oor-forum
[Top] [All Lists]

Re: [oor-forum] Ontologies vs Theories / Axioms vs Rules

To: OpenOntologyRepository-discussion <oor-forum@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>, Ali SH <asaegyn+out@xxxxxxxxx>
From: Pat Hayes <phayes@xxxxxxx>
Date: Tue, 18 Oct 2011 17:52:40 -0500
Message-id: <4F3C703D-0B80-40B3-8FF9-E6D6359FCC10@xxxxxxx>
Guys, you have to adapt your terminology to the people you are trying to 
communicate with. In the OWL/RDF/RIF/Semantic-Web/LInked-Data world, there is 
no such thing as an 'inference rule'.  (If there were, it would be a line of 
code inside an inference engine; but most inference engines don't work that way 
in any case, but instead build tableaux. The textbook terminology of formal 
logic has not been used in the applied ontology world for about the last two 
decades.)     (01)

That is not what the people that Ali is citing are talking about. In the 
applied-semantic-web world, traditional logics are not widely used, in fact 
hardly at all. The most widely used formalisms are description logics; so 
widely used in fact that for many people, DL's simply *are* the 'language' for 
writing ontologies, and the very idea of an ontology written any anything other 
than a DL (except maybe something even less expressive, such as RDF) is not 
even contemplated or mentioned. However, this world does recognize another 
class of notations, loosely derived from Prolog or from production systems 
(which were developed entirely separately from logics and so share almost no 
scholarly or terminological links with the logic field), which operate by 
chaining together 'rules' (basically, and oversimplifying, Horn clauses thought 
of as encoding forward-constrained implications). So there is a large and 
active field which develops, studies and categorizes "rule languages" which 
range in complexity from simple Horn-clause forward-inference engines to 
elaborate things with defaults, exceptions and so on. There is also a usage of 
"rule" as in 'business rule', and an active area of formalization and 
standardization for these 'rules' , in which they are seen as essentially 
deontic rules, encoding normative ways to behave rather than facts which are 
true or false. And these are still considered to be 'rules' and 'rule 
languages'. So it is not obvious that it all reduces to Horn clauses in every 
case. (Merging an assertional with a deontic language would be an interesting 
challenge.) And then there are logic-programming systems like Prolog, and 
production systems. All of these have a great deal in common at the 
implementation level, so they have come to be seen as parts of a single field 
of 'rule languages', one which now holds its own conferences, journals, 
standardization committees, etc.. etc..(For example, try googling RuleML.)    (02)

Both of these formalisms -  description logics and rule languages - can be 
viewed as subcases of FOL (as indeed can relational DBases) and this point of 
view often seems obvious or trivial to logicians, but it is far from obvious in 
practice, especially as these fields have developed rather different ways to be 
practically useful. DL restricts the logical expressivity to a decideable 
subset of FOL with the finite model property, and its paradigmatic tableaux 
reasoners achieve completeness within this decidable sub case. (There is a big 
theoretical literature recording the history and logical ramifications of all 
this, with links to modal logics and a great deal of advanced model theory.) 
The rule language tradition is far less logically based and more pragmatic: it 
typically pays no attention at all to completeness ( OK, I know there are 
exceptions, but they are achieved only by warping the semantics) and often 
thinks of the rule languages as more like programming languages than logics.     (03)

Still, there has been widespread interest in extending the expressive power of 
a DL logic by adding some of the functionality of a rule language to it. This 
has the great appeal of keeping the DL fragment intact while allowing inference 
engines to step outside the DL world where needed, without sacrificing the 
guarantees of decideability provided by the use of the DL fragment to do the 
basic consistency chacking which supports practical ontology entailment. Such 
hybrids have been being proposed, implemented and used since the beginning of 
the semantic web effort.     (04)

I think this is what the sources cited by Ali are referring to. S    (05)

So, now, let us switch back to logical terminology, and I will put scare quotes 
around the earlier usages. Are 'rules' axioms? Yes, pretty much, if we are 
talking baout the Horn-clause style of rule; although there are 'rule' 
languages which allow one to say things that cannot be said in normal logics, 
eg default assumptions, negation-by-failure, closed-world presumptions, etc..  
However, that terminology of 'axiom' would be anathematic in the ontology 
world. It smacks of mathematics (which ontology engineering most definitely is 
not) and it carries the presumption of being an 'assumed truth', which again is 
inappropriate in this other world. It would be much better to say, statement or 
expression or sentence, rather than axiom. But yes, many 'rules' are sentences, 
in fact sentences of the form ((A and B and C) imply D), where A--D are atomic 
sentences.     (06)

> When people refer to an ontology (or an ontology artifact), are they 
>referring singularly to (a) the axioms, or (b) the axioms under deductive > 
>closure, or (c) the axioms in combination(s) with reasoner(s)?    (07)

In the OWL/RDF world, definitely (a). However, don't call them 'axioms', 
please.     (08)

Pat Hayes    (09)




On Oct 18, 2011, at 3:41 PM, Ali SH wrote:    (010)

