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[ontolog-forum] Re : ontolog-forum Digest, Vol 93, Issue 33

To: ontolog-forum@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
From: Bruno Frandemiche <bruno.frandemiche@xxxxxxxx>
Date: Mon, 20 Sep 2010 12:23:41 +0000 (GMT)
Message-id: <129209.58263.qm@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
hello (sorry for my very bad english)
object,propriété,relation=no
holon,aspect,enaction=yes
enaction=lot of relations(pro-action,action,reaction,retroaction,reretroaction with meta,metameta,and metametameta)(relation=verb=action="" is fractal by definition)
aspect=domain of enaction(domain=group=catégorie=part)
holon=knot of aspect(the sum of part is more than the part)(knot is made by endo-relation)(endo ~ auto)
finally in e-Matrix(my personnal project) all are(shall) made of relation
comments and critics are welcome
bruno


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À : ontolog-forum@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Envoyé le : Lun 20 septembre 2010, 1h 59min 13s
Objet : ontolog-forum Digest, Vol 93, Issue 33

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Today's Topics:

  1. Re: Sustainability (David Eddy)
  2. Re: language vs logic - ambiguity and    startingwithdefinitions
      (Rich Cooper)
  3. Re: PROF Swartz ON DEFINITIONS (Rich Cooper)
  4. language vs logic - ambiguity and starting with    definitions
      (FERENC KOVACS)


----------------------------------------------------------------------

Message: 1
Date: Sun, 19 Sep 2010 13:43:21 -0400
From: David Eddy <deddy@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Subject: Re: [ontolog-forum] Sustainability
To: "[ontolog-forum] " <ontolog-forum@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Message-ID: <BA4FB17D-F15B-4F0E-B1BF-4579D8088937@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII; delsp=yes; format=flowed

John -

On Sep 18, 2010, at 11:11 PM, John F. Sowa wrote:

> The critical innovation was to use NLP technology to analyze all
> the documentation and relate it to the previously analyzed code.
> But most software tools rarely use NLP technology.

Running existing documentation thru NLP is indeed a novel approach. 
I can imagine all sorts of useful stuff bubbling to the surface.

Must confess that my going in assumption would be that the source 
code & data would be the only useful, accurate reflection for what 
the system is doing... & that whatever documentation might be found 
would be woefully out-of-date.

___________________
David Eddy
deddy@xxxxxxxxxxxxx

781-455-0949



------------------------------

Message: 2
Date: Sun, 19 Sep 2010 13:55:53 -0700
From: "Rich Cooper" <rich@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Subject: Re: [ontolog-forum] language vs logic - ambiguity and
    startingwithdefinitions
To: <doug@xxxxxxxxxx>,    "'[ontolog-forum] '"
    <ontolog-forum@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Message-ID: <20100919205601.423C3138CD4@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="windows-1256"

Hi Doug, Ferenc,



This is an interesting thread.  My comments are below:

-Rich



Sincerely,

Rich Cooper

EnglishLogicKernel.com

Rich AT EnglishLogicKernel DOT com

9 4 9 \ 5 2 5 - 5 7 1 2

-----Original Message-----
From: ontolog-forum-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
[mailto:ontolog-forum-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx] On Behalf Of doug foxvog
Sent: Saturday, September 18, 2010 10:26 PM
To: [ontolog-forum] ct
Subject: Re: [ontolog-forum] language vs logic - ambiguity and
startingwithdefinitions



On Sat, September 18, 2010 6:16, FERENC KOVACS said:



> I believe that core ontology concepts are objects, properties and

> relations.



I suppose you mean classes of objects.  Is the distinction between

properties and relations that properties relate objects to datatypes

while relations relate multiple objects or have more than two arguments?



There are two ways to go.  You can believe you ALREADY know truth and start
with classes to build instantiated objects, or you can start with objects,
and group them into classes so that the objects and classes can be
validated.  IMHO, the second way is far superior, and certainly more
realistic in most practical applications.  Assuming you know everything
about the classes to begin with is very misleading and causes you to find
exactly what you imagined instead of exactly what is there.  That is the way
human infants seem to learn.  Why should a set of axioms, though usually
small enough in number to conveniently support a theory, be expected to
correctly enumerate the details unless the topic is some abstruse, but
utterly simle mathematical theory.  I prefer a realistic appraisal of
reality that ends up in a math model, as compared to starting with a math
model that ends up missing reality and being unable to prove or disprove the
objects' memberships. 



This sounds fine to me, so long as the concept of object needs not be

physical and can include events and situations.



