Dear Azamat, (01)
> On Thursday, September 11, 2008 11:33 AM, Matthew wrote:
>
> 'The key choices that seem to me to be relevant here are:
> 1. Do particulars have temporal parts or not.
> i.e. are particulars extended in time as well as space (or not)?
> 2. Extensionalism (or not) in particulars.
> i.e. if particulars coincide, are they the same thing?
> 3. Eternalism vs presentism.
> i.e. is everything that exists what exists now, or is everything that
> exists include all that exists in the past and the future?
> 4. Extensionalism in sets/types/classes vs intensionalism
> i.e. if two sets/types/classes have the same membership, are they the
> same.'
>
> Now my choices are:
> > - Temporal Parts
> > - Extensionalism for particulars
> > - eternalism
> > - Extensionalism in sets
> >
> >>From the way you are talking you choices would seem to be:
> > - Temporal Parts
> > - (not clear from these discussions, but probably extensionalism for
> > particulars)
> > - Presentism (the membership of types changes over time)
> > - Intensionalism'
>
> Matthew,
>
> Very clear account, as always. But summing up looks not so consistent,
> what
> may be caused by the interpretation of ''eternalism', your or mine. If
> its
> meaning implies ''eternity'', then this sort of ontology of time would
> deny
> temporal boundaries at all or time itself, and hence any measure or
> number
> for change and motion.
> In fact, there is eternity as infinite duration, timelessness and
> immutability, and there is time, as a specific whole made of specific
> parts:
> the past, the now, the future. (02)
[MW] I tried to be clear about what I meant:
"everything that exists includes all that exists in the past and the
future." (03)
And of course I did not you or anyone else to interpret what I meant
differently. (04)
> But particulars with their classes are
> not
> the things partaking of eternity. Its denizens are rather fundamental
> properties and relationships, determining the meanings or intensions of
> things, and their classes, which innumerable members are the instances
> of
> those essential properties, in some particular world or state of
> affairs. (05)
[MW] Now you are talking about universals, some thing quite different,
but thanks for allowing me to make the distinction. (06)
> It
> appears that John ontological commitments look more coherent or, say,
> ontological, as far as ontology is about intensional entities and
> models,
> unlike formal set theory dealing with extensional things and
> interpretations. It is natural that some known ontologists tried to
> review
> the set theory, where sets and classes would be replaced by properties
> or
> attributes. (07)
[MW] If you think that it is about intensional entities then of course
you will prefer John's account. I don't take that view. (08)
> It must be also noted that in the information sciences and engineering,
> a
> usual doing is to divide the conceptual model into two complementary
> parts:
>
> A. intensional (intrinsic, underlying, innermost, inherent,
> essential,
> implicit, and constitutional);
>
> B. extensional (extrinsic, external, extraneous, or accidental).
>
> The former implies the generic things and relationships of the world
> and so
> inherently referred to ontology and embodied as a knowledge base
> schema. The
> latter involves particular states and cases of the world, and it deals
> with
> all sorts of specific assertions about specific instances of classes
> and
> relationships determined by the ontology, and presented as a knowledge
> base
> instance. So, the ontological work consists in providing the general
> entities, as properties, principles, rules, lwas, and underlying
> meanings,
> which form the base for any particular domain of special classes and
> individual things, or extensional classes. It seems to me that a
> noncontradictory position in terms of your conclusion could be:
> Eternalism
> (time as infinite duration) naturally implying Intensionalism [for
> individuals and classes]. (09)
[MW] I am of course aware of this view, however, I find that I loose
nothing in rejecting it and gain some simplicity. (010)
Regards (011)
Matthew West
http://www.matthew-west.org.uk/ (012)
>
> Thanks again for your inspiring communication.
>
>
>
> Azamat Abdoullaev
>
>
>
> ----- Original Message -----
> From: "Matthew West" <dr.matthew.west@xxxxxxxxx>
> To: "'[ontolog-forum] '" <ontolog-forum@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> Sent: Thursday, September 11, 2008 11:33 AM
> Subject: Re: [ontolog-forum] Thing and Class
>
>
> > Dear John,
> >
> > I know we usually agree on most things, so here I am going to try to
> > tease out what if anything we might disagree about here.
