properties of the original
shipment. We
> can and do timestamp all these decisions and changes. The
problem is the
> relationship of the whole knowledge about the shipment to certain
> predicates and other relations, which are both true and false if
you don't
> specify a time interval. The problem is that they resemble
other
> propositions about the shipment that are constant -- true or false
for all
> time -- because they refer to intrinsic/essential properties of
the
shipment
> and not to accidental properties.
If one wants to include intrinsic/essential/accidental properties this
involves taking a position. Fine, but acknowledge the position and do
not
presume that other people also have to adopt that position.
>
> Put another way there are wffs that look like propositions and are
of four
> kinds:
> - those that are constantly true or false over all
(interesting) time
> - those that explicitly refer to time and state and are thus
constantly
true or
> false
> - those that implicitly refer to time and explicitly refer
to 'state',
like 'late
> shipment', for which we may have work-arounds
> - those that cannot be evaluated because they refer to state
without time
This only works if one adopts the very particular stance you are
proposing.
In a 4D/possible worlds stance your statements are just plain false.
Therefore, I assume you are not adopting this stance. As I said
earlier, it
is important to qualify statements like this with the stance you are
adopting.
>
> I would like to disallow the last group, because there is no
meaningful
> semantic model for them, but I don't know how to characterize
them. And
> the problem is that when you inject time concepts into a knowledge
base
> that was originally about instantaneous decisions, you find
'propositions'
> like that, primarily in rule antecedents.
>
> > Maybe our knowledge of the world changes states - however, as
I said
> > in an earlier mail on this thread, that is epistemic.
> >
>
> This has nothing to do with epistemics. The knowledge being
processed is
> what we have recorded as "fact", and any relationship to
the "real world"
is
> dependent on unmodeled factors. It is possible that the
shipment is
really
> in Baltimore, even though we have
recorded that it is in Memphis.
Handling
> correction to the knowledge base is a different problem.
I think, from your example, you are looking at a different aspect of
epistemic.
The epistemic issue here is that systemically we do not know the
future. So
when we look at the contact, we know it describes a possible world, we
just
do not know whether it describes the actual world - i.e. the one we are
in.
By epistemic here, I do not mean we have made a mistake in what we have
recorded (e.g. it is in Baltimore not Memphis) - just that we
do not know
something.
>
> (We do have a project dealing with capturing assertions from
supply-chain
> messages from multiple sources in IKL and evaluating their
consistency and
> credibility, but that is an entirely different issue.)
>
> > As you say, temporal words can sometimes be about temporal
and modal
> > relationships.
> >
> > EB> The 4D idea that a thing in a different state is a
different
> > EB> thing,
> >
> >> and 'objects' are actually sequences (or more generally,
lattices) of
> >> things in states
> >>
> >
> > Just to be clear, some 4D approaches build up the 4D objects
from
> > their states.
> > However, I think it is often simpler to take the objects as
just 4D
> > simpliciter. If one wants to consider their states, then
these are
> > temporal slices that are also 4D simpliciter.
> >
> > EB>, but it is totally out of
> >
> >> line with the intuition of the domain experts.
> >>
> >
> > Jubien starts his book on properties with several examples of
4D talk
> > in everyday natural language. There seems to be a growing
consensus
> > that talk about events and processes are naturally 4D. The
first half
> > of the football match, etc. I'm sure football referees
intuitions can
> > stretch to first halves.
> >
>
> People have no problem with the idea of happenings in time, and
states of
> the world in time. No one has a problem with models of Chris
Partridge,
or
> a shipment, playing a role in a proposition that describes a
situation and
> refers to time. The intuition failure is the model of states
of an
individual
> thing in time. They don't think of Chris Partridge, or a
shipment of
goods, as
> a 'situation' in time.
Not sure what you mean here by a 'situation' in time.
We often think of people, especially historical figures, as situated in
time, and having states - Chris Partridge's childhood - Picasso's blue
period.
If you mean we have conflicting intuitions, I agree.
Also, not sure why you privilege domain expert's and their intuition.
Intuitions are easily tutored - so not a good basis for much.
Maybe, I have missed the point - would an example help?
>
> -Ed
>
> > Chris
> >
> >
> >> -----Original Message-----
> >> From: ontolog-forum-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
[mailto:ontolog-forum-
> >> bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx] On Behalf Of Ed Barkmeyer
> >> Sent: 21 January 2011 18:39
> >> To: [ontolog-forum]
> >> Subject: Re: [ontolog-forum] Ontology of Rough Sets
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> Christopher Menzel wrote:
> >>
> >>> On Jan 21, 2011, at 9:46 AM, doug foxvog wrote:
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>> ...
> >>>> A standard distinction between a set and a class,
is that
> >>>> membership in a [set] cannot change, while
membership in a class can.