Personally, i don't see the need for distinguishing properties and

relations in an ontology, although many ontology languages do make

that distinction.  This seems a language-dependent distinction to me.



Agreed, but that is the way convention has proceeded in math logic.  Is
there a compelling reason to not distinguish between properties and
relations?  The arity is, as you suggest, the only difference between
properties and relations by established convention. 



> In fact, the intitial state



Are you referring to the initial state of an ontology in the process

of creation?  Or are you referring to the state of a reference ontology
whose terms are used to make statements in a knowledge base with no
additional definitional statements?



Consider the initial state of the self generating explosion Ferenc is
referring to.  The initial state is whatever is needed to hold the axioms,
and the added state is the automatically generated (unrealistic in many
cases) set of objects generated from the theory. 



Again, predefining terms seems like putting the cart before the horse.  Why
assume a Poisson distribution (or pick another one) instead of using the
actual empirical data that we get so much of with current technology?



> is an object which is a unity of them and it is

> exploded through a number of mental operations. (Examles wanted?)



I'm not sure what you mean by an ontology exploding.  Do you mean

deriving all statements which are derivable from the initial statements

in the ontology?



If so, i would suggest that this "explosion" could be carried out by

formal logical operations -- they wouldn't need to be mental operations.



So long as the formal logical operations are not confused with the reality
of objects actually experienced.  Yet again, the theory is only approximate,
and was chosen by someone with limited personal experience in most cases.
With the learning curve (see the book "Bionomics"), every doubling of
experience leads to about a twenty percent improvement in efficacy. 



> With the help

> of these categories I can semantically analyze natural langauges and

> create an ontology that integrates the currently different domains.



> In this approach

> axioms and the concept of events are not of primary interest, because

> verbs are seen as the representations of relations



This is not necessarily the best way to model verbs.  In languages which use
verbs like English does, a verb indicates the occurrence of either a
situation or an event, with subject, direct object, indirect object, and
prepositional phrases indicating relations between the event and event
participants.



Features of the events/situations can certainly be modeled by relations that
ignore the events themselves, but this would require multiple relations to
be defined for each verb depending upon what other phrases happen to be in
the sentence.  Using this technique makes it difficult to add more
information about the same event and requires multiple rules to inter-relate
the multiple relations that represent the same verb.



  Jill threw the chair.

  Jill threw me the chair.

  Jill threw the chair through the window.

  Jill threw the chair yesterday.

  Jill threw the chair to kill the toad.

  Jill probably threw the chair at the toad.



Jill threw a fit and jumped up on the lawn chair when she saw the toad cross
the road toward her.  Examples abound in common corpora, so why axiomatize
everything at the beginning when you can take into account the actual usage
of the language, which is dependent on so many factors - the speaker, her
cultural background, her experiences, goals, values, perceptions, and all
those things that are NOT axiomatizable in realistic practice. 



IMHO, the verb "threw" represents a different relation in each of these, but
each use can unambiguously represent a throwing event, with multiple
relations to generate depending upon the other parts of the sentence. 



> (hence not limited to Boolean operators).



Why wouldn't the relations have Boolean truth values?  Is the point to

allow for probability descriptors?



Probabilities, fuzziness, certainty, value, cost, goals, suppositions, there
are a never ending set of value types associated with common statements.
Why limit them to Booleans?  Math logic has always done so, but even the
Boolean case results in true theorems that can't be proved and false
theorems that can't be disproved (Godel again). 



> Therefore the issuse of disambiguation as for dictionaries is a

> futile exercise, as the defintions used are sometimes incomplete and



Many dictionary definitions are certainly incomplete, but that does not mean
that they do not may (MAKE?) true statements constraining the meaning of the
thing they define. 



But are the constraints VALID?



> irrelevant in semantic terms,



I have not seen this.



> this is why you cannot "merge" them (should try to integrate

> them instead) as they are not in compatible forms (content)



If you are referring to multiple definitions from the same source,

they shouldn't be merged because they are describing different

denotations of the word.  Each definition should denote a different

concept.



It?s a rare occurrence when a concept has only one definition or a
definition designates only one concept. Consider the many-to-many mapping of
words to synsets in WN+VN. 



If you are referring to multiple definitions from different sources,

integrating multiple definitions of the same meaning of a word is

certainly appropriate.  However, sometimes such integration can be

handled by merging.



> and they are not modular either.

> You must accept that such a new ontology should be dynamic as

> many of you already suspect.



