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Re: [ontolog-forum] Ontology, Information Models and the 'Real World': C

To: Ingvar Johansson <ingvar.johansson@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: "[ontolog-forum] " <ontolog-forum@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
From: Pat Hayes <phayes@xxxxxxx>
Date: Tue, 29 May 2007 15:28:13 -0700
Message-id: <p0623091fc2825804961e@[]>
>John F. Sowa schrieb:
>>  Wacek and Ken,
>>  vQ> This encourages me to ask another question:  do propositions
>>   > involve indexicals?  (Would there be proposition-indexicals?)
>>   > Does the statement 'he is wise' correspond to a (number of)
>>   > proposition(s) about a particular individual at a particular
>>   > time each, or can it correspond to a proposition which still
>>   > does not have the 'he'-part resolved?
>>  KC> I think it's hard to consider any meaning of a proposition
>>   > like that without considering that it has an intended referent
>>   > for the indexical - that is, that it refers to a particular
>>   > individual.
>>  I agree with Ken.
>So do I, but this means that there is some distinction to be made (at
>least) in relation to indexical sentences. I have once proposed that in
>relation to a sentence such as 'he is wise' one should distinguish
>between a 'sentence mening' and a 'used sentence meaning'. Only used
>sentence meanings can express propositions and have truth-values, but of
>course there is something that corresponds to a non-indexed 'he is
>wise', too. (The idea is to be found in section 1 of my paper
>"Performatives and Antiperformatives", which is linked to my home site
>section 5. However, I am not the first one to have proposed such a
>distinction. David Lewis ...    (01)

I believe one can find early echoes of it in 
Frege, and maybe even in Aristotle.    (02)

>  Propositions cannot change truth-values.    (03)

I agree. But they can be said to 'hold' in 
different contexts. There are blue roses; but if 
I believe not, then one might express this by 
saying that 'blue roses exist' - a proposition, 
which happens to be true - does not hold in my 
belief-context. One might even say that it is 
false in my belief context, bearing in mind that 
false-in-a-context has nothing much to do with 
actual truth or falsity. I can believe anything I 
want, and that does not alter the facts. So    (04)

(that (exist (x)(and (Rose x)(Color x blue)))))    (05)

can fail to hold in - be false in - my belief context, and still be true.    (06)

Pat    (07)

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