De :
"ontolog-forum-request@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx"
<ontolog-forum-request@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
À :
ontolog-forum@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Envoyé le
: Lun 20 septembre 2010, 1h 59min 13s
Objet : ontolog-forum Digest, Vol 93, Issue
33
Send ontolog-forum mailing list submissions to
ontolog-forum@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxTo
subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit
http://ontolog.cim3.net/mailman/listinfo/ontolog-forumor,
via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to
ontolog-forum-request@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxYou
can reach the person managing the list at
ontolog-forum-owner@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxWhen
replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific
than "Re:
Contents of ontolog-forum digest..."
Today's Topics:
1. Re:
Sustainability (David Eddy)
2. Re: language vs logic - ambiguity and
startingwithdefinitions
(Rich Cooper)
3. Re: PROF Swartz ON
DEFINITIONS (Rich Cooper)
4. language vs logic - ambiguity and starting
with definitions
(FERENC
KOVACS)
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Message:
1
Date: Sun, 19 Sep 2010 13:43:21 -0400
From: David Eddy <
deddy@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Subject: Re:
[ontolog-forum] Sustainability
To: "[ontolog-forum] " <
ontolog-forum@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Message-ID:
<
BA4FB17D-F15B-4F0E-B1BF-4579D8088937@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Content-Type:
text/plain; charset=US-ASCII; delsp=yes; format=flowed
John -
On
Sep 18, 2010, at 11:11 PM, John F. Sowa wrote:
> The critical
innovation was to use NLP technology to analyze all
> the documentation
and relate it to the previously analyzed code.
> But most software tools
rarely use NLP technology.
Running existing documentation thru NLP is
indeed a novel approach.
I can imagine all sorts of useful stuff bubbling
to the surface.
Must confess that my going in assumption would be that
the source
code & data would be the only useful, accurate reflection
for what
the system is doing... & that whatever documentation might be
found
would be woefully out-of-date.
___________________
David
Eddy
deddy@xxxxxxxxxxxxx781-455-0949
------------------------------
Message:
2
Date: Sun, 19 Sep 2010 13:55:53 -0700
From: "Rich Cooper" <
rich@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Subject:
Re: [ontolog-forum] language vs logic - ambiguity and
startingwithdefinitions
To: <
doug@xxxxxxxxxx>, "'[ontolog-forum]
'"
<
ontolog-forum@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Message-ID:
<
20100919205601.423C3138CD4@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Content-Type:
text/plain; charset="windows-1256"
Hi Doug, Ferenc,
This
is an interesting thread. My comments are
below:
-Rich
Sincerely,
Rich
Cooper
EnglishLogicKernel.com
Rich AT EnglishLogicKernel DOT
com
9 4 9 \ 5 2 5 - 5 7 1 2
-----Original Message-----
From:
ontolog-forum-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx[mailto:
ontolog-forum-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx]
On Behalf Of doug foxvog
Sent: Saturday, September 18, 2010 10:26 PM
To:
[ontolog-forum] ct
Subject: Re: [ontolog-forum] language vs logic - ambiguity
and
startingwithdefinitions
On Sat, September 18, 2010 6:16,
FERENC KOVACS said:
> I believe that core ontology concepts
are objects, properties and
> relations.
I suppose you
mean classes of objects. Is the distinction between
properties and
relations that properties relate objects to datatypes
while relations
relate multiple objects or have more than two arguments?
There
are two ways to go. You can believe you ALREADY know truth and start
with
classes to build instantiated objects, or you can start with objects,
and
group them into classes so that the objects and classes can be
validated.
IMHO, the second way is far superior, and certainly more
realistic in most
practical applications. Assuming you know everything
about the classes to
begin with is very misleading and causes you to find
exactly what you
imagined instead of exactly what is there. That is the way
human infants
seem to learn. Why should a set of axioms, though usually
small enough in
number to conveniently support a theory, be expected to
correctly enumerate
the details unless the topic is some abstruse, but
utterly simle mathematical
theory. I prefer a realistic appraisal of
reality that ends up in a math
model, as compared to starting with a math
model that ends up missing reality
and being unable to prove or disprove the
objects' memberships.