If the ontology is used to interpret NL text in an open area, the

ontology would be incomplete and should dynamically be expanded.



If the ontology is to be used to express the information in a data

base that has been in constant use for years, dynamaticity is not

so crucial.



Databases in constant use constantly uncover situations which cannot be
handled within the database without expanding it. 



>> In math logic domain there is a kind of definition - an abbreviation when

>> they introduce new symbol saying for example:

>> definition

>> t???s denotes t<s or t=s



> In my "semantic analysis" this is formalization, a mental operation of the

> relation between two objects as indicated.



This formalization/definition is a logical operation between two

expressions (one of which is a disjunction,  I suppose the expressions

could be called objects.



Expressions are not objects - the interpreters we build postulate imaginary
objects to fit the theories, but they often miss the valid realities
especially in language use. 



> The commonsense transcript is that an

> object (to be specified, otherwise it does not make sense) is smaller than

> another object after comparison and a few other operations also required

> to arrive at that result in formalization.



You are stepping beyond the definition as given, to interpret what the

definition means.  This is intentionally moving beyond logic.



I think that is Ferenc's point - logic is not enough to explain language
use.  More is needed.  (Ferenc, correct me if my assumption is not what you
meant.) 



> In doing this I used the mental

> operation called interpretation, the reverse of formalization.

> For any message (statement) to make sense it is necessary to be complete,



Why can't a message tell merely a portion of a fact, instead of being

complete?



I have to agree with Doug on this one.  Many statements only make partial
sense, and some make no sense at all.  So interpretation is a very
subjective process that, IMHO, may not even be possible to formulate without
great loss of information compared to the glorious ambiguity of language. 



> which means that if it has (as it should have) a verb in it,

> then it should have person,



Here, i assume you mean grammatical person, not requiring the message

to relate to a person.  Person, in this sense, is a linguistic feature

of sentences of many languages, not necessarily relating to a feature

of the meaning being discussed.



Disagree - I think he means the interpretER, not the declension and
conjugation sort of person.  The syntactic parts are for convenience of
information transfer to a DIFFERENT interpretER who may have a totally
different view of the same sentence in her own interpretation. 



> number and tense specified among others to make sense.



Similarly number, tense, gender and other linguistic features are

allowed or required by different languages "to make sense".  Such

features may or may not relate to a feature of the meaning being

discussed and might or might not be expressed in the knowledge base

using the ontology.



"Do you want fries with that?"

"No."



There are no verbs in the second "sentence", no person, number, tense,
gender or "other linguistic features", but it makes perfect sense to
customers who drive through a fast food window lane millions of times per
day. 



> Or in other words "Media is the message" is interpreted as

> The message is instruction - in my translation.



I find this interpretation curious and don't understand how it

relates to your above statements.



I think the difference is in acknowledging the subjectivity and inherent
limits on formalizing language.  John Sowa has explained a lot about how
language and logic are not fully integratable in the distant past on this
list.  Now might be a time to bring this information out again, so we can
look at the Peircean view of logic and language in more depth.



> Regards, Ferenc





=============================================================

doug foxvog    doug@xxxxxxxxxx  http://ProgressiveAustin.org



"I speak as an American to the leaders of my own nation. The great

initiative in this war is ours. The initiative to stop it must be ours."

    - Dr. Martin Luther King Jr.

=============================================================



I was at college in Atlanta when King was killed in Tennessee.  We would
listen to his sermons from Ebenezer Baptist Church whenever they were
broadcast locally.  He was a very, very subjective person and the world is a
better place for it. He didn't subscribe the logic of his day, and he made
some amazing changes in society by clearly convincing people that he was
correct in his moral interpretation of events. 



HTH,

-Rich



=============================================================

doug foxvog    doug@xxxxxxxxxx  http://ProgressiveAustin.org



"I speak as an American to the leaders of my own nation. The great

initiative in this war is ours. The initiative to stop it must be ours."

    - Dr. Martin Luther King Jr.

=============================================================





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Message: 3
Date: Sun, 19 Sep 2010 14:03:39 -0700
From: "Rich Cooper" <rich@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Subject: Re: [ontolog-forum] PROF Swartz ON DEFINITIONS
To: "'[ontolog-forum] '" <ontolog-forum@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Message-ID: <20100919210346.6212F138D20@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"

Hi Alex,



The term "ancestor" in English means ALL those people who made babies in
closure sequence that led to the subject x's birth by parents y1 and y2, so
the "smallest" ancestor would only give those responses that are equally
small - y1 and y2. 