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>> I think it's useful to distinguish two claims when it
comes to the
> >>>
> > identity
> >
> >> conditions of classes:
> >>
> >>> (1) Classes are not extensional (i.e., distinct
classes can have the
> >>> same members/instances)
> >>>
> >>> (2) Classes can change their membership.
> >>>
> >>> In the formal semantics of a number of KR languages,
(1) is true
> >>> but,
> >>>
> > strictly
> >
> >> speaking at least, (2) is not. Notably, classes in
OWL are
> >> explicitly
> >>
> > non-
> >
> >> extensional: since a class is stipulated only to *have*
an extension
> >> in
> >>
> > OWL's
> >
> >> formal semantics, nothing prevents distinct classes from
having the
> >> same extension. The same is true of RDF.
However, simply because
> >> there is no formal notion of change built into OWL's
semantics, there
> >> is no
> >>
> > possibility,
> >
> >> within a given interpretation, that a class change its
membership.
> >> As
> >>
> > noted
> >
> >> in an earlier message in this thread, without augmenting
the notion
> >> of an OWL interpretation somehow, change can only be
represented
> >> formally in terms of something like a series of
interpretations that
> >> are thought of as temporally ordered. That said,
(2) does seem to be
> >> a strong *intuitive*
> >>
> > idea
> >
> >> in the KR, AI, and database communities.
> >>
> >> The particular problem I have recently got involved in is
the
> >> intrusion of temporal concepts into would-be ontologies
in business
> applications.
> >> In the supply-chain area, for example, it is important to
be able to
> >> talk
> >>
> > about
> >
> >> schedules and shipments being "late".
Getting past the indexical
> >> issues, which are fixed by translating the intuitive
"now"
> >> into specific time relationships, the particular problem
is that
> >> shipments
> >>
> > and
> >
> >> orders do change state, and actions are taken on the
basis of
> >>
> > reclassification.
> >
> >> A major problem for us is that the industry folk throw
these concepts
> >> into what was an ontology for the "snapshot"
model of decision-making
> >> -- the state of the world at the time the decision is to
be made.
> >> This gives
> >>
> > rise to
> >
> >> formalizing ideas like "proposition X is false at
time A and true at
> >> time
> >>
> > B."
> >
> >> And that problem arises from the idea that states of
things are
> >>
> > characterized
> >
> >> by propositions, which seems to be fundamental to
applications of
> >> ontologies. The 4D idea that a thing in a different
state is a
> >> different
> >>
> > thing,
> >
> >> and 'objects' are actually sequences (or more generally,
lattices) of
> >>
> > things in
> >
> >> states, is a means of producing a formal semantics, but
it is totally
> >> out
> >>
> > of
> >
> >> line with the intuition of the domain experts. They
cannot then
> >>
> > "validate"
> >
> >> the ontology -- they don't understand it.
> >>
> >> I have said in that forum that solving the problem is
beyond my
expertise.
> >>
> > It
> >
> >> is my conviction that the problem is not really
"time", but rather
> >> "change
> >>
> > of
> >
> >> state" or "alternative states", and in
that sense, "time" is a means
> >> of
> >>
> > labeling
> >
> >> "alternative possible worlds".
> >>
> >> All we are saying is that the intuitive notion of change
is endemic
> >> to a
> >>
> > lot of
> >
> >> ontology applications. We can usually constrain the
immediate
> >> application to avoid the problem or create a convenient
work-around,
> >> but that usually means that the next application the
business wants
> >> to use the ontology for requires re-writing it.
> >>
> >> -Ed
> >>
> >> "Mathematicians are like Frenchmen. Whatever
you say to them they
> >> translate into their own language and at once it becomes
something
> >> entirely different."
> >> -- Goethe
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>> Finally, the idea that sets are extensional and
classes are not is
> >>>
> > definitely
> >
> >> not standard among logicians and mathematicians, who
typically
> >> associate the notion of class with theories like VNBG,
wherein both
> >> classes and sets are extensional.
> >>
> >>> -chris
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >> --
> >> Edward J.
Barkmeyer
Email: edbark@xxxxxxxx
> >> National Institute of Standards & Technology
Manufacturing Systems
> >> Integration Division
> >> 100 Bureau
Drive, Stop
8263
Tel: +1 301-975-3528
> >> Gaithersburg,
MD 20899-8263
Cel: +1 240-672-5800
> >>
> >> "The opinions expressed above do not reflect
consensus of NIST, and
> >> have not been reviewed by any Government authority."
> >>
> >>
> >>
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>
>
> --
> Edward J.
Barkmeyer
Email: edbark@xxxxxxxx
> National Institute of Standards & Technology Manufacturing
Systems
> Integration Division
> 100 Bureau Drive,
Stop
8263
Tel: +1 301-975-3528
> Gaithersburg, MD 20899-8263
Cel: +1 240-672-5800
>
> "The opinions expressed above do not reflect consensus of
NIST, and have
> not been reviewed by any Government authority."
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