To: | ontolog-forum@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx |
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From: | Bruno Frandemiche <bruno.frandemiche@xxxxxxxx> |
Date: | Mon, 20 Sep 2010 12:23:41 +0000 (GMT) |
Message-id: | <129209.58263.qm@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> |
hello (sorry for my very bad english)
object,propriété,relation=no
holon,aspect,enaction=yes
enaction=lot of relations(pro-action,action,reaction,retroaction,reretroaction with meta,metameta,and metametameta)(relation=verb=action="" is fractal by definition)
aspect=domain of enaction(domain=group=catégorie=part)
holon=knot of aspect(the sum of part is more than the part)(knot is made by endo-relation)(endo ~ auto)
finally in e-Matrix(my personnal project) all are(shall) made of relation
comments and critics are welcome bruno
De : "ontolog-forum-request@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx" <ontolog-forum-request@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> À : ontolog-forum@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx Envoyé le : Lun 20 septembre 2010, 1h 59min 13s Objet : ontolog-forum Digest, Vol 93, Issue 33 Send ontolog-forum mailing list submissions to ontolog-forum@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit http://ontolog.cim3.net/mailman/listinfo/ontolog-forum or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to ontolog-forum-request@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx You can reach the person managing the list at ontolog-forum-owner@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific than "Re: Contents of ontolog-forum digest..." Today's Topics: 1. Re: Sustainability (David Eddy) 2. Re: language vs logic - ambiguity and startingwithdefinitions (Rich Cooper) 3. Re: PROF Swartz ON DEFINITIONS (Rich Cooper) 4. language vs logic - ambiguity and starting with definitions (FERENC KOVACS) ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Message: 1 Date: Sun, 19 Sep 2010 13:43:21 -0400 From: David Eddy <deddy@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> Subject: Re: [ontolog-forum] Sustainability To: "[ontolog-forum] " <ontolog-forum@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> Message-ID: <BA4FB17D-F15B-4F0E-B1BF-4579D8088937@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII; delsp=yes; format=flowed John - On Sep 18, 2010, at 11:11 PM, John F. Sowa wrote: > The critical innovation was to use NLP technology to analyze all > the documentation and relate it to the previously analyzed code. > But most software tools rarely use NLP technology. Running existing documentation thru NLP is indeed a novel approach. I can imagine all sorts of useful stuff bubbling to the surface. Must confess that my going in assumption would be that the source code & data would be the only useful, accurate reflection for what the system is doing... & that whatever documentation might be found would be woefully out-of-date. ___________________ David Eddy deddy@xxxxxxxxxxxxx 781-455-0949 ------------------------------ Message: 2 Date: Sun, 19 Sep 2010 13:55:53 -0700 From: "Rich Cooper" <rich@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> Subject: Re: [ontolog-forum] language vs logic - ambiguity and startingwithdefinitions To: <doug@xxxxxxxxxx>, "'[ontolog-forum] '" <ontolog-forum@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> Message-ID: <20100919205601.423C3138CD4@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="windows-1256" Hi Doug, Ferenc, This is an interesting thread. My comments are below: -Rich Sincerely, Rich Cooper EnglishLogicKernel.com Rich AT EnglishLogicKernel DOT com 9 4 9 \ 5 2 5 - 5 7 1 2 -----Original Message----- From: ontolog-forum-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx [mailto:ontolog-forum-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx] On Behalf Of doug foxvog Sent: Saturday, September 18, 2010 10:26 PM To: [ontolog-forum] ct Subject: Re: [ontolog-forum] language vs logic - ambiguity and startingwithdefinitions On Sat, September 18, 2010 6:16, FERENC KOVACS said: > I believe that core ontology concepts are objects, properties and > relations. I suppose you mean classes of objects. Is the distinction between properties and relations that properties relate objects to datatypes while relations relate multiple objects or have more than two arguments? There are two ways to go. You can believe you ALREADY know truth and start with classes to build instantiated objects, or you can start with objects, and group them into classes so that the objects and classes can be validated. IMHO, the second way is far superior, and certainly more realistic in most practical applications. Assuming you know everything about the classes to begin with is very misleading and causes you to find exactly what you imagined instead of exactly what is there. That is the way human infants seem to learn. Why should a set of axioms, though usually small enough in number to conveniently support a theory, be expected to correctly enumerate the details unless the topic is some abstruse, but utterly simle mathematical theory. I prefer a realistic appraisal of reality that ends up in a math model, as compared to starting with a math model that ends up missing reality and being unable to prove or disprove the objects' memberships. This sounds fine to me, so long as the concept of object needs not be physical and can include events and situations. Personally, i don't see the need for distinguishing properties and relations in an ontology, although many ontology languages do make that distinction. This seems a language-dependent distinction to me. Agreed, but that is the way convention has proceeded in math logic. Is