Ingvar,
I think I am in agreement with you on most of your points, insofar as I
understand them, except for the one about why bring in epistemology. I
don't know enough formally about philosophical ontology to think it is tied to
any particular belief. I simply saw something that raised questions for me. The
questions are about how a view of what a proposition is could relate to the
application of the ontological endeavor. Such application, or informing such
application, if I understand correctly (do I?), is one goal associated with this
forum.
If I interpret you correctly, your answer is something along these lines:
a) you agree that the meanings of propositions cannot always be easily
ascertained, but b) we can still do ontology to a degree to which we can agree
on their meanings and move knowledge forward, which is "quite a bit" despite the
issues of uncertainty in some realms about what we're talking about.
I agree. My concern was that in an effort to make an ontology for some type
of indexing of knowledge (applied ontology, as opposed to philosophical
ontology??), we should be aware of a vast universe of propositions and knowledge
for which this will be difficult or impossible, given the difficulty even
ascertaining what the propositions are.
One question was about the degree to which this concern is relevant to the
endeavor. If it's relevant at all, another question might be about how to
maintain perspective on the endeavor - build it somehow into the structure and
use of an ontology - in light of the concern. For example, the frontier of
definition and agreement on propositions shifts, perhaps even on previously
asserted propositions - how can this be handled, if it should?
One more caveat - I'm new to the formal ontological endeavor, and
particularly to the realm of its application, so please excuse the degree to
which my questions reflect a naivete about it (unless that contributes to useful
ideas, coming from another perspective). Also, I entered this forum not long
ago, so may have missed much about what it's about.
Ken
ingvar.johansson@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx writes:
Often,
ontological, epistemological, and semantic problems overlap, but
now and
then they can be kept distinct. In my mails I have only tried to
defend
the *philosophical-ontological view* that natural languages
contain
propositions, and that propositions are the primary truth-value
bearers.
This is quite consistent with both your *epistemological view*
that in
empirical matters one can never know with "absolute" certainty
that a
specific proposition is true, and your *semantic view* that in
actual
communication one can never be sure that speaker and hearer have
apprehended "exactly" the same proposition. Furthermore, I share these
views with you. But in practice we seem nonetheless to able to improve
on knowledge and communicate quite a bit. The only reason I can find why
you bring in epistemology, is that you think that philosophical ontology
is necessarily tied to a belief in infallible knowledge (as it was among
the rationalists and the idealists of earlier centuries), but this is
wrong. Philosophical ontology is quite compatible with fallibillism in
epistemology. One can give up "the quest for certainty" but nonetheless
do philosophical ontology.
My thesis about propositions implies
that there are "abstract objects"
in speech acts and reading acts in
natural languages. My view is in
conflict with Quine's philosophical
ontology, according to which there
is one and only one kind of abstract
objects: sets.
best communicative
wishes,
Ingvar