On Fri, October 1, 2010 10:58, Rick Murphy said:
> On Fri, 2010-10-01 at 04:13 +0000, FERENC KOVACS wrote:
>> Wordnet defines entity as "that which is perceived or known to have its
>> own distinct existence." (01)
As mentioned by John Sowa, this is not a definition, but a "gloss", i.e.
a hint at the meaning of the term. Also, note that WordNet is not an
ontology. It does not define terms. It records approximately how words
are used. (02)
>> which is the same thing as saying
>> An entity is (a whole) object with the property of existence (the most
>> generic one).
> Disagree. Entity subsumes Object and Concept. See . (03)
The reference is to WordNet, not Church's 1951 paper. WordNet gives
6 noun synsets for "object", one of which equates object with "physical
object" (which suggests to me that there might be non-physical objects
as well, else why use the modifier). One of the WN synsets for "object"
has the gloss "the focus of cognitions". This meaning is broader than
that of "entity" (since any entity can be the focus of cognitions) and
consistent with Ferenc's rephrasing. (04)
WordNet gives, as an example use of this meaning "objects of thought".
Many things can be objects of thought which are not "perceived or known
to have [their] own distinct existence." A color, e.g. Red, can not
have its own existence. Nor can the left half of a physical object,
nor an internal part, nor many other things. (05)
Church's paper , fwiw, does not define "Object". (06)
There are many technical descriptions of logic, which formalize definitions
for various common English words. Unless someone has agreed to use
a specific technical definition for a general word, it is inappropriate,
imho, to criticize someone for not using the technical definition which
you prefer. (07)
> Concepts are abstract entities in the referenced paper. (08)
More specifically, they are defined as the senses of names.
"A name is said to *denote* its denotation and to *express* its sense,
and the sense is said to be a *concept* of the denotation."
Note that the denotation of a 1951 Church concept can be an abstract
entity which is NOT itself a 1951 Church concept. (09)
> Objects are concrete. (010)
No. "Objects" are undefined in the paper. (011)
> Concept and Object are complements: their extents are disjoint. (012)
It's true that 1951 Church concepts and physical objects are disjoint.
But, the word "complement" mean that the set of complements make up a
whole. What is the whole which the union of physical objects and
the senses of all names comprises? (013)
> Returning to the subject of earlier threads, Abstract Objects have no
> extent: they do not exist. (014)
If you define "Object" as the meaning of the synset which WordNet names
"physical object", this is correct: Abstract physical objects do not
exist. Since WordNet provides a half dozen synsets for "object", the
one shared with "physical object" is obviously not the synset meant by
someone who uses the phrase "abstract object". (015)
"Abstract object of thought", on the other hand does have an extent. (016)
-- doug (017)
> 1 http://www.ditext.com/church/nae.html
> Rick (018)
doug foxvog doug@xxxxxxxxxx http://ProgressiveAustin.org (019)
"I speak as an American to the leaders of my own nation. The great
initiative in this war is ours. The initiative to stop it must be ours."
- Dr. Martin Luther King Jr.
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