This sounds fine to me, so long as the concept of object needs
not be
physical and can include events and
situations.
Personally, i don't see the need for distinguishing
properties and
relations in an ontology, although many ontology languages
do make
that distinction. This seems a language-dependent distinction to
me.
Agreed, but that is the way convention has proceeded in math
logic. Is
there a compelling reason to not distinguish between properties
and
relations? The arity is, as you suggest, the only difference
between
properties and relations by established convention.
> In fact, the intitial state
Are you
referring to the initial state of an ontology in the process
of
creation? Or are you referring to the state of a reference ontology
whose
terms are used to make statements in a knowledge base with no
additional
definitional statements?
Consider the initial state of the self
generating explosion Ferenc is
referring to. The initial state is whatever
is needed to hold the axioms,
and the added state is the automatically
generated (unrealistic in many
cases) set of objects generated from the
theory.
Again, predefining terms seems like putting the cart
before the horse. Why
assume a Poisson distribution (or pick another one)
instead of using the
actual empirical data that we get so much of with
current technology?
> is an object which is a unity of them
and it is
> exploded through a number of mental operations. (Examles
wanted?)
I'm not sure what you mean by an ontology exploding. Do
you mean
deriving all statements which are derivable from the initial
statements
in the ontology?
If so, i would suggest that
this "explosion" could be carried out by
formal logical operations --
they wouldn't need to be mental operations.
So long as the formal
logical operations are not confused with the reality
of objects actually
experienced. Yet again, the theory is only approximate,
and was chosen by
someone with limited personal experience in most cases.
With the learning
curve (see the book "Bionomics"), every doubling of
experience leads to about
a twenty percent improvement in efficacy.
> With the
help
> of these categories I can semantically analyze natural
langauges and
> create an ontology that integrates the currently
different domains.
> In this approach
> axioms and
the concept of events are not of primary interest, because
> verbs are
seen as the representations of relations
This is not necessarily
the best way to model verbs. In languages which use
verbs like English does,
a verb indicates the occurrence of either a
situation or an event, with
subject, direct object, indirect object, and
prepositional phrases indicating
relations between the event and event
participants.
Features
of the events/situations can certainly be modeled by relations that
ignore
the events themselves, but this would require multiple relations to
be
defined for each verb depending upon what other phrases happen to be in
the
sentence. Using this technique makes it difficult to add more
information
about the same event and requires multiple rules to inter-relate
the multiple
relations that represent the same verb.
Jill threw the
chair.
Jill threw me the chair.
Jill threw the chair through
the window.
Jill threw the chair yesterday.
Jill threw the
chair to kill the toad.
Jill probably threw the chair at the
toad.
Jill threw a fit and jumped up on the lawn chair when she
saw the toad cross
the road toward her. Examples abound in common corpora,
so why axiomatize
everything at the beginning when you can take into account
the actual usage
of the language, which is dependent on so many factors - the
speaker, her
cultural background, her experiences, goals, values,
perceptions, and all
those things that are NOT axiomatizable in realistic
practice.
IMHO, the verb "threw" represents a different
relation in each of these, but
each use can unambiguously represent a
throwing event, with multiple
relations to generate depending upon the other
parts of the sentence.
> (hence not limited to Boolean
operators).
Why wouldn't the relations have Boolean truth
values? Is the point to
allow for probability
descriptors?
Probabilities, fuzziness, certainty, value, cost,
goals, suppositions, there
are a never ending set of value types associated
with common statements.
Why limit them to Booleans? Math logic has always
done so, but even the
Boolean case results in true theorems that can't be
proved and false
theorems that can't be disproved (Godel again).
> Therefore the issuse of disambiguation as for dictionaries
is a
> futile exercise, as the defintions used are sometimes
incomplete and
Many dictionary definitions are certainly
incomplete, but that does not mean
that they do not may (MAKE?) true
statements constraining the meaning of the
thing they define.
But are the constraints VALID?
> irrelevant in
semantic terms,
I have not seen this.
> this is
why you cannot "merge" them (should try to integrate
> them instead)
as they are not in compatible forms (content)
If you are
referring to multiple definitions from the same source,
they shouldn't be
merged because they are describing different
denotations of the word.