there a compelling reason to not distinguish between properties and relations? The arity is, as you suggest, the only difference between properties and relations by established convention. > In fact, the intitial state Are you referring to the initial state of an ontology in the process of creation? Or are you referring to the state of a reference ontology whose terms are used to make statements in a knowledge base with no additional definitional statements? Consider the initial state of the self generating explosion Ferenc is referring to. The initial state is whatever is needed to hold the axioms, and the added state is the automatically generated (unrealistic in many cases) set of objects generated from the theory. Again, predefining terms seems like putting the cart before the horse. Why assume a Poisson distribution (or pick another one) instead of using the actual empirical data that we get so much of with current technology? > is an object which is a unity of them and it is > exploded through a number of mental operations. (Examles wanted?) I'm not sure what you mean by an ontology exploding. Do you mean deriving all statements which are derivable from the initial statements in the ontology? If so, i would suggest that this "explosion" could be carried out by formal logical operations -- they wouldn't need to be mental operations. So long as the formal logical operations are not confused with the reality of objects actually experienced. Yet again, the theory is only approximate, and was chosen by someone with limited personal experience in most cases. With the learning curve (see the book "Bionomics"), every doubling of experience leads to about a twenty percent improvement in efficacy. > With the help > of these categories I can semantically analyze natural langauges and > create an ontology that integrates the currently different domains. > In this approach > axioms and the concept of events are not of primary interest, because > verbs are seen as the representations of relations This is not necessarily the best way to model verbs. In languages which use verbs like English does, a verb indicates the occurrence of either a situation or an event, with subject, direct object, indirect object, and prepositional phrases indicating relations between the event and event participants. Features of the events/situations can certainly be modeled by relations that ignore the events themselves, but this would require multiple relations to be defined for each verb depending upon what other phrases happen to be in the sentence. Using this technique makes it difficult to add more information about the same event and requires multiple rules to inter-relate the multiple relations that represent the same verb. Jill threw the chair. Jill threw me the chair. Jill threw the chair through the window. Jill threw the chair yesterday. Jill threw the chair to kill the toad. Jill probably threw the chair at the toad. Jill threw a fit and jumped up on the lawn chair when she saw the toad cross the road toward her. Examples abound in common corpora, so why axiomatize everything at the beginning when you can take into account the actual usage of the language, which is dependent on so many factors - the speaker, her cultural background, her experiences, goals, values, perceptions, and all those things that are NOT axiomatizable in realistic practice. IMHO, the verb "threw" represents a different relation in each of these, but each use can unambiguously represent a throwing event, with multiple relations to generate depending upon the other parts of the sentence. > (hence not limited to Boolean operators). Why wouldn't the relations have Boolean truth values? Is the point to allow for probability descriptors? Probabilities, fuzziness, certainty, value, cost, goals, suppositions, there are a never ending set of value types associated with common statements. Why limit them to Booleans? Math logic has always done so, but even the Boolean case results in true theorems that can't be proved and false theorems that can't be disproved (Godel again). > Therefore the issuse of disambiguation as for dictionaries is a > futile exercise, as the defintions used are sometimes incomplete and Many dictionary definitions are certainly incomplete, but that does not mean that they do not may (MAKE?) true statements constraining the meaning of the thing they define. But are the constraints VALID? > irrelevant in semantic terms, I have not seen this. > this is why you cannot "merge" them (should try to integrate > them instead) as they are not in compatible forms (content) If you are referring to multiple definitions from the same source, they shouldn't be merged because they are describing different denotations of the word. Each definition should denote a different concept. It?s a rare occurrence when a concept has only one definition or a definition designates only one concept. Consider the many-to-many mapping of words to synsets in WN+VN. If you are referring to multiple definitions from different sources, integrating multiple definitions of the same meaning of a word is certainly appropriate. However, sometimes such integration can be handled by merging. > and they are not modular either. > You must accept that such a new ontology should be dynamic as > many of you already suspect. If the ontology is used to interpret NL text in an open area, the ontology would be incomplete and should dynamically be expanded. If the ontology is to be used to express the information in a data base that has been in constant use for years, dynamaticity is not so crucial. Databases in constant use constantly uncover situations which cannot be handled within the database without expanding it. >> In math