> >
> >> First of all, I strongly endorse the 4-d view, and I believe that
> >> it is preferable to a 3-d view for many problems. However, I don't
> >> believe that there is any ontology that is ideal for all problems.
> >
> > [MW] Yes, that is my position too.
> >>
> >> JFS>> Whether you have a 3D or a 4D perspective, change still
> exists,
> >>
> >> MW> Not really. 4-Dimensionalism has the effect of making 3D change
> >> > seem static, because it is looked at in a different way, in 4
> >> > dimensions instead of 3.
> >>
> >> The basic laws of physics are stated in differential equations,
> which
> >> are "almost" symmetric with respect to the space and time
> coordinates.
> >>
> >> I use the term 'almost' because entropy creates an "arrow of time",
> >> which breaks that symmetry. In relativistic terminology, the arrow
> >> of time defines a *light cone* that delimits the causal influences.
> >> If you look in the direction of that arrow, you find increasing
> >> entropy. But there is no such distinction in any of the spatial
> >> coordinates.
> >
> > [MW] Again I agree, but this is not really the root of what is
> different
> > between 3D and 4D. The real difference is that 3D sees that what
> exists
> > now is all that exists, whilst 4D sees the past and the future as
> part of
> > what exists as well as the present. This is what it means to stand
> outside
> > time.
> >
> > If you think about it this is necessary when you accept that things
> have
> > temporal parts. If things have temporal parts, then those temporal
> parts
> > must exist, but they are extended in time, so things that are not
> simply
> > "here and now" must exist, i.e. all spatio-temporal extents exist (at
> all
> > times, but strictly independent of time). Now when I was saying it
> was
> > natural in 4D that the set of, say cars, was the set of all cars that
> ever
> > existed, that is because it is natural for the set of cars to be the
> set
> > of
> > all cars that exist, and since that is the set of all extents that
> are
> > cars
> > for the whole of their lives, then that is naturally the set of all
> cars
> > that ever existed or will exist (to put it in 3D terms).
> >>
> >> MW> ... extensionalism in classes is quite natural when you have
> >> > dealt with change in the way that 4-dimensionalism does.
> >>
> >> I'll avoid getting into debates about what is 'natural', but I must
> >> emphasize that the distinction is independent of time or change.
> >> In my previous note, I made that point by talking about hypothetical
> >> issues, but the same point can also be made in terms of modal logic.
> >
> > [MW] And interestingly, I again use possible worlds as an alternative
> > to modal logic. Not that I object to others using modal logic, but I
> > do not see that I am obliged inevitably to do so.
> >>
> >> Second, the distinction can be seen very clearly in examples such as
> >> the types HumanBeing and FeatherlessBiped, both of which have the
> same
> >> extension, but different intensions. It's irrelevant whether those
> >> two types have the same extension in a 4-d universe or for all time
> >> in a 3-d universe. They are not provably equivalent according to
> >> the usual definitions of the terms. Therefore, they are different
> >> by intension, and only accidentally the same by extension.
> >
> > [MW] Again, I do not object to others choosing to follow this route,
> > I only say that I am not inevitably obliged to do so, and in fact do
> > not.
> >
> > What you say is very "natural" for someone with a background in logic
> > and traditional set theory which has a strong emphasis on predicates
> > equating to sets or types, but this is not an inevitable choice. For
> > example, I prefer to say that sometimes predicates do not refer to a
> > set (e.g. Russels paradox), and sometimes more than one predicate
> refers
> > to the same set (e.g. your example above).
> >>
> >> JFS>> In any perspective, you must be able to plan for the future,
> >> >> talk about what exists NOW, or what exists in some hypothetical
> >> >> time or place that might never exist anywhere in the 4D
> universe.
> >>
> >> MW> Yes. But in a 4-dimensional world view, all of this can be dealt
> >> > with extensionally, so why wouldn't you?
> >>
> >> You wouldn't in either 3-d or 4-d because it's impossible. Many
> more
> >> things are planned than are ever implemented, and many things that
> are
> >> implemented have no little or no resemblance to the plans.
> Therefore,
> >> you must be able to talk about the *type* of airplane because the
> set
> >> is very likely empty in any or all ontologies. And there is exactly
> >> one empty set: the set of all unicorns is identical to the set of
> >> all airplanes with flapping wings.
> >
> > [MW] This is just another case that is covered by possible worlds.