Each definition should denote a different
concept.
It?s a
rare occurrence when a concept has only one definition or a
definition
designates only one concept. Consider the many-to-many mapping of
words to
synsets in WN+VN.
If you are referring to multiple definitions
from different sources,
integrating multiple definitions of the same
meaning of a word is
certainly appropriate. However, sometimes such
integration can be
handled by merging.
> and they are
not modular either.
> You must accept that such a new ontology should
be dynamic as
> many of you already suspect.
If the
ontology is used to interpret NL text in an open area, the
ontology would
be incomplete and should dynamically be expanded.
If the ontology
is to be used to express the information in a data
base that has been in
constant use for years, dynamaticity is not
so
crucial.
Databases in constant use constantly uncover situations
which cannot be
handled within the database without expanding it.
>> In math logic domain there is a kind of definition - an
abbreviation when
>> they introduce new symbol saying for
example:
>> definition
>> t???s denotes t<s or
t=s
> In my "semantic analysis" this is formalization, a
mental operation of the
> relation between two objects as
indicated.
This formalization/definition is a logical operation
between two
expressions (one of which is a disjunction, I suppose the
expressions
could be called objects.
Expressions are not
objects - the interpreters we build postulate imaginary
objects to fit the
theories, but they often miss the valid realities
especially in language
use.
> The commonsense transcript is that an
>
object (to be specified, otherwise it does not make sense) is smaller
than
> another object after comparison and a few other operations also
required
> to arrive at that result in
formalization.
You are stepping beyond the definition as given,
to interpret what the
definition means. This is intentionally moving
beyond logic.
I think that is Ferenc's point - logic is not
enough to explain language
use. More is needed. (Ferenc, correct me if my
assumption is not what you
meant.)
> In doing this I used
the mental
> operation called interpretation, the reverse of
formalization.
> For any message (statement) to make sense it is
necessary to be complete,
Why can't a message tell merely a
portion of a fact, instead of being
complete?
I have to
agree with Doug on this one. Many statements only make partial
sense, and
some make no sense at all. So interpretation is a very
subjective process
that, IMHO, may not even be possible to formulate without
great loss of
information compared to the glorious ambiguity of language.
> which means that if it has (as it should have) a verb in
it,
> then it should have person,
Here, i assume you
mean grammatical person, not requiring the message
to relate to a
person. Person, in this sense, is a linguistic feature
of sentences of
many languages, not necessarily relating to a feature
of the meaning
being discussed.
Disagree - I think he means the interpretER, not
the declension and
conjugation sort of person. The syntactic parts are for
convenience of
information transfer to a DIFFERENT interpretER who may have a
totally
different view of the same sentence in her own interpretation.
> number and tense specified among others to make
sense.
Similarly number, tense, gender and other linguistic
features are
allowed or required by different languages "to make sense".
Such
features may or may not relate to a feature of the meaning
being
discussed and might or might not be expressed in the knowledge
base
using the ontology.
"Do you want fries with
that?"
"No."
There are no verbs in the second "sentence",
no person, number, tense,
gender or "other linguistic features", but it makes
perfect sense to
customers who drive through a fast food window lane millions
of times per
day.
> Or in other words "Media is the
message" is interpreted as
> The message is instruction - in my
translation.
I find this interpretation curious and don't
understand how it
relates to your above statements.
I
think the difference is in acknowledging the subjectivity and inherent
limits
on formalizing language. John Sowa has explained a lot about how
language
and logic are not fully integratable in the distant past on this
list. Now
might be a time to bring this information out again, so we can
look at the
Peircean view of logic and language in more depth.
> Regards,
Ferenc
=============================================================
doug
foxvog
doug@xxxxxxxxxx http://ProgressiveAustin.org"I speak as an
American to the leaders of my own nation. The great
initiative in this
war is ours. The initiative to stop it must be ours."
- Dr. Martin
Luther King
Jr.
=============================================================
I
was at college in Atlanta when King was killed in Tennessee. We would
listen
to his sermons from Ebenezer Baptist Church whenever they were
broadcast
locally. He was a very, very subjective person and the world is a
better
place for it. He didn't subscribe the logic of his day, and he made
some
amazing changes in society by clearly convincing people that he was
correct
in his moral interpretation of events.