> 
> 
> On Tue, Oct 18, 2011 at 4:16 PM, Christopher Menzel <cmenzel@xxxxxxxx> wrote:
> On Oct 18, 2011, at 10:06 PM, Ali SH wrote:
> > Dear Leo and Chris,
> >
> > Thanks for the responses. I understand the distinction between an inference 
>rule and an axiom,
> 
> Right, as I'd suspected (and so noted at the bottom of my post).
> 
> Noted, but not acknowledged in my initial email response :D. 
> 
> > the issue for me stems from a terminological confusion, because obviously, 
>an axiom can express a rule (not in the same sense as an inference rule; i.e. 
>if X is an employee then Y assigns X an employee number).
> 
> Looks like an axiom to me. :-)  "Rule" just seems to have a pragmatic 
>connotation that what is expressed is something that *ought* to be done by 
>whoever is playing a certain role (Y, presumably, in this case).
> 
> In the LKIF paper, they have statements such as:  
> 
> This is well explained in Deliverable D1.1, where LKIF itself is discussed: 
>for more complex or other types of knowledge than terminological knowledge we 
>also need rule formalisms. (page 3 in [1])
> 
> There are also several rule-based approaches that try to capture norms in 
>rules with notions like violation or duty as antecedent or conclusion. The 
>rule itself captures the meaning of the norm, so that the confusion between 
>norm and normative statementis again retained. (page 35 in [1])
> 
> Which suggests to me that they aren't referring to inference rules. But I 
>have no clue how to reliably distinguish a rule from an axiom. In  [2] 
>http://www.estrellaproject.org/doc/D1.1-LKIF-Specification.pdf, they have a 
>section describing their rules, which seems to me to be a mix of axioms and 
>inference rules.
> 
> For example, these seem like axioms to me (page 74 in [2]):
> 
> (rule §-9-306-1
> 
> (if (and (goods ?s ?c)
> (consideration ?s ?p)
> (collateral ?si ?c)
> (collateral ?si ?p)
> (holds (perfected ?si ?c) ?e)
> (unless (applies §-9-306-3-2 (perfected ?si ?p))))
> (holds (perfected ?si ?c) ?e)))
> 
> (rule §-9-306-2a
> 
> (if (and (goods ?t ?c)
> (collateral ?s ?c))
> (not (terminates ?t (security-interest ?s)))))
> (fact F1 (not (terminates T1 (security-interest S1))))
> (fact F2 (collateral S1 C1))
>  
> 
> > That said, your interpretation of rule poses an interesting question, do 
>people distinguish an ontology from an ontology + whatever inference rules 
>used to interpret it?
> 
> Inference rules simply come packaged with whatever logic one is building 
>one's ontology on (or affixing one's ontology axioms to).
> 
> That's what I thought.
>  
> 
> > Based on analogy then, does gmail as software refer to the gmail the source 
>code, or gmail the compiled, deployed code?
> 
> Sorry, man, that's too heavy for me! :-)
> 
> I have a feeling this question has been tread before.... ;) 
> 
> 
> > When people refer to an ontology (or an ontology artifact), are they 
>referring singularly to (a) the axioms, or (b) the axioms under deductive 
>closure, or (c) the axioms in combination(s) with reasoner(s)?
> 
> It seems to me that (a) and (b) are two viable meanings for "ontology".  (c) 
>does not seem feasible to me, except insofar as one identifies a reasoner with 
>the logic it is based on.
> 
> This is where I guess the analogy with traditional software breaks down. 
>Gmail compiled and deployed seems to me to be (c). Though for ontologies, the 
>line between (b) and (c) are a bit unclear to me. I don't know how someone 
>(i.e. human) would be able to actually access / generate (b) without some 
>reasoner (their mind?).
> 
> [1] Joost Breuker, Rinke Hoekstra, Alexander Boer, Kasper van den Berg, 
>Rossella Rubino, Giovanni Sartor, Monica Palmirani, Adam Wyner, and Trevor 
>Bench-Capon. OWL ontology of basic legal concepts (LKIF-Core). Deliverable 
>1.4, Estrella, 2007.
> [2] Alexander Boer, Marcello Di Bello, Kasper van den Ber, Tom Gordon, 
>Andr´as F¨orh´ecz, R´eka Vas. Specification of the Legal Knowledge Interchange 
>Format. Deliverable 1.1, Estrella, 2007
> 
> Best,
> Ali
> 
> 
> -- 
> 
> 
> (•`'·.¸(`'·.¸(•)¸.·'´)¸.·'´•) .,., 
> 
> _________________________________________________________________
> Message Archives: http://ontolog.cim3.net/forum/oor-forum/  
> Subscribe: mailto:oor-forum-join@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 
> Config/Unsubscribe: http://ontolog.cim3.net/mailman/listinfo/oor-forum/  
> Shared Files: http://ontolog.cim3.net/file/work/OOR/ 
> Wiki: http://ontolog.cim3.net/cgi-bin/wiki.pl?OpenOntologyRepository     (011)

------------------------------------------------------------
IHMC                                     (850)434 8903 or (650)494 3973   
40 South Alcaniz St.           (850)202 4416   office
Pensacola                            (850)202 4440   fax
FL 32502                              (850)291 0667   mobile
phayesAT-SIGNihmc.us       http://www.ihmc.us/users/phayes    (012)






_________________________________________________________________
Message Archives: http://ontolog.cim3.net/forum/oor-forum/  
Subscribe: mailto:oor-forum-join@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 
Config/Unsubscribe: http://ontolog.cim3.net/mailman/listinfo/oor-forum/  
Shared Files: http://ontolog.cim3.net/file/work/OOR/ 
Wiki: http://ontolog.cim3.net/cgi-bin/wiki.pl?OpenOntologyRepository     (013)
<Prev in Thread] Current Thread [Next in Thread>