logic domain there is a kind of definition - an abbreviation when >> they introduce new symbol saying for example: >> definition >> t???s denotes t<s or t=s > In my "semantic analysis" this is formalization, a mental operation of the > relation between two objects as indicated. This formalization/definition is a logical operation between two expressions (one of which is a disjunction, I suppose the expressions could be called objects. Expressions are not objects - the interpreters we build postulate imaginary objects to fit the theories, but they often miss the valid realities especially in language use. > The commonsense transcript is that an > object (to be specified, otherwise it does not make sense) is smaller than > another object after comparison and a few other operations also required > to arrive at that result in formalization. You are stepping beyond the definition as given, to interpret what the definition means. This is intentionally moving beyond logic. I think that is Ferenc's point - logic is not enough to explain language use. More is needed. (Ferenc, correct me if my assumption is not what you meant.) > In doing this I used the mental > operation called interpretation, the reverse of formalization. > For any message (statement) to make sense it is necessary to be complete, Why can't a message tell merely a portion of a fact, instead of being complete? I have to agree with Doug on this one. Many statements only make partial sense, and some make no sense at all. So interpretation is a very subjective process that, IMHO, may not even be possible to formulate without great loss of information compared to the glorious ambiguity of language. > which means that if it has (as it should have) a verb in it, > then it should have person, Here, i assume you mean grammatical person, not requiring the message to relate to a person. Person, in this sense, is a linguistic feature of sentences of many languages, not necessarily relating to a feature of the meaning being discussed. Disagree - I think he means the interpretER, not the declension and conjugation sort of person. The syntactic parts are for convenience of information transfer to a DIFFERENT interpretER who may have a totally different view of the same sentence in her own interpretation. > number and tense specified among others to make sense. Similarly number, tense, gender and other linguistic features are allowed or required by different languages "to make sense". Such features may or may not relate to a feature of the meaning being discussed and might or might not be expressed in the knowledge base using the ontology. "Do you want fries with that?" "No." There are no verbs in the second "sentence", no person, number, tense, gender or "other linguistic features", but it makes perfect sense to customers who drive through a fast food window lane millions of times per day. > Or in other words "Media is the message" is interpreted as > The message is instruction - in my translation. I find this interpretation curious and don't understand how it relates to your above statements. I think the difference is in acknowledging the subjectivity and inherent limits on formalizing language. John Sowa has explained a lot about how language and logic are not fully integratable in the distant past on this list. Now might be a time to bring this information out again, so we can look at the Peircean view of logic and language in more depth. > Regards, Ferenc ============================================================= doug foxvog doug@xxxxxxxxxx http://ProgressiveAustin.org "I speak as an American to the leaders of my own nation. The great initiative in this war is ours. The initiative to stop it must be ours." - Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. ============================================================= I was at college in Atlanta when King was killed in Tennessee. We would listen to his sermons from Ebenezer Baptist Church whenever they were broadcast locally. He was a very, very subjective person and the world is a better place for it. He didn't subscribe the logic of his day, and he made some amazing changes in society by clearly convincing people that he was correct in his moral interpretation of events. HTH, -Rich ============================================================= doug foxvog doug@xxxxxxxxxx http://ProgressiveAustin.org "I speak as an American to the leaders of my own nation. The great initiative in this war is ours. The initiative to stop it must be ours." - Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. ============================================================= _________________________________________________________________ Message Archives: http://ontolog.cim3.net/forum/ontolog-forum/ Config Subscr: http://ontolog.cim3.net/mailman/listinfo/ontolog-forum/ Unsubscribe: mailto:ontolog-forum-leave@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx Shared Files: http://ontolog.cim3.net/file/ Community Wiki: http://ontolog.cim3.net/wiki/ To join: http://ontolog.cim3.net/cgi-bin/wiki.pl?WikiHomePage#nid1J To Post: mailto:ontolog-forum@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: http://ontolog.cim3.net/forum/ontolog-forum/attachments/20100919/00666619/attachment.html ------------------------------ Message: 3 Date: Sun, 19 Sep 2010 14:03:39 -0700 From: "Rich Cooper" <rich@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> Subject: Re: [ontolog-forum] PROF Swartz ON DEFINITIONS To: "'[ontolog-forum] '" <ontolog-forum@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> Message-ID: <20100919210346.6212F138D20@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Hi Alex, The term "ancestor" in English means ALL those people who made