HTH,
-Rich
=============================================================
doug
foxvog
doug@xxxxxxxxxx http://ProgressiveAustin.org"I speak as an
American to the leaders of my own nation. The great
initiative in this
war is ours. The initiative to stop it must be ours."
- Dr. Martin
Luther King
Jr.
=============================================================
_________________________________________________________________
Message
Archives:
http://ontolog.cim3.net/forum/ontolog-forum/ Config
Subscr:
http://ontolog.cim3.net/mailman/listinfo/ontolog-forum/
Unsubscribe: mailto:
ontolog-forum-leave@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxShared
Files:
http://ontolog.cim3.net/file/Community Wiki:
http://ontolog.cim3.net/wiki/ To join:
http://ontolog.cim3.net/cgi-bin/wiki.pl?WikiHomePage#nid1JTo
Post: mailto:
ontolog-forum@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx--------------
next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL:
http://ontolog.cim3.net/forum/ontolog-forum/attachments/20100919/00666619/attachment.html
------------------------------
Message: 3
Date: Sun, 19 Sep
2010 14:03:39 -0700
From: "Rich Cooper" <
rich@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Subject:
Re: [ontolog-forum] PROF Swartz ON DEFINITIONS
To: "'[ontolog-forum] '"
<
ontolog-forum@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Message-ID:
<
20100919210346.6212F138D20@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Content-Type:
text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
Hi Alex,
The term
"ancestor" in English means ALL those people who made babies in
closure
sequence that led to the subject x's birth by parents y1 and y2, so
the
"smallest" ancestor would only give those responses that are equally
small -
y1 and y2.
For example, our ancestors may go all the way back
to most of Turkana Boy's
ancestors two million years ago, so as an upper
limit, 2^N ancestors for N
generations (but there was also interbreeding, so
the actual number must be
way less than 2^N by a large factor) over long
terms.
But I am not really certain I comprehend the point you
are trying to make.
Perhaps you can use Parent(x,y) and Ancestor(x,y) instead
of R(x,y) and
R_(x,y). The symbols are construed by the interpretER (me in
this case)
possibly differently than you meant them.
-Rich
Sincerely,
Rich
Cooper
EnglishLogicKernel.com
Rich AT EnglishLogicKernel DOT
com
9 4 9 \ 5 2 5 - 5 7 1 2
_____
From:
ontolog-forum-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx[mailto:
ontolog-forum-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx]
On Behalf Of Alex Shkotin
Sent: Saturday, September 18, 2010 11:07 PM
To:
[ontolog-forum]
Subject: Re: [ontolog-forum] PROF Swartz ON
DEFINITIONS
Hi Rich,
It seems that in FOL we do not have a
definition at all:
suppose we have binary predicate R (primary or
defined) and we introduce new
predicate R_ and two axioms with
it:
"R(x,y) hence R_(x,y)"
and
"R_(x,z) and R(z,y) hence
R_(x,y)"
We can't say that we have definition for R_ as we need
to add "the
smallest..." as for transitive closure
(
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transitive_closure).
What
do you think?
Alex
2010/9/18 Rich Cooper <
rich@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Ferenc,
How about
If _x is an ancestor of
_z
And _z is the father of _y
Or _z is the mother of
_y
Then _x is an ancestor of _y.
The basis relations
include:
_ is the father of _
_ is the mother of
_
And the term defined with recursion, is
_ is an ancestor
of _
Each expansion of the Horne clause during the query must be
instantiated
with some variable or constant in order to continue expanding
the search
backward. If at any point, the database runs out of father and
mother
facts, then recursion stops. But that fact doesn't show up in FOL
as
clearly as in the software function that interprets it, and which
must
specifically figure out how to stop the recursion when there is no
more
fodder for the query.
