In a message dated 5/23/2007 3:21:46 A.M. Eastern Daylight Time,
ingvar.johansson@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx writes:
I would
like to switch from "truth and reality" to "what is a
proposition?" Here
is what one of my philosophical dictionaries says:
"In philosophy, but
not in business and sexual activity, a proposition
is whatever can be
asserted, denied, contended, maintained, assumed,
supported, implied, or
presupposed. It is that which is expressed by a
typical indicative
sentence. The same proposition may be expressed by
different
sentences."
I have a few thoughts related to a point I made about
determining the truth of propositions - that is, they have truth values, but we
may have a hard time ascertaining the truth value of any given proposition.
Science gives us a way to approach that endeavor in a way that agreement is
sought in a community about what propositions have a high likelihood of having a
high degree of truth.
Here's a similar thought about what any given proposition is:
it can be similarly difficult to ascertain in some cases. I'll consider a
proposition to be the meaning of the statement expressing it, not just the form
of the words. Although a person making a proposition has an intended
meaning for it, the _expression_ of a proposition might a) be taken by a receiver
as having a different meaning from how it was intended by the proposer, and b)
some part of the meaning of a proposition may even be hidden from the
conscious awareness of the proposer. The point is that the meaning of a
proposition, although theoretically inherent in the proposition, may not be
entirely clear to one or more of the participants in a transaction involving the
proposition, just as the truth value of a proposition (even if the meaning is
clear) may be hard to ascertain in a meaningful way.
I'll try to clarify part of where I'm coming from here:
I'm assuming equal and competent mastery of the fundamental "language" in
which the proposition is framed by all participants - but part of the issue is
that some of the meaning might not be inherent in the formal,
verbal language - for example, if we consider a verbal statement by someone
as expressing the proposition, some body language and intonation might carry
some meaning associated with or part of the proposition, but these do not come
through in a verbal transliteration of the proposition. The way someone says
something, the inflection and intonation, often carries part of the message
(meaning - the core of the proposition), as does the "body language" used in
delivery. The same could be said of context even for entirely written
propositions. Example for the manner of speaking being important (but
other examples could be much more subtle): saying "This is really good" in
a sarcastic way is quite a different proposition from saying it in a
straightforward or excited way. Furthermore, people who speak and understand the
same verbal language might have very different competencies in picking up and
interpreting some of these non-verbal or contextual parts of the message, and
have different interpretations of what they mean. One could say that emotion is
a main element of messages conveyed in this non-verbal way, but a) that may not
be true in every case, and b) emotional content or emotional-related
content might be just as valid a part of a proposition as anything
else.
One could confine consideration of propositions to the meaning of the
verbal and symbolic elements of them (as I think I implied doing in my previous
comments), but this might leave out an important aspect of reality. One could
try to translate the non-verbal parts into verbal form - this might or might not
be fully feasible.
In this view, the meanings of propositions can be difficult to ascertain,
as may be their truth values, being inextricably involved in the human
(animal; being) nature of the activity of asserting them and interpreting
them.
Although I developed the thoughts here in response to Ingvar's question, I
imagine that there is a philosophical precedent for this point of view that
someone could refer us to. What are the implications of this point of view for
the endeavor at hand? How might it relate to John's approach and Ingvar's
response to it? Or is it relevant at all?
Are we confined to dealing only with the parts of propositions or types of
propositions that are more easily accessible, with meaning inherent
formally in the verbal parts of the language? Science's realm is not all
propositions, but only those for which the approach can be used meaningfully. If
the useful realm of propositions is as severely limited by language and symbol
as I suggest here it could be, what is the implication for an ontology as
ontologies are meant to be considered and implemented here?
I don't mean to open a can of worms, but just to pose some questions that
seem potentially relevant to me, and the question of their relevance in
others' eyes.
Ken
Kenneth
Cliffer, Ph.D.