babies in closure sequence that led to the subject x's birth by parents y1 and y2, so the "smallest" ancestor would only give those responses that are equally small - y1 and y2. For example, our ancestors may go all the way back to most of Turkana Boy's ancestors two million years ago, so as an upper limit, 2^N ancestors for N generations (but there was also interbreeding, so the actual number must be way less than 2^N by a large factor) over long terms. But I am not really certain I comprehend the point you are trying to make. Perhaps you can use Parent(x,y) and Ancestor(x,y) instead of R(x,y) and R_(x,y). The symbols are construed by the interpretER (me in this case) possibly differently than you meant them. -Rich Sincerely, Rich Cooper EnglishLogicKernel.com Rich AT EnglishLogicKernel DOT com 9 4 9 \ 5 2 5 - 5 7 1 2 _____ From: ontolog-forum-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx [mailto:ontolog-forum-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx] On Behalf Of Alex Shkotin Sent: Saturday, September 18, 2010 11:07 PM To: [ontolog-forum] Subject: Re: [ontolog-forum] PROF Swartz ON DEFINITIONS Hi Rich, It seems that in FOL we do not have a definition at all: suppose we have binary predicate R (primary or defined) and we introduce new predicate R_ and two axioms with it: "R(x,y) hence R_(x,y)" and "R_(x,z) and R(z,y) hence R_(x,y)" We can't say that we have definition for R_ as we need to add "the smallest..." as for transitive closure (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transitive_closure). What do you think? Alex 2010/9/18 Rich Cooper <rich@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> Ferenc, How about If _x is an ancestor of _z And _z is the father of _y Or _z is the mother of _y Then _x is an ancestor of _y. The basis relations include: _ is the father of _ _ is the mother of _ And the term defined with recursion, is _ is an ancestor of _ Each expansion of the Horne clause during the query must be instantiated with some variable or constant in order to continue expanding the search backward. If at any point, the database runs out of father and mother facts, then recursion stops. But that fact doesn't show up in FOL as clearly as in the software function that interprets it, and which must specifically figure out how to stop the recursion when there is no more fodder for the query. -Rich Sincerely, Rich Cooper EnglishLogicKernel.com Rich AT EnglishLogicKernel DOT com 9 4 9 \ 5 2 5 - 5 7 1 2 _____ From: ontolog-forum-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx [mailto:ontolog-forum-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx] On Behalf Of FERENC KOVACS Sent: Saturday, September 18, 2010 8:17 AM To: ontolog-forum@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx Subject: [ontolog-forum] PROF Swartz ON DEFINITIONS IN THE SAME DOCUMENT Recursive Definitions (Advanced material) By a "direct ancestor" we mean one's "parents, grandparents, great-grandparents, etc." More formally, we might write: "x is a direct ancestor of y" =df "x is a parent of y; or x is a parent of a parent of y; or x is a parent of a parent of a parent of y; etc." My comments: is it not the referent that the definition is about?C ompare with the statement in the front above: quote For example, the term, "pain", is defined, but pain itself is not defined. We define only terms, never their referents. end of quote Ferenc _________________________________________________________________ Message Archives: http://ontolog.cim3.net/forum/ontolog-forum/ Config Subscr: http://ontolog.cim3.net/mailman/listinfo/ontolog-forum/ Unsubscribe: mailto:ontolog-forum-leave@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx Shared Files: http://ontolog.cim3.net/file/ Community Wiki: http://ontolog.cim3.net/wiki/ To join: http://ontolog.cim3.net/cgi-bin/wiki.pl?WikiHomePage#nid1J To Post: mailto:ontolog-forum@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: http://ontolog.cim3.net/forum/ontolog-forum/attachments/20100919/72d3d4b3/attachment.html ------------------------------ Message: 4 Date: Sun, 19 Sep 2010 23:58:49 +0000 (GMT) From: FERENC KOVACS <f.kovacs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx> Subject: [ontolog-forum] language vs logic - ambiguity and starting with definitions To: ontolog-forum@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx Message-ID: <18725.13869.qm@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" Rich, I am only commenting points that I believe are related to my points. There are two ways to go. You can believe you ALREADY know truth and start with classes to build instantiated objects, or you can start with objects, and group them into classes so that the objects and classes can be validated. Ferenc: In the beginning (and for the rest of your life) you have not idea of what truth is. You may know however what existence is through using your senses, including your common sense. By practicing your common sense you will find out something in terms of knowledge before you can speak. When you know how to speak you follow a fast process to select from your (acquired) repertory of a NLs to share something (to give an account of) with your partner who as a unit determine your wording to complete a communication act the quality of which is judged by mutual understanding.This is at the same time a process of earning about the world, and if we are lucky it is a dialogue or dialectics as it were, a fairly disciplined course of exchanging ideas while checking everything left unclear or incomplete, unproven, etc. When you first have an encounter with something (let us call it an object) you first check out if you know it and if it exists (or real). If you do not know it, you