paola.dimaio@xxxxxxxxx schrieb:
> Good example!
> 'the sky is blue'
>
> haha the sky is not blue!, It just looks blue (01)
I am not completely illiterate. And I have even studied some physics. I
tried to make the point that the concept of 'truthlikeness' is
semantically coherent, and then I used some simple everyday statements.
O.K.? (02)
Ingvar (03)
>
> http://www.sciencemadesimple.com/sky_blue.html
>
> (what may seem true and something to base a set of inferences from,
> may simply be
> a matter of perspective, or optical illusion).
>
> Never take anyting for granted..
> Paola
>
>
>
>
> On 5/9/07, *Waclaw Kusnierczyk* <Waclaw.Marcin.Kusnierczyk@xxxxxxxxxxx
> <mailto:Waclaw.Marcin.Kusnierczyk@xxxxxxxxxxx>> wrote:
>
>
>
> Ingvar Johansson wrote:
> > Waclaw Kusnierczyk schrieb:
> >> Ingvar Johansson wrote:
> >>
> >>> Being a fallibilist means
> >>> to accept that a theory may be empiricially adequate for a
> time without
> >>> being completely true. I think what (reading vQ:s mail) might be
> >>> pedagogically missing in Peirce and Sowa is a concept
> advertised by
> >>> another fallibilist, Karl Popper. He verbalizes it using three
> different
> >>> expressions: 'truthlikeness', 'verisimilitude', and
> 'approximation to
> >>> truth'. Theories are not just either true or false; truth can take
> >>> degrees. And very very much tells in favor of the view that most
> >>> empirically adequate theories have a rather high degree of
> truthlikeness.
> >>>
> >> i am not sure how much to like the 'partially true' and 'truth
> can take
> >> degrees' parts.
> >>
> >> clearly, if we think of a theory as of a set of statements, the
> theory
> >> is partially true if there is a subset of it with every
> statement being
> >> true. (every theory is partially true, since every theory
> includes the
> >> empty theory, which is vacuously true.)
> >>
> >
> > This is *not* what I mean. The intuition behind the notion of
> > 'truthlikeness' can be explained in the following way.
> >
> > Assume that the statement (1) "The sun is shining from a
> completely blue
> > sky" is simply true. Look then at the statements (2) "It is somewhat
> > cloudy" and (3) "It is raining". I would in this situation say
> that (2)
> > is *more truthlike* than (3).
> >
> > Another case. Assume that the statement (1') "There are four blood
> > groups plus the Rh factor" is simply true. Look then at the
> statements
> > (2') "There are four blood groups" and (3') "All blood has the same
> > chemical composition". I would in this situation sa that (2') is
> *more
> > truthlike* than (3').
> >
> > The fact that we can never know with *absolute certainty* that
> (1) and
> > (1') are true does not make the notion of 'truthlikeness'
> semantically
> > incoherent.
> >
>
> I would think that, irrespectively of (1) being true or false (in the
> sense of its correctly describing the state of the matters, as in some
> flavour of the correspondence theory of truth), any of (2) and (3) is
> either true or false. Their truthlikeness is not really a measure of
> how much they are true, but rather of how much we certain that
> they (or
> the initial assumption) are or are not true.
>
> If we assume that (1) is simply (?) true, then both (2) and (3)
> must be
> (simply?) false to us. That (2) appears more truthlike than (3)
> to you
> reflects your uncertainty about how accurate (1) is. (Not 'how
> true (1)
> is'.)
>
> If I am sure that (1) is true, then (2) and (3) are equally
> truthlike to
> me, in that I am sure that both (2) and (3) are false. This is of
> course completely irrespective of whether any of (1), (2), (3) is
> true.
>
> But if I have any doubt in (1), then (2) and (3) should appear at
> least
> plausible to me. And, as far as my experience reaches, the situations
> in which it is raining are only some of the situations in which it is
> cloudy, and all situations in which it is raining are situations in
> which it is cloudy (leave exceptions aside). So yes, (2) appears more
> truthlike than (3) to me, but this is only in virtue of my doubt about
> (1)s truth, and irrespectively of the truth; either (1) or (2) are
> true, but not both, and none of them is 'partially true'.
>
> Another thing is how likely it is that, given that the sky is
> completely
> blue, it won't be completely blue in a few moments. So you could say
> that, given (1) is true, it is more likely that (2) will soon be true
> than it is for (3). I would expect that becomes cloudy before it
> begins
> to rain, and that it may get cloudy and not raining, but not the other
> way round. So, given (1), (2) is more truthlikely to me; but still,
> either (1) or (2) is true now, and either (1) or (2) will be true
> later.
>
> Given a statement s, we should keep separate the truthness of s (s is
> either true or not) and our confidence in that s is true (here you
> may
> have degrees). I agree that talking about truthlikeness may be very
> useful, but it is not talking about truth.
>
> (In the case of (1') and the rest, I would rather subscribe to (3').)
>
> vQ
>
>
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>
>
> --
> Paola Di Maio****
>
>
> Lecturer and Researcher
> School of Information Technology
> Mae Fah Luang University
> Chiang Rai
> Thailand
> *********************************************
> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
>
>
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> (04)
--
Ingvar Johansson
IFOMIS, Saarland University
home site: http://ifomis.org/
personal home site:
http://hem.passagen.se/ijohansson/index.html (05)
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