-Rich
Sincerely,
Rich
Cooper
EnglishLogicKernel.com
Rich AT EnglishLogicKernel DOT
com
9 4 9 \ 5 2 5 - 5 7 1 2
_____
From:
ontolog-forum-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx[mailto:
ontolog-forum-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx]
On Behalf Of FERENC KOVACS
Sent: Saturday, September 18, 2010 8:17 AM
To:
ontolog-forum@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxSubject:
[ontolog-forum] PROF Swartz ON DEFINITIONS
IN THE SAME
DOCUMENT
Recursive Definitions
(Advanced material) By a "direct
ancestor" we mean one's "parents,
grandparents, great-grandparents, etc."
More formally, we might write:
"x is a direct ancestor of y" =df "x is a
parent of y; or x is a parent of a
parent of y; or x is a parent of a parent
of a parent of y; etc."
My comments: is it not the referent that
the definition is about?C ompare
with the statement in the front above:
quote
For example, the term, "pain", is defined, but pain itself
is not defined.
We define only terms, never their referents. end of
quote
Ferenc
_________________________________________________________________
Message
Archives:
http://ontolog.cim3.net/forum/ontolog-forum/Config Subscr:
http://ontolog.cim3.net/mailman/listinfo/ontolog-forum/Unsubscribe:
mailto:
ontolog-forum-leave@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxShared
Files:
http://ontolog.cim3.net/file/Community Wiki:
http://ontolog.cim3.net/wiki/To join:
http://ontolog.cim3.net/cgi-bin/wiki.pl?WikiHomePage#nid1JTo
Post: mailto:
ontolog-forum@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx--------------
next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL:
http://ontolog.cim3.net/forum/ontolog-forum/attachments/20100919/72d3d4b3/attachment.html
------------------------------
Message: 4
Date: Sun, 19 Sep
2010 23:58:49 +0000 (GMT)
From: FERENC KOVACS <
f.kovacs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Subject:
[ontolog-forum] language vs logic - ambiguity and starting
with
definitions
To:
ontolog-forum@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxMessage-ID:
<
18725.13869.qm@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Content-Type:
text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
Rich,
I am only commenting points
that I believe are related to my points.
There are two ways to go. You
can believe you ALREADY know truth and start
with classes to build
instantiated objects, or you can start with objects, and
group them into
classes so that the objects and classes can be validated.
Ferenc:
In the beginning (and for the rest of your life) you have
not idea of what truth
is. You may know however what existence is through
using your senses, including
your common sense. By practicing your common
sense you will find out something
in terms of knowledge before you can
speak. When you know how to speak you
follow a fast process to select from
your (acquired) repertory of a NLs to share
something (to give an account
of) with your partner who as a unit determine your
wording to complete a
communication act the quality of which is judged by mutual
understanding.This is at the same time a process of earning about the world,
and
if we are lucky it is a dialogue or dialectics as it were, a fairly
disciplined
course of exchanging ideas while checking everything left
unclear or incomplete,
unproven, etc.
When you first have an encounter
with something (let us call it an object) you
first check out if you know it
and if it exists (or real). If you do not know
it, you have got to learn
about it. By doing so, you have some automatisms, such
as seeing an object
in terms of form and content. If you can visually define the
object as a
whole, then you recognize its form, if you cannot, you recognize its
content.
Knowing its content is knowing a property, ultimately and if
nothing else can be
inferred, this property is existence (in this form a
shorthand, in proper word
class is existing, existed)
You also and
immediately also see this new thingie in terms of it being specific
and
generic.If you see it for the first time, it is specific (to you), but you
also automatically assume that whatever that is, the next one will be the
same
or similar, in other words you expect a class to emerge later.
Now
to be able to remember this encounter later, you must verbally identify the
thingie by using the name giving techniques and procedures available to you
in
that environment. I do not want to expand on that.
IMHO, the
second way is far superior, and certainly more realistic in most
practical
applications. Assuming you know everything about the classes to
begin with
is very misleading and causes you to find exactly what you imagined
instead
of exactly what is there. That is the way human infants seem to
learn.
Ferenc:
So as a result of an encounter you will have a form
defined in terms of a name
and in terms of a mental replica of some sort of
the physical thingie. The
content of this form is an incomplete list of
properties staring with the most
generic existence and any other you ma be
able to abstract, experience,
discover, etc. in other words relations and
mental operations suggested by the
verbs listed above as an
example.