For example, our ancestors may go all the way back to most of Turkana Boy's
ancestors two million years ago, so as an upper limit, 2^N ancestors for N
generations (but there was also interbreeding, so the actual number must be
way less than 2^N by a large factor) over long terms. 



But I am not really certain I comprehend the point you are trying to make.
Perhaps you can use Parent(x,y) and Ancestor(x,y) instead of R(x,y) and
R_(x,y).  The symbols are construed by the interpretER (me in this case)
possibly differently than you meant them. 



-Rich



Sincerely,

Rich Cooper

EnglishLogicKernel.com

Rich AT EnglishLogicKernel DOT com

9 4 9 \ 5 2 5 - 5 7 1 2

  _____ 

From: ontolog-forum-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
[mailto:ontolog-forum-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx] On Behalf Of Alex Shkotin
Sent: Saturday, September 18, 2010 11:07 PM
To: [ontolog-forum]
Subject: Re: [ontolog-forum] PROF Swartz ON DEFINITIONS



Hi Rich,

It seems that in FOL we do not have a definition at all:

suppose we have binary predicate R (primary or defined) and we introduce new
predicate R_ and two axioms with it:

"R(x,y) hence R_(x,y)"

and

"R_(x,z) and R(z,y) hence R_(x,y)"



We can't say that we have definition for R_ as we need to add "the
smallest..." as for transitive closure
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transitive_closure).

What do you think?

Alex



2010/9/18 Rich Cooper <rich@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>

Ferenc,



How about



If    _x is an ancestor of _z

And _z is the father of _y

Or  _z is the mother of _y

Then _x is an ancestor of _y. 



The basis relations include:

_ is the father of _

_ is the mother of _



And the term defined with recursion, is

_ is an ancestor of _



Each expansion of the Horne clause during the query must be instantiated
with some variable or constant in order to continue expanding the search
backward.  If at any point, the database runs out of father and mother
facts, then recursion stops.  But that fact doesn't show up in FOL as
clearly as in the software function that interprets it, and which must
specifically figure out how to stop the recursion when there is no more
fodder for the query. 



-Rich



Sincerely,

Rich Cooper

EnglishLogicKernel.com

Rich AT EnglishLogicKernel DOT com

9 4 9 \ 5 2 5 - 5 7 1 2

  _____ 

From: ontolog-forum-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
[mailto:ontolog-forum-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx] On Behalf Of FERENC KOVACS
Sent: Saturday, September 18, 2010 8:17 AM
To: ontolog-forum@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Subject: [ontolog-forum] PROF Swartz ON DEFINITIONS



IN THE SAME DOCUMENT

Recursive Definitions
(Advanced material) By a "direct ancestor" we mean one's "parents,
grandparents, great-grandparents, etc." More formally, we might write:

"x is a direct ancestor of y" =df "x is a parent of y; or x is a parent of a
parent of y; or x is a parent of a parent of a parent of y; etc."



My comments: is it not the referent that the definition is about?C ompare
with the statement in the front above: quote



For example, the term, "pain", is defined, but pain itself is not defined.
We define only terms, never their referents. end of quote



Ferenc



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Message: 4
Date: Sun, 19 Sep 2010 23:58:49 +0000 (GMT)
From: FERENC KOVACS <f.kovacs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Subject: [ontolog-forum] language vs logic - ambiguity and starting
    with    definitions
To: ontolog-forum@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Message-ID: <18725.13869.qm@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"

Rich,
I am only commenting points that I believe are related to my points.

There are two ways to go.  You can believe  you ALREADY know truth and start
with classes to build instantiated objects, or  you can start with objects, and
group them into classes so that the objects and  classes can be validated.


Ferenc:
In the beginning (and for the rest of your life) you have not idea of what truth
is. You may know however what existence is through using your senses, including
your common sense. By practicing your common sense you will find out something
in terms of knowledge before you can speak. When you know how to speak you
follow a fast process to select from your (acquired) repertory of a NLs to share
something (to give an account of) with your partner who as a unit determine your
wording to complete a communication act the quality of which is judged by mutual
understanding.This is at the same time a process of earning about the world, and
if we are lucky it is a dialogue or dialectics as it were, a fairly disciplined
course of exchanging ideas while checking everything left unclear or incomplete,
unproven, etc.
When you first have an encounter with something (let us call it an object) you
first check out if you know it and if it exists (or real). If you do not know
it, you have got to learn about it. By doing so, you have some automatisms, such
as seeing an object in terms of form and content. If you can visually define the
object as a whole, then you recognize its form, if you cannot, you recognize its
content.
Knowing its content is knowing a property, ultimately and if nothing else can be
inferred, this property is existence (in this form a shorthand, in proper  word
class is existing, existed)

You also and immediately also see this new thingie in terms of it being specific
and generic.If you see it for the first time, it is specific (to you), but you
also automatically assume that whatever that is, the next one will be the same
or similar, in other words you expect a class to emerge later.
Now to be able to remember this encounter later, you must verbally identify the
thingie by using the name giving techniques and procedures available to you in
that environment.  I do not want to expand on that.