> Plans
> > are about possible worlds you wish to bring about, but often they do
> not
> > coincide exactly with the real world, and they can include entirely
> > fictional
> > worlds in which unicorns do exist, and then I can quantify across
> these
> > possible worlds and not end up with the empty set.
> >>
> >> MW> Well you can do the usual things with possible worlds to deal
> >> > with That [hypotheticals], so no great problem there.
> >>
> >> But we cannot observe, visit, or manipulate possible worlds.
> >
> > [MW] But we can talk about them and say "What if?" which is the usual
> use
> > I find for these in practice.
> >
> >> When we reason about possible worlds and entities on our computers,
> >> we are actually using intensional descriptions of the hypothetical
> >> entities to create 'virtual' extensions.
> >
> > [MW] I suggest that using possible worlds is not necessarily
> restricted
> > to this. I see the entities as existing in the possible world, and
> not
> > being hypothetical.
> >>
> >> Even with our actual world, it is impossible to deal with extensions
> >> for most of the things we talk about. Census takers are well aware
> >> of the difficulty of enumerating all the people in a single city.
> >> Imagine trying to enumerate or reason with the set of all mice,
> >> flies, or bacteria in a city. We must reason with intensional
> >> descriptions because it's impossible to deal with the extensions.
> >
> > [MW] Ah! OK. Here we need to distinguish between what is and what we
> > know. Ontologically, the set of people in a city (at a point in time)
> > does exist, but we may not know all the members. That does not make
> the
> > set intensional, nor does it mean the set does not exist, it only
> means
> > we do not have complete knowledge about it.
> >
> > This brings some practical problems, but it is not an ontological
> reason
> > for intensionality.
> >>
> >> MW> They [differential equations] are just descriptions of 4D
> >> > objects, just as a quadratic can describe a line in two
> dimensions.
> >>
> >> Yes, indeed. Those equations are *intensional* characterizations
> >> of entities that might or might not exist in any world, independent
> >> of whether the ontology happens to be viewed in 3-d or 4-d terms.
> >
> > [MW] I see these as properties that all members happen to have. That
> > might be why a particular set is interesting, rather than another
> one.
> >>
> >> MW> However, a 3D ontology will be predisposed to an intensional
> >> > approach, whereas I find with a 4D ontology an extensional
> approach
> >> > is more natural.
> >>
> >> In all of your examples of hypotheticals and plans, you were talking
> >> about the intensional characterizations. So you were doing what I
> >> was suggesting: talking about intensions.
> >
> > [MW] I agree I am "talking about" the same things, but in different
> > terms.
> >
> > Bottom Line
> >
> > There are a number of ontological positions that you need to choose
> > between, and it seems to me that we have not made all the same
> choices,
> > and this is what is resulting in the differences we have found here.
> >
> > The key choices that seem to me to be relevant here are:
> > 1. Do particulars have temporal parts or not.
> > i.e. are particulars extended in time as well as space (or not)?
> > 2. Extensionalism (or not) in particulars.
> > i.e. if particulars coincide, are they the same thing?
> > 3. Eternalism vs presentism.
> > i.e. is everything that exists what exists now, or is everything that
> > exists include all that exists in the past and the future?
> > 4. Extensionalism in sets/types/classes vs intensionalism
> > i.e. if two sets/types/classes have the same membership, are they the
> > same.
> >
> > Now my choices are:
> > - Temporal Parts
> > - Extensionalism for particulars
> > - eternalism
> > - Extensionalism in sets
> >
> >>From the way you are talking you choices would seem to be:
> > - Temporal Parts
> > - (not clear from these discussions, but probably extensionalism for
> > particulars)
> > - Presentism (the membership of types changes over time)
> > - Intensionalism
> >
> > Now none of these choices are a free lunch it seems to me, and
> various
> > combinations
> > can make sense, though I think there are some that do not, and there
> are
> > other
> > choices to be made beyond these (like possible worlds and modal
> logic). In
> > my mind,
> > the most important thing is to be clear about the choices you have
> made,
> > and
> > then
> > be consistent, rather than that there is only one "right" choice that
> can
> > be
> > made.
> >
> >
> > Regards
> >
> > Matthew West
> > http://www.matthew-west.org.uk/
> >
> >
> >>
> >> John
> >>
> >>
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