Adrian and Chris, (01)
I agree that distinguishing those three levels is useful and
that levels #1 and #3 are rarely defined precisely: (02)
AW> * Semantics1 Is (meta)data semantics, W3C-style
>
> * Semantics2 Specifies what an inferences should be made
> from any collection of rules and facts -- usually based
> on a model theory, e.g. as in [3].
>
> * Semantics3 Concerns the real world English meanings
> of logical predicates (03)
I'm also happy that Adrian and Chris agree on the use of model
theory to put #2 on a solid foundation. (04)
But I also believe that level #1 can be defined just as precisely
as #2. The foundation can also be based on ideas that Tarski
presented in his famous paper on truth in formalized languages
-- namely his stratified hierarchy of metalevels. An important
addition to Tarski's hierarchy is Dunn's semantics of laws and
facts, which I summarized in the following two papers: (05)
http://www.jfsowa.com/pubs/laws.htm
Laws, Facts, and Contexts (06)
http://www.jfsowa.com/pubs/worlds.pdf
Worlds, Models, and Descriptions (07)
The major difficulty with #3 is that there is no single "real
world meaning" for most words in English or any other natural
language. I believe that Wittgenstein's language games provide
a basis for characterizing the multiple meanings of any word: (08)
1. Almost all the words in any natural language can be used
in an open-ended number of ways (which W. called "language
games"). (09)
2. For any particular game that is sufficiently well defined,
the meanings of the words (word senses) may be used in a
sufficiently narrow way that a formal definition of each
word sense (along the same lines as #2 above) can be stated. (010)
3. For some words, all or most of the word senses for different
games may have a common generalization for which a formal
definition (as in #2) is possible. Each word sense would
then be a subtype of that generalization. (011)
4. But for some words, there is no single common generalization
that includes all the senses. In such a case, it is necessary
to distinguish several generalized word senses, each of which
could be formally defined (as in #2). (012)
I discussed these issues in the paper I presented at FOIS'06
in November: (013)
http://www.jfsowa.com/pubs/dynonto.htm
A Dynamic Theory of Ontology (014)
Following is the abstract of that paper. (015)
John
___________________________________________________________________ (016)
A Dynamic Theory of Ontology (017)
John F. Sowa (018)
Abstract. Natural languages are easy to learn by infants, they can
express any thought that any adult might ever conceive, and they
accommodate the limitations of human breathing rates and short-term
memory. The first property implies a finite vocabulary, the second
implies infinite extensibility, and the third implies a small upper
bound on the length of phrases. Together, they imply that most words in
a natural language will have an open-ended number of senses -- ambiguity
is inevitable. Peirce and Wittgenstein are two philosophers who
understood that vagueness and ambiguity are not defects in language, but
essential properties that enable it to accommodate anything and
everything that people need to say. In analyzing the ambiguities,
Wittgenstein developed his theory of language games, which allow words
to have different senses in different contexts, applications, or modes
of use. Recent developments in lexical semantics, which are remarkably
compatible with the views of Peirce and Wittgenstein, are based on the
recognition that words have an open-ended number of dynamically changing
and context-dependent microsenses. The resulting flexibility enables
natural languages to adapt to any possible subject from any perspective
for any humanly conceivable purpose. To achieve a comparable level of
flexibility with formal ontologies, this paper proposes an organization
with a dynamically evolving collection of formal theories, systematic
mappings to formal concept types and informal lexicons of natural
language terms, and a modularity that allows independent distributed
development and extension of all resources, formal and informal. (019)
_________________________________________________________________
Message Archives: http://ontolog.cim3.net/forum/ontolog-forum/
Subscribe/Config: http://ontolog.cim3.net/mailman/listinfo/ontolog-forum/
Unsubscribe: mailto:ontolog-forum-leave@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Shared Files: http://ontolog.cim3.net/file/
Community Wiki: http://ontolog.cim3.net/wiki/
To Post: mailto:ontolog-forum@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx (020)
|