Why should a set of axioms, though usually small enough in
number to
conveniently support a theory, be expected to correctly enumerate
the details
unless the topic is some abstruse, but utterly simle
mathematical theory.
I do not feel compelled to do that. I
have not even dealt with another template
called quality and quantity.And I
am going to skip that for the sake of brevity.
(No to mention the mental
activity of counting.)
I prefer a realistic appraisal of reality that
ends up in a math model, as
compared to starting with a math model that
ends up missing reality and being
unable to prove or disprove the objects'
memberships.
I believe you.In fact I endorse you.
I'm not
sure what you mean by an ontology exploding. Do you mean
deriving all
statements which are derivable from the initial statements
in the
ontology?
FK: NO
If so, i would suggest that this "explosion" could
be carried out by
formal logical operations -- they wouldn't need to be
mental operations.
FK Negative. My suggestion is something else
So
long as the formal logical operations are not confused with the reality of
objects actually experienced. Yet again, the theory is only approximate,
and
was chosen by someone with limited personal experience in most cases.
With the
learning curve (see the book "Bionomics"), every doubling of
experience leads
to about a twenty percent improvement in efficacy.
You read loud and clear
Jill threw a fit and jumped up on the
lawn chair when she saw the toad cross
the road toward her. Examples
abound in common corpora, so why axiomatize
everything at the beginning
when you can take into account the actual usage of
the language, which is
dependent on so many factors - the speaker, her cultural
background, her
experiences, goals, values, perceptions, and all those things
that are NOT
axiomatizable in realistic practice
Ferenc:
Yes, you are right. Why?
I did not suggest that.
I think that is Ferenc's point - logic is not
enough to explain language use.
More is needed. (Ferenc, correct me if my
assumption is not what you meant.)
Absolulety agreed
Why can't a message tell merely a portion of a fact, instead of
being
complete?
I have to agree with Doug on this one. Many
statements only make partial
sense, and some make no sense at all. So
interpretation is a very subjective
process that, IMHO, may not even be
possible to formulate without great loss of
information compared to the
glorious ambiguity of language.
Ferenc
I am not interested in any
statement meant or suitable to fool you, deceive you,
etc. including so
called facts of science or ?ogic for that matter.
Interpretation is
subjective, that is a fact of life. What we can do is have a
dialogue and
using the same framework for interpretation. The closer we are in
time and
space the higher chance we experience similar things and interpret them
similarly enough to come to an agreement, especially when w have a method or
tool to guide us through such process of negotiating.If we are not lucky, we
need to use translators, such as me :-))
"Do you want fries with
that?"
"No."
There are no verbs in the second "sentence", no person,
number, tense, gender
or "other linguistic features", but it makes perfect
sense to customers who
drive through a fast food window lane millions of
times per day.
Ferenc: Yes, because context and the length or
type of message are in reverse
proportion.You are familiar with elypsis too,
I guess..
I think the difference is in acknowledging the
subjectivity and inherent limits
on formalizing language. John Sowa has
explained a lot about how language and
logic are not fully integratable in
the distant past on this list. Now might
be a time to bring this
information out again, so we can look at the Peircean
view of logic and
language in more depth.
Ferenc
My points are NOT about
formalizing languages, but showing a different sort of
semantic analysis
with a different set of core ontology categories.
Thanks a
lot!!!!
Ferenc
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML
attachment was scrubbed...
URL:
http://ontolog.cim3.net/forum/ontolog-forum/attachments/20100919/d9bd6175/attachment.html
------------------------------
_________________________________________________________________
Message
Archives:
http://ontolog.cim3.net/forum/ontolog-forum/ Config
Subscr:
http://ontolog.cim3.net/mailman/listinfo/ontolog-forum/
Unsubscribe: mailto:
ontolog-forum-leave@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxShared
Files:
http://ontolog.cim3.net/file/Community Wiki:
http://ontolog.cim3.net/wiki/ To join:
http://ontolog.cim3.net/cgi-bin/wiki.pl?WikiHomePage#nid1JTo
Post: mailto:
ontolog-forum@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxEnd
of ontolog-forum Digest, Vol 93, Issue
33
*********************************************