have got to learn about it. By doing so, you have some automatisms, such as seeing an object in terms of form and content. If you can visually define the object as a whole, then you recognize its form, if you cannot, you recognize its content. Knowing its content is knowing a property, ultimately and if nothing else can be inferred, this property is existence (in this form a shorthand, in proper word class is existing, existed) You also and immediately also see this new thingie in terms of it being specific and generic.If you see it for the first time, it is specific (to you), but you also automatically assume that whatever that is, the next one will be the same or similar, in other words you expect a class to emerge later. Now to be able to remember this encounter later, you must verbally identify the thingie by using the name giving techniques and procedures available to you in that environment. I do not want to expand on that. IMHO, the second way is far superior, and certainly more realistic in most practical applications. Assuming you know everything about the classes to begin with is very misleading and causes you to find exactly what you imagined instead of exactly what is there. That is the way human infants seem to learn. Ferenc: So as a result of an encounter you will have a form defined in terms of a name and in terms of a mental replica of some sort of the physical thingie. The content of this form is an incomplete list of properties staring with the most generic existence and any other you ma be able to abstract, experience, discover, etc. in other words relations and mental operations suggested by the verbs listed above as an example. Why should a set of axioms, though usually small enough in number to conveniently support a theory, be expected to correctly enumerate the details unless the topic is some abstruse, but utterly simle mathematical theory. I do not feel compelled to do that. I have not even dealt with another template called quality and quantity.And I am going to skip that for the sake of brevity. (No to mention the mental activity of counting.) I prefer a realistic appraisal of reality that ends up in a math model, as compared to starting with a math model that ends up missing reality and being unable to prove or disprove the objects' memberships. I believe you.In fact I endorse you. I'm not sure what you mean by an ontology exploding. Do you mean deriving all statements which are derivable from the initial statements in the ontology? FK: NO If so, i would suggest that this "explosion" could be carried out by formal logical operations -- they wouldn't need to be mental operations. FK Negative. My suggestion is something else So long as the formal logical operations are not confused with the reality of objects actually experienced. Yet again, the theory is only approximate, and was chosen by someone with limited personal experience in most cases. With the learning curve (see the book "Bionomics"), every doubling of experience leads to about a twenty percent improvement in efficacy. You read loud and clear Jill threw a fit and jumped up on the lawn chair when she saw the toad cross the road toward her. Examples abound in common corpora, so why axiomatize everything at the beginning when you can take into account the actual usage of the language, which is dependent on so many factors - the speaker, her cultural background, her experiences, goals, values, perceptions, and all those things that are NOT axiomatizable in realistic practice Ferenc: Yes, you are right. Why? I did not suggest that. I think that is Ferenc's point - logic is not enough to explain language use. More is needed. (Ferenc, correct me if my assumption is not what you meant.) Absolulety agreed Why can't a message tell merely a portion of a fact, instead of being complete? I have to agree with Doug on this one. Many statements only make partial sense, and some make no sense at all. So interpretation is a very subjective process that, IMHO, may not even be possible to formulate without great loss of information compared to the glorious ambiguity of language. Ferenc I am not interested in any statement meant or suitable to fool you, deceive you, etc. including so called facts of science or ?ogic for that matter. Interpretation is subjective, that is a fact of life. What we can do is have a dialogue and using the same framework for interpretation. The closer we are in time and space the higher chance we experience similar things and interpret them similarly enough to come to an agreement, especially when w have a method or tool to guide us through such process of negotiating.If we are not lucky, we need to use translators, such as me :-)) "Do you want fries with that?" "No." There are no verbs in the second "sentence", no person, number, tense, gender or "other linguistic features", but it makes perfect sense to customers who drive through a fast food window lane millions of times per day. Ferenc: Yes, because context and the length or type of message are in reverse proportion.You are familiar with elypsis too, I guess.. I think the difference is in acknowledging the subjectivity and inherent limits on formalizing language. John Sowa has explained a lot about how language and logic are not fully integratable in the distant past on this list. Now might be a time to bring this information out again, so we can look at the Peircean view of logic and language in more depth. Ferenc My points are NOT about formalizing languages, but showing a different sort of semantic analysis with a different set of core ontology categories. Thanks a lot!!!! Ferenc -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... 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