IMHO, the second way is far superior, and certainly  more realistic in most
practical applications.  Assuming you know everything  about the classes to
begin with is very misleading and causes you to find  exactly what you imagined
instead of exactly what is there.  That is the way  human infants seem to
learn. 



Ferenc:
So as a result of an encounter you will have a form defined in terms of a name
and in terms of a mental replica of some sort of the physical thingie. The
content of this form is an incomplete list of properties staring with the most
generic existence and any other you ma be able to abstract, experience,
discover, etc. in other words relations and mental operations suggested by the
verbs listed above as an example.


Why should a set of axioms, though usually small  enough in number to
conveniently support a theory, be expected to correctly  enumerate the details
unless the topic is some abstruse, but utterly simle  mathematical theory. 



I  do not feel compelled to do that. I have not even dealt with another template
called quality and quantity.And I am going to skip that for the sake of brevity.
(No to mention the mental activity of counting.)


I prefer a realistic appraisal of reality that ends up in  a math model, as
compared to starting with a math model that ends up missing  reality and being
unable to prove or disprove the objects' memberships.



I believe you.In fact I endorse you.

I'm not sure what you mean by  an ontology exploding.  Do you mean
deriving all statements which  are derivable from the initial statements
in the  ontology?
FK: NO

If so, i would suggest that  this "explosion" could be carried out by
formal logical operations --  they wouldn't need to be mental operations.

FK Negative. My suggestion is something else

So long as the formal logical operations  are not confused with the reality of
objects actually experienced.  Yet again,  the theory is only approximate, and
was chosen by someone with limited personal  experience in most cases.  With the
learning curve (see the book "Bionomics"),  every doubling of experience leads
to about a twenty percent improvement in  efficacy. 


You read loud and clear

Jill threw a fit and jumped up on the lawn  chair when she saw the toad cross
the road toward her.  Examples abound in  common corpora, so why axiomatize
everything at the beginning when you can take  into account the actual usage of
the language, which is dependent on so many  factors - the speaker, her cultural
background, her experiences, goals, values,  perceptions, and all those things
that are NOT axiomatizable in realistic  practice

Ferenc:
Yes, you are right. Why? I did not suggest that.

I think that is Ferenc's point - logic is  not enough to explain language use. 
More is needed.  (Ferenc, correct me if my  assumption is not what you meant.) 


Absolulety agreed

 
Why can't a message tell merely  a portion of a fact, instead of being
complete?

I have to agree with Doug on this one.  Many statements only make partial
sense, and some make no sense at all.  So  interpretation is a very subjective
process that, IMHO, may not even be possible  to formulate without great loss of
information compared to the glorious  ambiguity of language.

Ferenc

I am not interested in any statement meant or suitable to fool you, deceive you,
etc. including so called facts of science or ?ogic for that matter.
Interpretation is subjective, that is a fact of life. What we can do is have a
dialogue and using the same framework for interpretation. The closer we are in
time and space the higher chance we experience similar things and interpret them
similarly enough to come to an agreement, especially when w have a method or
tool to guide us through such process of negotiating.If we are not lucky, we
need to use translators, such as me :-))

"Do you want fries with  that?"
"No."

There are no verbs in the second  "sentence", no person, number, tense, gender
or "other linguistic features", but  it makes perfect sense to customers who
drive through a fast food window lane  millions of times per day. 



Ferenc: Yes, because context and the length or type of message are in reverse
proportion.You are familiar with elypsis too, I guess.. 




I think the difference is in acknowledging  the subjectivity and inherent limits
on formalizing language.  John Sowa has  explained a lot about how language and
logic are not fully integratable in the  distant past on this list.  Now might
be a time to bring this information out  again, so we can look at the Peircean
view of logic and language in more  depth.

Ferenc

My points are NOT about formalizing languages, but showing a different sort of
semantic analysis with a different set of core ontology categories.

Thanks a lot!!!!

Ferenc
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