My responses to Ingvar (essentially agreement, with a bit of explanation)
are embedded below.
happy to join what I take to be your agreement on the concept of
Let me just test my understanding.
In one of her mails, Paola wrote:
"Truth (like falseness) is a quality
of a statement or assertion about
[Not that it matters, but I think I (Ken) wrote (get the blame
for) that statement.]
philosophical ontology, it
is sometimes necessary to distinguish between
*monadic qualities* and
*relational qualities*. The quality of "being a
sphere" is monadic;
when there is an instance of sphericity it
simply inheres in a thing.
The quality of "being more spherelike than the
Earth", on the other
hand, is a relational quality. If we claim "Venus is
than the Earth", then we claim not only that Venus has a
we also claim that this shape stands in a certain
another shape. Now, what has this distinction with the
truth concept to do?
In my understanding of Ken's nice exposition,
truth as a "quality of a
statement" cannot possibly be a monadic quality,
it has to be a
*relational quality*; it must bring in a relation of
between the statement and something that ought to be called
*truthmaker*. To claim that a statement is completely true is to claim
that it has a relation of complete correspondence to a truthmaker; to
claim that it is truthlike is to claim that it has a relation of partial
correspondence to a truthmaker.
Do you (at least Ken and Paola)
I think I agree, with a few qualifications or caveats with respect to my
view of it.
1) One can, I think, consider the truth not only of a statement, but of a
(the) mental model associated with the statement, as a statement is typically an
_expression_ of a mental model of reality. The two (the statement and the
associated mental model it expresses) can be considered themselves to be
2) The "truthmaker" as I interpret Ingvar's invocation of it
would be the aspect of reality that the statement is about and that the
mental model associated with the statement represents.
3) The relation is the degree of correspondence between the model or
statement expressing it and the reality; no correspondence means falseness,
complete correspondence means truth, and partial correspondence means partial
4) I agree with Ingvar's last statement about complete and partial truth,
with the caveat that it may be difficult or impossible to assess the level of
truth in a meaningful absolute way. However, science does it in a relative way
of checking correspondence of the statement or model with observations
associated with the reality, considered using logical reasoning. To the degree
to which the statement or model accurately expresses or predicts the
observations or results of experiments considered to "test" its validity
(truth), it is considered to be true. But science always leaves room for a
better-performing model that can be demonstrated to be "more true" by a better
correspondence with observations, including observations that may not have been
considered initially in association with the statement or model.
5) However, as I indicated previously, some statements are so clearly
agreed to represent reality accurately when understood as intended, that we can
have a high degree of confidence in their "truth".
contemporary philosophers do (I am sad to report) have the view
is a monadic quality of statements (propositions).
I don't specifically know what you're referring to, but it's hard to
imagine how a statement could have a truth value without considering that it
itself is an _expression_ of a mental construct (thought) for which the truth
depends on its status with respect to the thing it's referring to. Even
if it's an assumption for heuristic purposes, it's still relational - it's
declared to correspond to a manufactured reality (mental model) being
considered. The referent, as far as I can see, must be something separate from
the statement or model it expresses, which could include (as some have pointed
out) people's mental models or other statements about reality.