Jon Awbrey schrieb:
> BS = Barry Smith
> HS = Henry Story
> IJ = Ingvar Johansson
> JA = Jon Awbrey
> I wanted to continue replying to one of your previous messages,
> but 2 or 3 tries at doing that led me to believe that I should
> review the way that "correspondence theories of truth" came up
> in our discussions here.
After having read everything you say below, I think I have a piece of
information that might be enlightening. There are at least two very
different ways of looking at truth - while adhering to the
correspondence theory of truth. If they are not separated, then serious
misunderstandings easily arise; I know from hard-won experience. Here
comes the two views: (02)
1. The Fregean view that when a statement is true it corresponds to the
truthvalue Truth. Here, it becomes natural to say: 'the good for logic
is truth'. (03)
2. The view (mine) that when a statement is true it corresponds to an
obtaining state of affairs (fact). Here, it becomes natural to say: 'the
good for logic is valid inferences'. (04)
> Many of the participants in this forum make it their business
> to concern themselves with the relationship between realities --
> very often all too harsh realities -- and the representations
> that we form of the relevant piece of the world. As a result,
> the question often arises, expressed many ways by many voices,
> as to how realities impact -- or ought to impact -- on formal
> theories and formal models, IF those theories and models are
> to allow of "continuous quality improvement" (CQI), as one
> recent buzzword expresses it.
> For my part, I've been focused for a couple of months now on
> the questions that arose in the train of trying to answer the
> question that Barry Smith raised back around the Ides of July:
> | If we have a sentence in a biology textbook,
> | say "blood cells are non-nucleated", then
> | is this about cells in reality (as I, and
> | I guess common sense, would assume) or
> | about cells in the biology model?
> | Barry Smith,
> So we have (1) the "real world", the objective situations and things of
> our various concerns, and we have (2) a wide variety of representations
> on our "non-fiction shelves", so to speak, from the raw data of our own
> senses to the cleaned-up data in our lab archives to axiomatic theories
> and mathematical models, all of which "relate" to this world of reality.
> A very compelling question then arises:
> What is the nature of this relation?
> What is it? What ought it to be?
> Those questions bring us to the heart of logic -- What's it all about?
> One of the ways that I addressed the question of logic was in this form:
> | Peirce continues a classical line of calling logic a normative science,
> | a science of how we ought to do things of we want to achieve a certain
> | class of objectives. This makes logic, whose object is truth, akin to
> | aesthetics, whose object is beauty, pleasure, or experiential goodness,
> | and ethics, whose object is virtue, justice, or comportmental goodness.
> | What is the good of logic? The classical answer is "truth".
> | What is truth? It's a property of a sign, or a representation,
> | that makes it a good sign, a representation that is so natured
> | or so designed as to further the achievement its proper object.
> | Jon Awbrey,
> One of the ways that another interlocutor addressed the question was this:
> | Now the other way of looking at truth is that there is a relation
> | between statements and reality. That still holds. If you accept
> | as true statements that are wrong, reality will soon remind you
> | of your mistake.
> | Henry Story,
> If we think of "truth" as a design objective of our representations,
> the quality that justifies calling them "knowledge representations",
> then we must attend to our concept of truth, and try to clarify it.
> That is where definitions of "truth" as "correspondence" came in.
> Jon Awbrey
> JA: In what "frame of reference" shall I evaluate your objection?
> I tried to follow fashion by invoking analogies from physics.
> Relative to that frame of reference, I can only iterate what
> all my physics professors dinned into my skull, to wit, that
> older common sense notions of magnitude had simply ceased to
> make sense any more lacking reference to an observer's frame
> and the specified operations commonly known as "measurements"
> that are an absolute, er, relative "must" to pin operational
> definitions to the given magnitudes. That's how they taught,
> but I will refrain from echoing all the ridicule they heaped
> on former generations of deluded philosophers, prescientists,
> and especially common sense normal folks who ever languished
> in the dissociative styles of thought that dreamed otherwise.
> JA: Ingvar sought to evade the point of that analogy by shifting
> the frame of reference to everyday epistemology and ordinary
> language acceptability. The very attempt to change the fact
> by shifting the frame of reference has just proved the point.
> IJ: 1. I did not try to evade any lesson to be learnt from the
> theory of special relativity. I tried to point out the
> following. We learn (both as children and as adults)
> many concepts (everyday as well as scientific) by means
> of meeting protypical examples or performing prototypical
> actions. In case of understanding the concept of
> 'the correspondence theory of truth' there is a
> prototypcial example available: the correspondence
> or non-correspondence between ordinary perceptions
> on the one hand and statements in ordinary language
> on the other.
> IJ: 2. I think it is fair to say that "older common sense"
> implicitly had a Newtonian notion of absolute space
> and time, and that the special theory of relativity (SR)
> proved this notion to be obsolete. But this does does mean
> that SR proved either that *epistemological relativism* is true
> or that *operationalism* in the philosophy of science is true.
> What SR does mean, among other things, is (i) that each inertial
> frame of reference is just like the absolute space of Newtonian
> mechanics, and (ii) that there is a special formula (the Lorentz
> transformations) by means of which measurement values obtained in
> one inertial frame of reference can be translated into the values
> that would be obtained in another such frame. This story is
> neither a threat to a fallibilist epistemology nor to the
> correspondence theory of truth.
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