Leo, (01)
I agree with that point, but I don't recommend the practice: (02)
Leo
> But it's also the case that "disposition" becomes/has become significant in
> metaphysics, and thus perhaps derivatively (or the converse) in ontology:
> perhaps the influence is mutual. (03)
And I agree that the SEP article you cited is a good summary: (04)
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/dispositions/ (05)
But note that the article is very indecisive. It describes one position
after another without finding an argument for any of them that isn't met
with a counter argument that is at least as strong or stronger. (06)
My claim is that any theory (or ontology) based on dispositions can be
replaced by a simpler and clearer one without them. For example,
start with the opening paragraph of the SEP article: (07)
SEP
> A glass has certain dispositions, for example the disposition to shatter
> when struck. But what is this disposition? It seems on the one hand to be
> a perfectly real property, a genuine respect of similarity common to
> glasses, china cups, and anything else fragile. Yet on the other hand,
> the glass's disposition seems mysterious... (08)
First, we note that glasses, china cups, etc., share some observable
properties that are very different from the properties of things that
don't shatter -- tin cups, paper cups, rubber balls... (09)
Second, there are laws of physics that predict how a sharp blow can
cause stresses that affect the structure of objects that have those
properties. One of the effects is a rapid breakdown called shattering. (010)
Note that the word 'disposition' is not needed for this explanation.
I also recommend checking a decent dictionary. From the Merriam-
Webster online, the definition of 'fragile': (011)
> 1 a : easily broken or destroyed <a fragile vase> (012)
For ontology, my recommendation is to define a monadic relation
fragile(x), and use the dictionary definition for an underspecified
ontology. If you need to go into more detail, then talk about the
structure and how it is affected by certain kinds of forces. (013)
The word 'disposition' is not helpful for either the underspecified
(dictionary) definition or the detailed axioms based on physics. (014)
Leo
> Some say dispositions introduce modal notions, but I'm not yet
> inclined to that. (015)
I agree with Michael Dunn that the semantics of all modal notions
can be defined in terms some applicable laws -- a law of nature
for physical modes or a law of some authority for deontic modes
of permission and obligation. (016)
Since I would replace dispositions with an ontology that has
axioms that express the appropriate laws, those same laws
would have a modal effect in determining what is possible
(consistent with the laws) or necessary (provable from the laws). (017)
Following is my article about Dunn's semantics and modality: (018)
http://www.jfsowa.com/pubs/worlds.pdf
Worlds, Models, and Descriptions (019)
John (020)
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